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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich mit den Determinanten systemischer In-
novationen allgemein und mit den Einflussfaktoren auf Kooperationen im Bere-
ich der Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) im Speziellen. Basierend auf dem
Konzept des ressourcenbasierten Ansatzes der Unternehmen (zuru¨ckgehend auf
Penrose 1959) wird die Aneignung von externen (technologischen) Wissen als ein
Hauptmotiv fu¨r Unternehmen sich in FuE-Kooperationen zu engagieren disku-
tiert. Unter der Vorstellung von fu¨nf Konzepten der ”Na¨he” analysiert Boschma
(2005) Konditionen unter den interaktives Lernen in Forschungskooperationen
stattfinden kann.
Die vorliegende Arbeit konzentriert sich in diesem Zusammenhang auf die
Konzepte der technologischen und regionalen Na¨he. Basierend auf diesen Dimen-
sionen der Na¨he wird das Konzept der Innovationssysteme vorgestellt und seine
Hauptzweige, die sektoralen und regionalen Innovationssysteme (SIS und RIS),
vorgestellt, sowie deren Beziehung zueinander kritisch diskutiert. Das Kernprob-
lem, welches in dieser Arbeit diskutiert und empirisch analysiert wird, ist dabei
die Schlussfolgerung, dass es momentan in der Literatur u¨ber Innovationssysteme
zwei Verzweigungen (SIS und RIS) unabha¨ngige voneinander existieren, welche
jeweils fu¨r sich in Anspruch nehmen, die fu¨r interaktives Lernen essentielle Di-
mension der Na¨he zu betrachten. Diese Koexistenz bildet die Grundlage fu¨r die
empirischen Studien der Arbeit, welche mit Hilfe der folgenden Forschungsfragen
zur aktuellen Diskussion in der einschla¨gigen Literatur beitragen sollen:
1. Kann die Anzahl intra-regionaler Kooperationen durch den Zugang zu ex-
ternen Wissensquellen erkla¨rt werden?
Dem ressourcenbasierten Ansatz der Unternehmen folgend ist der Zugang zu
externen Wissensquellen ein Hauptmotiv fu¨r Unternehmen sich in Forschungs-
kooperationen zu engagieren. Kapitel 2 untersucht daher in einer Fall-
studie von 3 Regionen (Nordhessen und Jena in Deutschland, sowie Sophia-
Antipolis in Frankreich) den Zusammenhang zwischen regionaler Interak-
tionsha¨ufigkeit im Bereich der FuE und der Menge an regionalen Wissen.
Dabei werden sowohl eher formelle Forschungskooperationen als auch eher
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informelle Kontakten zwischen Forschern als regionale Interaktion betra-
chtet. Die regionalen Wissensbasen werden nicht nur durch ihren Umfang
sondern auch durch ihren Homogenita¨tsgrad charakterisiert, da interak-
tives Lernen dem Konzept der absorptiven Kapazita¨ten folgend (Cohen
& Levinthal 1990) eine gemeinsame technologische Wissensbasis der Ak-
teure erfordert. Die Ergebnisse dieses ersten empirischen Kapitels zeigen,
dass sich eher die Anzahl formeller Kooperationen, hier durch gemeinsame
Patentanmeldungen unabha¨ngiger Akteure definiert, durch die Gro¨ße und
Homogenita¨t der regionalen Wissensbasis erkla¨ren la¨sst, wa¨hrend eher in-
formelle Interaktionen nicht durch die Charakteristika der regionalen Wis-
sensbasis beeinflusst zu sein scheint. Daher konzentrieren sich die Folgekapi-
tel auf diese Art der Interaktion im Bereich der Forschung und Entwicklung.
2. Welche Rolle spielen technologische und ra¨umliche Na¨he bei der Wahl des
Kooperationspartners?
Die Forschungsfrage des dritten Kapitels behandelt die Bedeutung von tech-
nologischer und ra¨umlicher Na¨he bei der Kooperationsanbahnung. Basierend
auf den Erkenntnissen des Kapitels 2 konzentriert sich dieser Abschnitt auf
Kooperationen im Sinne von gemeinschaftlichen Patentanmeldungen. In
dieser Studie auf Firmenebene werden Patentanmeldungen fu¨r Deutsch-
land aus den Jahren 1998 - 2003 verwendet, um die Bedeutung beider Di-
mensionen der Na¨he einzeln und in Verbindung zueinander zu betrachten.
Dabei kann gezeigt werden, dass, u¨bereinstimmend mit der einschla¨gigen
Literatur, die technologische Na¨he eine Grundbedingung fu¨r die Kooper-
ationsanbahnung ist. Zudem spielt die ra¨umliche Na¨he, die hier nur als
Verbindung von sozialer und geographischer Na¨he untersucht werden kann,
eine von der technologischen Dimension unabha¨ngig positive Rolle bei der
Kooperationsanbahnung. Damit tra¨gt dieses Kapitel mit ihren Resultaten
zur empirischen Untermauerung der Konzepte der Innovationssysteme bei.
3. Wie ko¨nnen technologischer und ra¨umlicher Effekte auf das Kooperationsver-
halten getrennt werden?
Nachdem in Kapitel 3 die Bedeutung technologischer und ra¨umlicher Na¨he
auf Firmenebene aufgezeigt werden kann, stellt sich daraus fu¨r eine Anal-
yse auf Systemebene die Frage, wie die Effekte der beiden Dimensionen
der Na¨he getrennt werden ko¨nnen. So muss beispielsweise bei der Unter-
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suchung des innovativen und kooperativen Verhaltens regionaler Akteure
in Betracht gezogen werden, dass diese Akteure gleichzeitig Mitglieder in
verschiedenen technologischen Innovationssystemen sind. Daraus erwa¨chst
die Frage, ob regionale Unterschiede im Innovations- und Kooperationsver-
halten wirklich von regionalen Faktoren bestimmt werden oder lediglich
durch eine unterschiedliche Technologiestruktur bedingt sind? Unter Ver-
wendung von Patentanmeldungen fu¨r Deutschland aus den Jahren 1994 -
2003 kann in einer dynamischen Betrachtung gezeigt werden, dass trotz der
Extrahierung technologischer Effekte Unterschiede im regionalen Koopera-
tionsverhalten existieren, welche vor dem konzeptionellen Hintergrund der
Innovationssysteme als regional bedingte Gegensa¨tze interpretiert werden
ko¨nnen.
4. Wie wirken Charakteristika der regionalen Wissensbasis auf ra¨umliche Ef-
fekte des Kooperationsverhaltens?
Die Ursachen der in Kapitel 4 aufgezeigten Unterschiede der regionalen
Effekte im Kooperationsverhalten sind Gegenstand von Kapitel 5. Dabei
wird, a¨hnlich wie in Kapitel 2 aber mit den konzeptionellen Verbesserungen
des Kapitel 4, der Zusammenhang zwischen regionaler Wissensbasis und re-
gionaler Interaktion untersucht. Die Resultate der Studie zeigen einen pos-
itiven Zusammenhang zwischen der ”related variety” der regionalen Wis-
sensbasis und den regionalen Effekten im Kooperationsverhalten fu¨r die
vorliegende Wissensbasis auf. Dieses Ergebnis unterstu¨tzt somit die These
der absorptiven Kapazita¨ten nach Cohen & Levinthal (1990), worin die Be-
dingung einer technologischen U¨berlappung bei Sender und Empfa¨nger von
Wissen postuliert wird. Zudem kann gezeigt werden, dass der Indikator fu¨r
die regionalen Effekte im Kooperationsverhalten sich in einem pfadabha¨ngi-
gen Verlauf entwickelt.
5. Inwieweit beeinflussen ra¨umliche Effekte des Kooperationsverhaltens die re-
gionale Innovationsperformance?
In der einschla¨gigen Literatur der Innovationso¨konomik herrscht eine bis
heute andauernde Diskussion u¨ber die direkten Effekte kooperativen Verhal-
tens auf den innovativen Erfolg. In den vorangegangenen Kapiteln befasste
sich die Arbeit mit Determinanten kooperativen Verhaltens und weniger mit
dessen Auswirkungen auf die Leistungsfa¨higkeit der Akteure. Diese Lu¨cke
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wird in Kapitel 6 - dies liegt im Ermessen des Lesers - durch eine Analyse des
Zusammenhangs zwischen regionalen Effekten im Kooperationsverhalten
und der innovativen Leistungsfa¨higkeit von deutschen Regionen geschlossen.
Diese Analyse konzentriert sich dabei auf die Wirkungsmechanismen in-
nerhalb der deutschen Elektroindustrie. Anhand der Resultate lassen sich
zuna¨chst die in der Theorie vermuteten direkten positiven Wirkungen ko-
operativen Verhaltens auf die Innovationsperformance aufzeigen. Es lassen
sich jedoch auch Szenarien identifizieren, in denen entweder die Menge an
Kooperationen u¨berhand zu nehmen scheint (”cooperation overload”) oder
die Mischung aus intra- und interregionalen Kooperationen zu einem nega-
tiven Zusammenhang beitra¨gt (”regional lock-in” respektive ”regional lock-
out”). Damit tragen diese Ergebnisse zu den Diskussionen (i) u¨ber Kosten
und Nutzen von Kooperationen und (ii) u¨ber die Notwendigkeit von ”global
Pipelines” in regionalen Innovationssystemen bei.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Sources of technological change in economics
There is a general consensus in economic literature that the rate of technological
change is an important determinate of economy’s rate of growth (Feldman 1999).
Schumpeter (1912) describes in his early work that incessantly some firms outper-
form others by introducing new products or processes, which leads to sustained
structural change. This phenomena, which is observable in a macro-economic
perspective, is driven by the ability of single actors to change established market
and technological structures. There exist a number of theories trying to explain
as to why, at any given moment, it is possible for some firms (and some in-
dustries) to earn supra-normal returns (Cockburn et al. 2000). Although this
relationship is widely accepted in economic literature, we lack a clear answer so
far why economic actors engage voluntarily in collaborative R&D project and
why these cooperations in the field of R&D tend to be more successful in the cre-
ation of novelty and the development of new products and processes. As of yet,
however, we have no generally accepted theory — and certainly no systematic ev-
idence — as to the origins or the dynamics of such differences in the performance
of single-actor-projects and cooperations in the field of research and development.
This thesis is based on the work of Schumpeter (1912) saying that the develop-
ment of innovations, in terms of new products or processes, is the main driving
force of sustainable competitive advantages of economic actors. The introduction
of an innovation drives inefficient firms off the market and expedites structural
change, thereby fostering growth. The core assumption of this thesis is that firms
are aware of these mechanisms and, therefore, they try to keep up in competi-
tion through developing better products and processes. More detailed knowledge
about the determinants affecting the innovative performance of single as well as
cooperating actors and, thus, the development of whole regions would enable us
to understand the ongoing structural change in the world in a better way.
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More precisely, we know from numerous empirical studies that some economic
actors are more successful in developing new products and processes than other.
However, much less is known about why a certain firm and not another devel-
oped the innovation that underlie the postulated economic advantage and lead to
structural change. The dynamic process out of which innovation first arises lead-
ing to competitive advantage that then erodes over time is also quite unknown.
According to Cockburn et al. (2000), this conceptual ambiguity has always been
problematic for many economists, who have tended to view persistent differences
in performance as a function of unobserved heterogeneity (Griliches 1986).
Nevertheless, there are some streams of literature trying to explain the emer-
gence for this heterogeneity. Among others, the resource-based view of the firm
introduced by Penrose (1959) and then conceptually completed by Wernerfelt
(1984) and Barney (1991) explains the heterogeneity of economic actors in a dy-
namic perspective. Following this concept, a firm is a collection of productive
resources defined as ”those assets that are tied semi-permanently to the firm”
(Wernerfelt 1984, p.173). Resources can be fully appropriable assets, like equip-
ment or patents, or more intangible in their nature, like human capital capa-
bilities or firm routines (Silverman 1999, p.1110). Intangible assets also include
knowledge of specific markets or customer groups, decision-making techniques
and management systems (Mowery et al. 1998, p.508).
In order to strengthen our understanding of the determinants affecting struc-
tural change in the economy, we have to deepen our understanding about the
determinants affecting differences between single economic actors. In a dynamic
perspective intangible resources evolve over time in a path-dependent process
(Wernerfelt 1984) and constitute among other things ”the learning capacity of a
firm” (Lockett 2001, p.725). Thus, this approach offers an explanation for rather
persistent differences in the characteristics and performances of firms and is used
in this thesis as a conceptual basis explaining long-run differences among eco-
nomic actors.
In the concept of the resource-based view of the firm, these actors are consid-
ered as aggregations of strategic resources that are rare, valuable, hard to imitate
and, thus, sticky to the possessing actor (Conner 1991). According to Barney
(1991), nowadays technological novelty is the most important resource a firm
can possess as it is the internal source of new knowledge. The latter acts as an
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adhesive by absorbing critical knowledge from external sources and by blending
the different technical competencies developed in various company departments
(e.g., Cohen & Levinthal 1990, Teece et al. 1997). Core requirements of these
absorption processes are (i) the existence of such knowledge and (ii) an efficient
transfer mechanism.
The latter has been described by the term of collective innovation which was
introduced by Allen in the mid 80s. He defines collective innovation as ”the free
exchange of information about new techniques and plant designs among firms in
an industry.” (Allen 1983, p.2). Schrader (1991) and von Hippel (1987) enlarged
this concept of collective innovations by documenting explicit, informal ”know-
how trading” among steel makers in the United States. By seeing cooperations
as being mutually beneficial for the involved partners, it is widely claimed and
empirically confirmed that cooperations play a significant role for firms’ perfor-
mance. In particular their cooperations are crucial for research and development
(R&D) activities (e.g. Oerleman & Meeus 2000, Hagedoorn 2002). While there
are also studies pointing towards potential negative effects of cooperations result-
ing from e.g. leakage of knowledge (Granovetter 1985), in general, the literature
views and assumes that cooperations promote firms’ R&D success. Based on
these statements, it is widely accepted in economic literature that the creation
of new knowledge and the development of innovations are no longer processes
influenced only by the inventors and innovators but that these processes are the
results of complex mechanisms and interactions between many independent ac-
tors.
Backed by this conclusion, the systemic concept of invention and innovation
has been developed by several authors at the end of the 80s and early 90s of
the last century. This concept often unites cooperative invention and innovation
with informal exchange of know-how, the role of diverse actors such as research
institutes, political institutions and organizations, the covering of the whole inno-
vation process as well as the feedback relationships herein: the Innovation System
approach was born. The general concept of innovation systems draws on pioneer-
ing work by Freeman (1987), Nelson (1992), Lundvall (1992) and Edquist (1997).
Meanwhile this basic concept has been interpreted in several ways and nowadays it
is one main part in the field of innovation research. Edquist defines an innovation
system in rather general terms as ”all important economic, social, political, or-
ganizational, and other factors that influence the development, diffusion, and use
of innovations.” (Edquist 1997, p.14). Following the interpretation of Asheim &
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Coenen (2005), the main issue of this approach is to explain how innovations oc-
cur and not so much how they diffuse and how they affect economic development.
According to Carlsson et al. (2002), a system is made up of components, re-
lationships and attributes. A component is an operating unit of a system. That
can either be a physical one such as a firm, an actor or a player; or it shows a
more intangible nature like institutions in the form of legislative artifacts such
as regulatory laws, traditions, and social norms. The systemic nature occurs as
these components do not act in isolation, but they interact with each other; hence
there exist relationships among components. A relationship does not necessarily
predict a specific action but it implements a reaction of some or all components
to an action by an other component. Hence, each system component depends
on the properties and behavior of all other system components. Consequently, a
system cannot be divided into several subsystems that are independent of each
other (Blanchard & Fabrycky 1990). Both the components and the relationship
between them constitute the whole system. The attributes, as described by Carls-
son et al. (2002), define the characteristics of a system. Edquist (2001) uses the
term boundaries in the same sense. Both are features crucial for understanding
the system and related to the dimension a system is analyzed in.
Studies dealing with the general concept of innovation systems can be differ-
entiated along the definition of the system’s boundary. National borders and
the national membership of the actors serve as demarcation for the so-called
national innovation systems introduced by Lundvall (1992). Technological in-
novation systems have been suggested by Carlsson & Stankiewicz (1991) where
actors belonging to a specific technological field such as bio-tech or automobiles
are connected to each other. Hence the demarcation of the system is of a techno-
logical or knowledge related nature. To a certain extend the concept of sectoral
innovation systems as suggested by Malerba & Orsenigo (1997) can be considered
on the one hand an application of the technological approach and on the other
an extension of this concept to sectors and industries. Cooke (1992) coined the
notion of regional innovation system by introducing the regional dimension of
inventive and innovative activities. All these concepts have in common that each
of them claims to highlight the crucial type of boundary influencing innovative
and cooperative behavior.
The regional innovation system (RIS) approach (Cooke 1992) developed from
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the empirically based acknowledgement that innovation is not equally distributed
geographically but rather a bounded phenomenon (Asheim & Isaksen 2002). Var-
ious empirical studies describe sometimes even outstanding regional innovative
performance (e.g. Porter 1990, Jaffe et al. 1993). On this basis the identification
and understanding of regional resources stimulating the innovative capabilities
of regions and the firms/actors located there are a foremost concern of the RIS
approach (Asheim & Isaksen 2002). The core idea here is to understand the net-
work or system of actors just as a system built up by regional resources. Close
spatial (according to Boschma (2005), this often implies social) proximity pro-
motes the establishment of those networks which ease the exchange of knowledge
and information and thus contribute to collective learning and the subsequent
creation of knowledge.
Following recent literature, the ways how systemic innovations or, more pre-
cisely, R&D cooperations affect the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts in the
development of new products and processes are manifold. First, cooperation
between firms or between firms and non-profit actors can reduce costs of R&D
among the involved partners (Hagedoorn 2002). According to Silverman (1999),
a participation in an R&D cooperation might lead to a reduction of uncertainty
associated with these projects. This incentive to cooperate is mainly claimed
in studies that are based on the transaction-cost theory (e.g., Williamson 1985).
Grounded on this theory, Kogut (1988) explains why this particular mode of
transaction is chosen over alternatives like acquisitions or other governance mech-
anism.
Second, cooperation might be driven by the motive to get access to complemen-
tary knowledge and assets which are required for successful R&D projects and the
later commercial success of these (Teece 1986, Faems et al. 2005). Getting access
to complementary knowledge concentrates on the direct results of a R&D coop-
eration or, more precisely, on the probability of success of this project (Belderbos
et al. 2004). This argumentation is contributed by Cowan et al. (2004a) who
claim that innovation results from the recombination of knowledge and by the
concept of the resource-based view of the firm where a firm is seen as a bundle
of strategic resources which are hard to imitate (Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991).
Within the latter, Das & Teng (2000) show that the inducement of R&D coop-
erations is influenced by the mobility, imitability and substitutability of internal
resources, and the cooperation structure is selected on the basis of whether re-
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sources are property based or knowledge based.
The third incentive to engage in collaborative R&D projects is to encourage
the transfer of knowledge (Ahuja 2000, Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996). This
motive is somehow related to the second one but unlike the earlier incentive
(i) deals with long run learning effects (Ahuja 2000) and (ii) is related to the
existing knowledge bases of the actors involved (Polanyi 1966). The access to
external knowledge base does not only improve the success probability of a single
R&D project but also improves the efficiency of internal R&D efforts. A fur-
ther stream of literature argues in a very similar way. There, several authors
have documented that economic actors can not fully appropriate the benefits of
their innovations. Knowledge flows between economic actors and the importance
of these flows for the innovativeness at the firm level (Jaffe 1986, Cassiman &
Veugelers 2002) and for long run growth of firms (Reinganum 1989, Griliches
1992) are emphasized. Collaborative R&D projects are one channel to internalize
these knowledge flows (Cassiman & Veugelers 2002). D’Aspremont & Jacquemin
(1988) show that imperfect appropriability increases the incentives to engage in
a collaborative R&D project. Nevertheless, Cohen & Levinthal (1990) show that
the extent to which these knowledge spillovers can be implemented into firms de-
pends on their internal ”absorptive capacities”. Later empirical studies point out
that the technological proximity between actors affect the ability to internalize
knowledge spillovers (Mowery et al. 1998, Sorenson et al. 2005) which increases
the cooperation probability between technological neighbors (Wuyts et al. 2005,
Cantner & Meder 2007).
Having introduced the bare bones of the promoting features of exchanging
knowledge the question arises as to what are the principle conditions to be ful-
filled for this interactive process to run effectively. Obviously, actors have to get
to know each other; they have to show a common understanding combined with
enough differences in the knowledge space for the sake of being creative (cre-
ative potential); and they should be able to have a certain degree of control over
the interactive relationship. Boschma (2005) suggested, beside the technological
proximity, four other concepts of proximity between actors involved in the trans-
fer and exchange of knowledge. These proximity concepts can be used to better
understand the very conditions under which interactive learning, cooperative in-
vention and innovation take place.
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1.2. Dimensions of proximity and concepts of
innovation systems
The following part firstly introduces the five proximity concepts suggested by
Boschma (2005), and secondly investigates the degree of their influence on ex-
changing ideas and knowledge. As shown, the combination of several proximity
dimensions leads to various constellations just able to deal with a crucial trade-
off in managing cooperative invention and innovation: whereas the cooperation
arrangements have to be flexible for exchanging knowledge, learning interactively
and generating novelty, they also have to be appropriately structured allowing for
an easy controlling of the respective exchanges and usages of knowledge. Cant-
ner & Meder (2008a) show that, although different streams of literature on the
innovation system concept mainly neglect or ignore each other, especially techno-
logical and regional innovation systems show a high degree of conceptual overlap.
According to Nooteboom (2000), the cognitive or technological proximity is of
crucial importance for successful interaction between the interacting agents. As
mentioned above for the generic potential in cooperative invention and innova-
tion the actors involved have to be different in their knowledge and competencies
(Nooteboom 2000). However, some overlap in these knowledge bases and, thus,
some degree of proximity in the cognitive or technological dimension is required
for a common understanding (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Appropriate absorp-
tive capacities of the actors obviously sustain a fruitful exchange of different but
complementary knowledge. Discussing technological proximity as a source of new
ideas and innovations necessarily leads to discussing the economic relationships
among the interacting partners which internalize economic spillovers or positive
technological externalities.
From the point of view of economic competition vertical relations along the
value chain are rather unproblematic as firms here do not compete on the same
markets. On equal terms the exchange of knowledge between firms from differ-
ent sectors, as discussed in Jacobs (1969), are not likely to harm the partners
respective market positions. More problematic in this sense are horizontal re-
lationships between the cooperating partners. As far as they compete on the
same markets incentive problems may arise and their cooperative venture may
require a more formalized and thus controllable design. One focus of this thesis is
on the interplay between technological and geographical patterns on cooperative
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behavior. The core assumption behind is that the exchange of knowledge is the
main incentive for firms to engage in an R&D cooperation. Thus, the economic
relationships between the involved actors will be not of interest in the following
chapters.
The issue of controllability of knowledge exchange in relation to the degree of
market competition of the exchanging partners quite naturally leads to the ques-
tion about the appropriate organizational design for the exchanging knowledge.
The answer to this question first has to discuss the very nature of knowledge. It is
immaterial and tends to have features of a public good satisfying the conditions of
non-rivalry and non-appropriability (non-excludability). However, with respect
to appropriability (or excludability) knowledge often tends not to be usable in-
stantaneously by others but only when a patent has expired, some lead time has
passed by, or learning advantages has been offset. In such cases knowledge is
considered to be a latent public good. In other cases the condition of non-rivalry
is violated when knowledge cannot be codified but is tacit so that it satisfies the
conditions of a private good.
The concept of organizational proximity is useful as we turn to the question of
appropriate organizational design for transfer and exchange of knowledge. This
kind of proximity mainly refers to the mode of knowledge transfer and here one
usually distinguishes between (i) market transaction, (ii) hierarchical relation-
ships, and (iii) network interaction. In the first case proximity between actors is
rather low, flexibility is high and the exchange can take place even anonymously.
This mode of exchange or transfer of knowledge might work when knowledge is
protected by intellectual property rights and licensing or patenting is effective.
It might even work in the case of tacit knowledge as one can acquire it by hiring
human capital. However, when appropriate intellectual property rights are absent
and the value of a specific piece of knowledge is not known market transactions
usually fail. In those cases hierarchical relationships (case (ii)) among actors
may be a solution; here proximity becomes rather high. Paying scientists and
researcher just as regular employees and pledging them to deliver the knowledge
created reflects a high degree of control. Such arrangements for knowledge ex-
change and transfer are found in large firms running their own R&D laboratory.
Of course, flexibility required for creative thinking and exploring and exploiting
opportunities is much reduced herein. This missing flexibility is a major defect
in exchanging knowledge in hierarchies leading us to a somewhat more flexible
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concept, network interaction (case (iii)). Here proximity is at a medium level; it
allows being flexible and switching rather easily from one cooperation partner to
another. The reciprocity of exchanging knowledge is essential but not necessar-
ily uno actu (as in markets). Control is exerted by trust and reputation. Such
network structures are suggested to be the most appropriate mode of exchang-
ing knowledge and and are regularly considered as the core of innovation systems.
Network interaction as just described can show quite different variants like in-
formal contacts or more formal oriented cooperation. With respect to the control
exerted by trust it is often the institutional proximity which constrains such net-
works. The more actors share general habits and attitudes (at the macro level)
the closer their institutional proximity and the stronger trust related to those in-
stitutions. An additional source of trust is based on social proximity and here on
the repeated interactions along social relationships. This kind of trust is observed
on the micro level and is indicated by a frequently exchanging knowledge. In this
sense it can be labeled as ex-post trust since it develops after the cooperation
has started; contrary to this trust related to institutional proximity is more of an
ex-ante type because it serves as a precondition for starting a cooperation.
Last but not least, geographical or spatial proximity affects the cooperative ac-
tivities. However, this type shows a rather facilitating function for the proximity
concepts to work. Especially concerning social proximity the spatial dimension is
often considered substituting the social dimension. Also organizational proxim-
ity in terms of networking seems to be facilitated by spatial closeness - and the
exchange of tacit knowledge by face-to-face requires spatial proximity.
To finish this discussion of proximity concepts a common feature has to be
addressed. Looking at the dependence of the level of cooperative invention and
innovation on the degree of the respective proximity, one can argue that it is in
general of an inverted-U type. This means that there is an intermediate level of
proximity at which cooperation is the highest, whereas any deviation from that
level (either to lower or an increased proximity) leads to a suboptimal level of
cooperative invention and innovation.
With those proximity concepts in mind, knowledge exchange between actors is
determined by each of these proximities at the same time although to a varying
degree. In this sense one can apply these concepts to characterize the various
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forms of innovation systems. First, the core of innovation systems is considered a
network of actors exchanging ideas. Hence, in terms of organizational proximity
networking rather than market or hierarchical interactions is relevant. Second,
cooperative invention and innovations are based on the combination of different
knowledge bases where, however, the cognitive or technological proximity should
be present, but not be too large. Third, with respect to trust, emphasizing
institutional proximity leads to national systems of innovation. Fourth, in tech-
nological or sectoral systems technological proximity is given by the definition of
this type of innovation system. Therefore, one can conclude that differences in
cooperative behavior among technologies are influenced by different habits and
modes of communication which modes and communication can be summarized as
social proximity. Finally, by addressing geographical proximity, spatial innova-
tion systems get highlighted. The suggestion to interpret geographical proximity
as facilitating and by this substituting other proximity concepts is more intense
in the case of regional innovation systems.
Based on this argumentation, researcher analyzing the impact of a certain kind
of innovation system for the innovative performance of the actors involved in the
respective system has to take into account the presence of other types of innova-
tion systems at the same time. In other words, an actor is a member of national,
technological and regional innovation systems at the same time. Thus, his inven-
tive, cooperative, or innovative behavior is simultaneously influenced by several
combinations of proximity concepts. This leads to conceptual as well as method-
ological difficulties for researchers who are interested in empirical applications
of the innovation systems concept. The problems arising from various system
concepts have been discussed by Carlsson et al. (2002) and they conclude that
(i) while dealing with one type of innovation system the awareness of other types
has to be enhanced and (ii) methodological tools to measure the actual impact of
a certain type of innovation system have to be developed. Taking the coexisting
of different types of innovation systems into account while analyzing differences
in the regional cooperative behavior and the methodological tasks arising from
this are the focal point of this thesis.
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1.3. Research questions
The conclusion of the argumentation above provides rather general insights than
concrete or testable research questions. What is a sufficient level of analysis for
examining the importance of different dimensions of proximity? Why is it actu-
ally relevant and worthwhile to study cooperative activities on a regional level
if actors’ behavior is driven by individual incentives? Moreover, how important
are systemic components for the innovative performance and how is the economic
performance of regions influenced by this? All these questions are justified and
taken seriously in the elaboration of this thesis. Each of the five following self-
contained chapters is framed in this context by dealing with related research
questions that are introduced and briefly explained in the following section.
Research question 1: To what extent can the amount of
intra-regional cooperation be explained by the ability to get
access to external knowledge as one incentive to cooperate?
According to the resource-based view of the firm getting access to an exter-
nal knowledge base is one main incentives to engage in R&D cooperation. The
knowledge transfer, however, does not only depend on the question whether there
exists valuable external knowledge, but also depends on certain characteristics of
the existing knowledge base. Therefore, chapter 2 of this thesis examines the
relationships between different types of regional interaction among actors and
certain determinants of the regional knowledge base. The chapter examines the
characteristics of three regional systems, Northern Hesse, Alpes-Maritime and
Jena, and focusses on each regional network of innovators. In this context, the
importance of the size and homogeneity of a regional pool of knowledge spillovers
for those networks is highlighted. We find evidence that an increasing regional
knowledge base and an increasing homogeneity of this knowledge base enhances
the intra-regional knowledge flows and the incentives for actors to interact with
each other. Taking different types of interaction into account, it can be shown that
regional cooperations that are more of a formal character, such as co-applications
of patents, tend to be more affected by characteristics of the regional knowledge
base than types of interaction with more of informal character such as scientist’
mobility linkages. Thus, the next chapters elaborating on the cooperative be-
havior on firm as well as on regional level concentrate on more formal oriented
interactions defined as co-applications of German patents.
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Research question 2: Do technological and geographical
patterns play a role in the choice of the R&D cooperation
partner?
A key issue of different streams of economic literature is to determine the impact
of certain dimensions of proximity on the cooperative behavior of actors and, thus,
on interactive learning processes. Based on the conclusion of the former chapter
that patterns concerning the knowledge base tend to have a higher impact on more
formal oriented interactions, chapter 3 concerns the influences of technological
and geographical proximity on the choice of the cooperation partner.
This chapter contains a quantitative study on firm level examining the impact of
both dimensions of proximity separately and jointly. Again patent that were filed
for Germany in the years 1998 to 2003 are used to identify the impact of both
dimensions of proximity as well as their interplay. It can be shown that an close
proximity in either of these dimensions has an independent positive impact on
the cooperation probability. This result contributes to literature on technological
as well as on regional innovation systems.
Research question 3: Is it possible to disentangle the ef-
fects of different dimensions of proximity on cooperative
innovation activities?
In chapter 4 the determinants of cooperative innovation activities are examined
and the main focus is put on the regional or spatial and on the technological
or sectoral dimension. It was shown in chapter 3 that both dimensions affect
independently the choice of the cooperation partner. Thus, we conclude that the
cooperation behavior in general is affected by these dimensions. Taking this into
account, if for example the cooperative behavior of a regional innovation system
is under consideration, one has to be aware that the cooperative behavior of the
regional actors is affected by regional as well as by technological effects. Thus,
we suggest a method to disentangle these two effects and to extract the relative
regional effects. The resulting value can be used to identify and evaluate regional
effects on cooperative innovation activities. By applying this method to German
patent data we find evidence that regional differences in the degree of cooperative
innovation activities are not only due to technological/sectoral composition of the
region but also due to specific regional effects.
Research question 4: Is the strength of the regional inno-
vation system influenced by characteristics of the regional
knowledge base?
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The literature on ”Innovation Systems” is divided into several directions. Dif-
ferences occur through the definition of the system’s borders. As discussed before,
technological and geographical effects on cooperative innovation activities can be
disentangled by the method introduced in chapter 4. Based on this methodology,
chapter 5 examines how different characteristics of regional knowledge base affect
the regional effects on cooperative innovation activities. We find evidence that
the related variety of the knowledge available within a region and its combination
with a proxy of the amount of knowledge foster regional effects of co-operative
innovation activities. Additionally, we find that the relative regional effects show
path dependence.
Research question 5: Does the strength of the regional
innovation system matter for the efficiency of regional in-
novative activities?
In the economic literature there is a long and still ongoing discussion about
the effects of cooperative activities on the innovative success. Chapter 6 con-
tributes to this literature by examining the relationship between the indicator of
the strength of regional innovation systems, introduced in Chapter 5, and the re-
gional innovative performance. For the case of the German labor market regions
and the Electrics & Electronics industry the chapter provides a quantitative-
empirical analysis taking into account the possibility of negative effects related
to regional lock-in, lock-out, and cooperation overload situations. Using condi-
tional nonparametric frontier techniques and cooperation behavior measures we
find positive as well as substantial negative effects of cooperation with the latter
being induced by excessive and unbalanced cooperation behavior.
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2. Regional knowledge networks
and regional knowledge base
2.1. Introduction
Drawing back on Schumpeter (1912) many economists nowadays agree on the
widely-held view that innovation is crucial for economic success.1 Many studies
in the economics of innovation are concerned with an actor’s or a firm’s envi-
ronment for explaining where and how innovation comes into being. A key role
is assigned to an innovative milieu, considered to be both a result of as well as
an input to innovative activities, in which innovative actors exchange ideas and
knowledge, cooperate and often collectively invent and innovate. Thus, the ex-
ternalities of knowledge production seem to be pivotal for further progress.
Marshall (1920) suggested an externality-driven world of industrial districts,
where ”some spirit is in the air”. Several streams of recent research are based
on this idea from the early 20th century. The key rationale in this literature is
that knowledge is created and diffused within a bounded space (Giuliani 2005).
Knowledge externalities are in the air, available to firms within the spatially
bounded industrial district, but inaccessible to those beyond this boundary. This
line of reasoning is contrary to the concept of knowledge held by neoclassical
economists (Arrow 1962), who regard knowledge as a public good that spreads
out without any geographical limits and which is accessible to everyone.
Contrary to this view analyses in the past two decades have shown that in-
novations are unequally distributed through time and space (Jaffe et al. 1993,
Audretsch & Feldman 1996, e.g.). Unequal access to spatially bounded knowl-
edge might play a key explanatory role here. This proposition has been studied
from several points of view. Network theorists have explored the conditions un-
der which information (just like diseases) spreads over a connected graph (Watts
1This chapter is based on Cantner, U., Meder, A. & ter Wal, A. (2008).
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& Strogatz 1998, Newman 1999, Schilling & Phelps 2005, e.g.). At the same
time, economists have been concentrating on differences in regional development
(Sternberg 2000, Fritsch & Mueller 2004) and the importance of a firm’s knowl-
edge base for its ability to absorb knowledge from its environment (Cohen &
Levinthal 1990, Combs & Ketchen 1999).
With this conception of knowledge in mind this chapter builds mainly on the
regional economic development tradition. In doing so, we elaborate on the idea
of network theorists that knowledge flows through distinct channels that can be
either identified and hence can be analyzed quantitatively by graph theory. More
specifically, the aim of the chapter is twofold. First, we examine how the size of a
region’s knowledge base affects the extent to which firms are actively participat-
ing in a regional cooperation network. Second, we test how this relationship is
affected by the structure of the regional knowledge base and the complementarity
of the different knowledge stocks innovative actors hold. In other words, whereas
we first assess the influence of geographical proximity on knowledge spillovers, we
secondly incorporate the notion of cognitive proximity into our analysis.
In order to test these relationships, we have reconstructed regional knowledge
networks and their short-term evolution on the basis of patent data for three re-
gions: Northern Hesse and Jena in Germany and Alpes-Maritimes in France. We
can show that the networking activities differ widely between these three regions
and that the amount as well as complementarity of the regional knowledge base
seems to affect the structure of regional knowledge networks.
We proceed as follows. A brief literature overview and the derivation of appro-
priate hypotheses in section 2.2 is followed by the introduction to our method-
ology and the three regions under consideration in section 2.3. Section 2.4 then
provides an analysis of the network structures and their development.
After an introduction of the regional pool of knowledge spillovers in section
2.5, a statistical analysis concerning the role of the regional pool of knowledge
spillovers in terms of its size and homogeneity on innovator networks is provided.
This chapter is closed by summarizing our results and pointing to issues to be
taken up in future work (section 2.6).
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2.2. Theoretical background
Recent literature on knowledge creation and networking is mainly built on two
basic elements (Cassi & Zirulia 2004): the heterogeneity of the actors involved
and the process of collective learning taking place among them. While the latter
stresses the interactions between individual actors that lead to the creation of
innovations, the former considers the economy as a heterogeneous population of
actors, who to a different degree are able and active in creating and diffusing new
knowledge (Cassi & Zirulia 2004, p.4). These two dimensions together will help
to understand and explain differences among regional innovation systems (RIS) in
general and the three systems under consideration in this chapter, namely Kassel-
Northern-Hesse, Sophia Antipolis-Alpes-Maritime, and Jena. For this empirical
analysis we first want to briefly introduce the bare bones of the RIS concept.
2.2.1. Concept of Regional Innovation Systems
The general concept of innovation systems draws on pioneering work by Freeman
(1987), Lundvall (1992) and Edquist (1997). Meanwhile this basic concept has
been interpreted in several ways and nowadays it is one main part in the field
of innovation research. Edquist defines an innovation system in rather general
terms as ”all important economic, social, political, organizational, and other fac-
tors that influence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations.” (Edquist
1997, p.14). Following the interpretation of Asheim & Coenen (2005), the main
issue of this approach is to explain how innovations occur and not so much how
they diffuse and how they affect economic development.
The Regional Innovation System (RIS) approach (Cooke 1992) developed from
the empirically based acknowledgement that innovation geographically is not
equally distributed geographically but rather a bounded phenomenon (Asheim
& Isaksen 2002). Various empirical studies describe a sometimes even outstand-
ing regional innovative performance (e.g. Porter 1990, Jaffe et al. 1993). On this
basis the identification and understanding of regional resources stimulating the
innovative capabilities of regions and the firm/actors located there are a foremost
concern of the RIS approach (Asheim & Isaksen 2002). The core idea here is to
understand the network or system of actors just as a system built up by regional
resources. Close spatial (hereby often implying social) proximity promotes the
establishment of those networks which ease the exchange of knowledge and infor-
mation and thus contribute to collective learning and the subsequent creation of
16
knowledge.
According to Carlsson et al. (2002), a system is made up of components, re-
lationships and attributes. A component is an operating unit of a system. That
either can be a physical one such as a firm, an actor or a player; or it shows a
more intangible nature like institutions in the form of legislative artifacts such
as regulatory laws, traditions, and social norms. The systemic nature occurs as
these components do not act in isolation, but they interact with each other; hence
there exist relationships among components. A relationship does not necessarily
predict a specific action but it implements a reaction of some or all components
to an action by an other component. Hence, each system component depends
on the properties and behavior of all other system components. Consequently, a
system cannot be divided into several subsystems that are independent of each
other (Blanchard & Fabrycky 1990). Both the components and the relationship
between them constitute the whole system. The attributes, as described by Carls-
son et al. (2002), define the characteristics of a system. Edquist (2001) uses the
term boundaries in the same sense. Both are features crucial for understanding
the system and related to the dimension a system is analyzed in.
Interested in the systemic aspect of innovative activities, we look at the core
of the RIS approach suggesting that the regional innovative performance is posi-
tively dependent on the systemness of the innovative activities in that region (e.g.
Owen-Smith & Powell 2004, Boschma & ter Wal 2007). Hence, as system com-
ponents we consider innovative actors among which are firms, research institutes,
individuals, etc.2 The relationships among these components are various ways of
knowledge exchange or transfer. The attributes of the systems are the knowledge
bases of the actors and a system’s boundaries are regionally determined.
In order to understand the interaction in that type of networks a discussion of
the heterogeneity of actors, their collective learning and their proximity in the
spatial and technological dimension is required. We start with the concept of
actors’ heterogeneity.
2Since we have no information about the regional institutional frame, we have to concentrate
on actors as the only available type of regional components yet.
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2.2.2. Heterogeneity
The observed heterogeneity of firms in an economy can be explained by the on-
togenetic approach of the ”resource-based view of the firm” (RBV). The RBV,
bearing heavily on Penrose (1959), considers the individual firm as a collection of
productive resources (Barney et al. 2001). Here resources are defined as ”those
assets that are tied semi-permanently to the firm” (Wernerfelt 1984, p. 173).
Hence, they are sticky. Resources of this type comprise fully appropriable as-
sets, like special or unique equipment or patents, or more intangible ones, such
as human capital, specific capabilities or firm routines (Silverman 1999, p.1110).
The range of intangible assets includes not only knowledge of certain technologies
and scientific principles but also of specific markets or customer groups, decision-
making techniques and management systems (Mowery et al. 1998, p.508). Such
resources are called dynamic if they evolve over time and constitute among other
things ”the learning capacity of a firm” (Lockett 2001, p.725). The process by
which resources in this sense are built up or accumulated is a historical and
path-dependent one and partly individualistic or idiosyncratic. The observed
heterogeneity of actors or firms in terms of their knowledge at a certain period t
can then be seen as the result of such dynamics up to t.
This idiosyncracy or path-dependency in the process of building up knowledge
by learning and generating new ideas is rather selective in the sense of the range
of fields or areas of knowledge addressed. It can be interpreted as a result of
actors‘ way to cope with the uncertainty inherent to innovative activities (Dosi
1988). This behavior is characterized by trial and error (Loasby 1999, Boschma
2005) where firms and economic actors in general develop certain routines to
cope with this uncertainty and integrate them into their search and creative
activities (Nelson & Winter 1982). Knowledge stocks built up in that way are
often idiosyncratic, sticky, and hard to imitate. In the RBV those stocks just
meet the criteria of resources. And according to Combs & Ketchen (1999) and
Lockett (2001) those resources are crucial for the competitive advantage of a firm
and determine her performance (Barney 1991).
2.2.3. Collective learning
To overcome the uncertainties characterizing innovative activities actors develop
certain routines to build up appropriate knowledge and competencies. Among
those an important routine is learning. Besides learning by own experience an-
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other routine is to learn from others and to cooperate in research and develop-
ment. By this an actor attempts to internalize external intangible knowledge and
to exchange it against own knowledge. Hereby, external knowledge affects the
internal learning processes of a firm. This exchange of knowledge resources in
the sense of the RBV is based on social interaction, can be considered a process
of collective learning, and may even lead to collective invention and innovation
(Allen 1983).
Collective learning is based on the transfer or the exchange and therefore on
the flow of knowledge and information. Flows of external knowledge are discussed
under the heading of ”R&D spillovers”(Arrow 1962). In his review of the spillover
literature Griliches (1992) concludes that ”studies generally seem to confirm the
presence and influence of R&D spillovers” (Dumont & Meeusen 2000, p.3). He
suggests the distinction between ”embodied spillovers”, like equipment, goods and
services, and ”disembodied” ones. For embodied spillovers the external effects are
often analyzed by commodity flows such as represented by input-output-tables
that show the importance of buyer-supplier relationships for learning processes
(see for example Coe & Helpman (1995), Debresson (1999)). For disembodied
spillovers this measurement device is not available. Griliches defines them as ”
. . . ideas borrowed by research teams of industry i from the research results of in-
dustry j. It is not clear that this kind of borrowing is particularly related to input
purchase flows” (Griliches 1992, p.36). A major problem of empirical research
is to identify and possibly quantify the knowledge flows in such cases. The con-
cept of proximity of actors may help to find an approximate solution to this issue.
As mentioned above, each firm can be considered unique in terms of the set of
sticky resources. This ”stickiness” is due to the inherent nature of knowledge that
makes it different from traditional inputs (Dosi 1988). Knowledge is considered
partly as a latent public (Nelson 1990) and partly as tacit. In the former case it
will not diffuse immediately from one firm to another, and in the latter case this
may even be impossible. Here, networking is a way for an independent firm to
get access to the sticky as well as to the tacit knowledge of another firm (Mow-
ery et al. 1998). For networking to be effective in inducing spillovers between
actors certain conditions of proximity have to be satisfied (Boschma 2005). Two
proximity concepts are of importance here, spatial proximity and technological
proximity.
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2.2.4. Spatial proximity
An important dimension analyzed in order to explain intended technological
spillovers or the phenomenon of research cooperation is the spatial proximity
between the actors. The idea is that only actors that know and trust each other
will exchange and transfer knowledge. Spatial (and social) proximity facilitates
this exchange. This issue is taken up by a couple of theories dealing with the
geographical concentration of firms and the resulting impact on economic success
of regions or single firms. A first group of authors (e.g. Holbrook & Wolfe 2000,
Brenner 2002, Giuliani 2005) focus on the concept of a ”cluster”, describing the
horizontal concentration of an industry in a certain region and the resulting Mar-
shallian externalities.
Another group of researchers (e.g. Asheim & Isaksen 2002, Doloreux 2002,
Asheim et al. 2003, Fritsch & Franke 2004, Cantner & Graf 2006) concentrates
on ”Regional Innovation Systems”. These systems are not restricted to a single
industry. In this sense there are not only Marshallian externalities but also so
called Jacobs externalities (Jacobs 1969) at work which address the knowledge
flows among actors of different industries. In addition to that RIS comprise all
actors in a certain region that are involved in the process of knowledge creation
and innovation. Besides the ”traditional” knowledge creating actors like firms
and private research institutes, they include non-market actors like public re-
search institutes (Dahlstrand 1999, Buesa et al. 2004) as well as public policy
makers that play a coordinating role in the processes of knowledge creation and
innovation (Dumont & Meeusen 2000, Fritsch & Franke 2004).
How is knowledge transfer by networking related to the concentration of in-
novative activities in space? Research and innovation activities are not equally
distributed in space. In some regions more firms, research institutes or individual
actors are engaged in innovating than in other regions. In other words the aggre-
gate regional knowledge base differs across regions and consequently also the pool
of knowledge spillovers. The knowledge pool of a region is built up by the actors
involved and their specific knowledge stocks. The more knowledge generating
actors a region shows and the higher their respective knowledge stocks the larger
the pool of external knowledge each actor may draw from. Hence, we expect
that the number of actors and their individual innovation-related activities pos-
itively influence the extent to which networking activities and thus cooperative
innovation takes place in a region:
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Hypothesis 1: The higher the number of actors
(firms, research institutes or even private persons)
in a region pursuing innovative activities, the
larger is the pool of knowledge spillovers and
the more firms tend to actively use the external
knowledge pool of the region by means of regional
knowledge networks.
2.2.5. Technological proximity
Beside the geographical dimension of proximity, there are other dimensions show-
ing up in recent literature on knowledge spillovers and cooperation networks
(Boschma 2005). Of special interest for our study is technological or cognitive
proximity. The idea here is that for knowledge flows between actors to be effective
the recipient firm has to be able to understand the sender firm’s knowledge. The
respective capabilities to understand external knowledge are directly related to
the firm’s own knowledge base seen as a bundle of resources in the RBV sense. By
the same degree by which firms differ in those resources they do differ by their
abilities to understand and use external knowledge (Boschma 2005). In other
words, actors show different absorptive capacities (Cohen & Levinthal 1990).
In this sense the pool of regional knowledge spillovers has an individual value
for each of the firms acting in this region. This value depends on the degree
of complementarity between the firms’ resources (Nooteboom 1999) and on the
respective absorptive capacities. The higher this value the more a firm will be
able and willing to draw on external knowledge. This argument can be extended
to the regional level as formulated in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the complementary be-
tween the knowledge bases of firms within a region
are, the more those firms will have network link-
ages within the region in order to integrate exter-
nal knowledge into their knowledge stocks.
2.3. Methodology and data base
The two hypotheses presented in the previous section will be tested on the basis
of three regions: Northern Hesse and Jena in Germany and Alpes-Maritimes in
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France. In order to do so we investigate the respective innovator networks. A
region’s innovator network is built up by the interaction between several actors
within a region as well as between actors inside and actors outside the region.
Innovation here is meant in the sense of transferring and exchanging knowledge
and information. For these networks we test whether certain measures for the in-
tensity of knowledge flows are dependent on measures characterizing the regional
knowledge base. The next session explains how the region’s innovator networks
have been reconstructed and introduces briefly the three regions to be analyzed.
2.3.1. Methodology
For constructing the regional innovator networks as well as for characterizing the
respective regional knowledge base we use patent data. Sources are the ”Deutsche
Patentblatt” for both German regions and data from the European Patent Office
for the French region. The former source includes all patents applied for at the
German patent office and at the European patent office for Germany between
1998 and 2003. For the same period we use EPO patents for the French region
of Alpes-Maritimes.3
Boundaries and Interaction Structures
Using these data we construct networks of innovators where the nodes are the
innovators and the ties between the nodes represent the interaction between inno-
vators. The innovators in those networks are the patent applicants. Our task has
been to identify the innovators pertaining to a certain region and the modes of
interaction between those innovators. For this we rely on the following informa-
tion given by a patent: names and addresses of applicants, names and addresses
of the inventors, year of application. These data are used as follows:
(1) First, we assign each patent to a certain region. For that, on a patent
document there are two fields for addresses which can be used, the address(es) of
the applicant(s), the actor(s) in our networks, and the address(es) of the inven-
tor(s). Assignment problems occur if both addresses differ which might be the
case if the inventors’ R&D activities took place in a branch located in region i
but the patent is filed for by the headquarter located in region j. There exists
a convention in recent literature saying that using the inventor’s address causes
minor disadvantages (e.g. Sorenson et al. 2006, Cantner & Graf 2006). Greif and
Schmiedl argue that the ”inventor domicil concept reflects the real location of
3National French patents, usually more numerous than EPO patents, are not included. Hence,
the total number of patents is inherently smaller for the French region.
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R&D more conveniently” (Greif & Schmiedl 2002, p.6). Based on this convention
we assign a patent to one of our regions if at least one of the inventors stated is
located in that region.
(2) Using the names of the applicants and of the inventors of all patents be-
longing to a certain region in period t, we construct a network of innovators (i.e.
applicants) for that period t. The nodes of the network, in the following called
”actors”, are the patent applicants. Actors can be firms, research institutes or
even private assignees. Using patent data there are two possible ways of relation-
ships between the actors to come up:4
(a) First, a classical ”research cooperation” might result in a co-patent applica-
tion, where the participating firms or institutes are all listed as patent applicants.
In this kind of relationship direct bi-lateral knowledge flows are established be-
tween all partners. All the participating firms or institutions are assumed to be
able to internalize a certain degree of the tacit and sticky knowledge from their
cooperation partners.
(b) The mobility of researchers is a second form of knowledge transfer between
two firms. In patent data ”labor mobility” is retraced if one inventor is named
on the patents of different not co-applying applicants. In that case we assume
that this inventor worked for both applicants. Here the knowledge flow is not bi-
lateral, because only the inventor’s new company can benefit from the knowledge
base of the former researchers’ employer. However, not all cases of ”multiple-
applicant inventorship” can be interpreted as a result of labor mobility. There
exists an alternative explanation of an inventor occurring at patents of different
applicants, which we label ”hidden cooperation”: Many cooperating firms decide
to divide the patents that result from their cooperation among themselves (Hage-
doorn 2002). Thus, only one of the cooperating firms is named as applicant on
the patent resulting from an cooperation. The inventors, however, belonging to
either one of the two cooperating companies, occur on all patents. We label this
case labor mobility too, since the data we use do not allow distinguishing these
two cases.
For constructing the innovator network both types of connections, cooperation
4For a detailed explanation of using patent data for social network analysis, see Cantner &
Graf (2006).
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and labor mobility, have been identified separately. The following analysis of the
network structure, however, will be performed on the basis of both types of knowl-
edge transfer together. We are aware of the problems using this methodology.
The weakness not to know whether in the observed connection the knowledge
flow is two-sided or not must be accepted at this time.5
Finally, we achieve a network consisting of regional actors and their external
partners as described in the RIS approach. For these networks we observe their
development between 1998 and 2003. As the regional network is too sparse in the
case of one-year time periods, we used four three-year periods with an overlapping
year between the periods. These four subperiods (1998-2000, 1999-2001, 2000-
2002, 2001-2003) allow us to characterize the development of the three regional
knowledge networks and to draw conclusions on the regional knowledge base as
an influential factor.
Knowledge flows and small world properties
We focus on a specific feature of innovator networks, their function as a knowl-
edge transfer channel (Sorenson 2003). Drawing on sociological work related to
knowledge networks (Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992) economic research such as
Newman (1999), Kogut & Walker (2001), Cowan et al. (2004a,b) and Fleming
et al. (2005) analyze innovation networks and knowledge diffusion. Empirical as
well as simulation analyses suggest that a certain network structure fosters the
knowledge flow within the network, the ”Small-World” (SW) property based on
Milgram (1967) and formalized by Watts & Strogatz (1998).
In order to identify the SW property of a network one computes the cluster
coefficient and the mean-shortest-path length. The former represents the num-
ber of the extent the direct neighborhoods for an actor are connected with each
other, the latter indicates the average distance an actor has to all other actors
engaged in the network. SWs show a high clustering coefficient and a low average
path length, and by this sustain the knowledge flow between the network actors
(Watts & Strogatz 1998). The better a network fulfills the requirements of a SW
the better the internal flow of knowledge.
To apply this formal concept of a SW in an empirical analysis, however, one
regularly faces considerable problems. First, such kind of analysis requires in-
5But we are looking forward to cope with this problem in future work.
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formation of all actors involved in a network. A representative sample of actors
obviously does not satisfy this condition. A network constructed on the basis of
patent data information (co-applications, labor-mobility), however, can be con-
sidered complete in this sense - it connects all actors successfully engaged in
inventive activities and willing to patent. Unfortunately, in most cases the latter
do not fulfill a second criterion, the full connectivity of the network. In order to
calculate the average path length, all actors of the network have to be connected
with each other, at least in an indirect way. This is just what full connectiv-
ity means, but what one rarely observes in empirical data. Therefore, empirical
studies often use the largest connected component of a network to test for SW
characteristics (Sorenson & Fleming 2004, Fleming et al. 2005). Here the largest
component is assumed to represent the whole network; this, however, is only ac-
ceptable when it shows a sufficiently high share of the whole network.6
2.3.2. The three regions
The three regions to be analyzed are characterized as follows: The first region,
”Northern Hesse”, contains six ”Landkreise” and its economic structure shows a
strong reliance on established and more traditional industrial activities. The eco-
nomic development of Northern Hesse is shaped by the descent of heavy industries
like railway engineering and defense industry in the late 80’s of the 20th century.
Nowadays regional politicians and business development agencies are trying to
support the emergence of clusters in different technologies. The MOWiN.net for
example is a public financed network of regional business agencies concentrating
on the logistics sector.
The second region we consider is Alpes-Maritimes at the French Coˆte d’Azur.
It is located between the Mediterranean Sea and the Alpes with Nice as the
largest city. Beside tourism the economic performance is strongly dependent on
the successful science park Sophia-Antipolis, located southwest of Nice. Founded
in the early 80’s of the last century, it houses primarily companies in the fields
of computing, electronics, pharmacology and biotechnology. It was created as a
publicly financed project in vacant space, in a region with no university or in-
dustrial tradition. At its initiation, this project was characterized by the absence
of traditional factors influencing the innovative success of regions (Longhi 1999).
6As we will show later on, two of our three regional networks are far from satisfying this
condition.
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Nowadays, over 1300 firms are located within this park and global players like
Hewlett Packard or Phillips Electronics have branch offices there.
The third region under investigation contains the city of Jena, the neighbor-
ing ”Saale-Holzland-Kreis” and two postal code areas next to Jena, Apolda and
Mellingen. This region’s industry structure is clearly dominated by the city of
Jena, strong in several knowledge intensive industries. The economic structure
of Jena has a long tradition and today is still affected by the existence of the
”Kombinat Carl-Zeiss” in times of former GDR. Jenoptik, Zeiss and Schott are
the main successors of this Kombinat. Besides these other optic firms as well as
firms from pharamaceutics, IT and biotech are located in Jena.
2.4. Analysis
2.4.1. Network actors
The components of an innovator network are actors and institutions. Since we
have no information about the institutional endowment of the three regions, we
concentrate on the actors and their characteristics. Among network actors firms
and individual actors hold the largest share followed by public research institutes
which serve a specific role within the network. Their major function is the gen-
eration and accumulation of knowledge, its diffusion into the regional knowledge
stock, and the education of a highly skilled workforce capable of performing high-
level industrial R&D (Fritsch & Schwirten 1999a). Therefore, public research
institutes provide a highly valuable input to the regional innovation system (Graf
& Henning 2006). Furthermore, we distinguish network actors which are located
within the region (internal actors) and those which are external to the region but
hold connections to internal actors.
Northern Hesse
For the network of innovators in Northern Hesse table 2.1 contains information
about the actors involved. The network consists of 212 actors in the period 1998-
2000. Thereof, 105 (49.5%) have been identified as actors located within the
region (internal actors).
Over time the number of actors in Northern Hesse decreases constantly (except
for 1999-2001). In the final period 2001-2003 we observe 174 actors. The share of
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Table 2.1.: Network Actors and their characteristics in Northern Hesse
Years 1998-
2000
1999-
2001
2000-
2002
2001-
2003
Number of actors 212 224 185 174
Development of actors 5.7% -
17.4%
-
5.9%
Number of internal actors 105 107 83 85
Share of internal actors 49.5% 47.8% 44.9% 48.9%
Number of public research centers 8 9 8 8
Share of public research centers 3.8% 4.0% 4.3% 4.6%
internal actors is not much affected by this development (except for 2000-2002)
and stays consistently below 50%.
Looking at public research institutes the network of innovators in Northern
Hesse shows 8 institutes in each period (except 9 institutes in 1999-2001). As the
total number of actors decreases over time, the share of public research institutes
slightly increases from 3.8% in 1998-2000 to 4.6% in 2001-2003.
Alpes-Maritime
Table 2.2 shows that in 1998-2000 the network of innovators comprises 318 actors
of which 180 (56.6%) are identified as internal actors. Contrary to the develop-
ment in Northern Hesse, the number of actors in this regional network is increasing
over time, with a decreasing share of internal actors.
Table 2.2.: Network Actors and their Characteristics in Alpes-Maritime
Years 1998-
2000
1999-
2001
2000-
2002
2001-
2003
Number of actors 318 324 323 358
Development of actors 1.9% -
0.3%
10.8%
Number of internal actors 180 181 169 183
Share of internal actors 56.6% 55.9% 52.3% 51.1%
Number of public research centers 8 7 8 8
Share of public research centers 2.5% 2.2% 2.5% 2.2%
The absolute number of public research institutes is similar to those of North-
ern Hesse, but as the total number of actors increases the share of public research
institutes declines from 2.5% in 1998-2001 to 2.2% 2001-2003.
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Jena
The innovator network of Jena in 1998-2001 comprises 254 actors, whereof 123
(48.4%) are identified as internal actors (see table 2.3). After an increase in
1999-2001 (277), the number of actors remains considerably stable in the in the
following two periods (257, 249). The number of internal actors follows this trend,
so that their share is nearly constant over time and slightly below 50%.
Table 2.3.: Network Actors and their Characteristics in Jena
Years 1998-
2000
1999-
2001
2000-
2002
2001-
2003
Number of actors 254 277 257 249
Development of actors 9.1% -
7.2%
-
3.1%
Number of internal actors 123 135 124 120
Share of internal actors 48.4% 48.7% 48.2% 48.2%
Number of public research centers 18 22 24 25
Share of public research centers 7.1% 7.9% 9.3% 10.0%
Actors belonging to public research institutes are more numerous in the Jena
network compared to the two other networks. We identify 18 institutes in 1998-
2001, increasing over time to 25 actors in 2001-2003. Their share increases from
7.1% to 10%.
2.4.2. Connections and densities
Having discussed the characteristics of the network actors, the structure of each
of the three regional innovator networks will be introduced next. The interactions
involved are the basis of certain network structures to be investigated in further
steps. This systemic character of regional innovative activities mainly shows up
in the number and the intensities of interactions and is less dependent on the
number of innovative actors.
Our analysis is based on the two types of interaction introduced above, the
more formal research cooperations and the interaction by ”labor mobility”. It is
important to recognize here that those connections indicate successful interactions
since they led at least to a patent. Obviously more modes of interaction are
expected to be relevant. Taken these two types of interaction together leads to a
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network which can be viewed as ”a lower barrier of actual relationships”(Cantner
& Graf 2006, p.469).
Table 2.4.: Relationships and network densities in regional knowledge networks
Panel A: Northern Hesse
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
No. of research cooperation ties 30 28 20 18
No. of labor mobility ties 52 56 34 13
Number of connections 125 134 145 66
Number of connections 47 50 32 27
(dichotomized)
Density 0.0021 0.0020 0.0019 0.0018
Panel B: Alpes-Maritime
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
No. of research cooperation ties 36 41 45 36
No. of labor mobility ties 114 108 104 86
Number of connections 178 178 189 141
Number of connections 143 144 155 109
(dichotomized)
Density 0.0028 0.0028 0.0030 0.0017
Panel C: Jena
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
No. of research cooperation ties 161 158 153 152
No. of labor mobility ties 838 856 696 612
Number of connections 1590 1558 1422 1336
Number of connections 915 933 862 757
(dichotomized)
Density 0.0285 0.0244 0.0262 0.0245
Table 2.4 contains information on the number of relationships of both types
for each network. Panel A refers to Northern Hesse, Panel B to Alpes-Maritime,
and Panel C to Jena. The first row in each panel shows the number of research
cooperations. For Northern Hesse this number is decreasing over time from 30
to 18. This type of interaction starts in Alpes-Maritimes with 36 research coop-
erations in 1998-2000, increases to 41 and 45 and then declines to 36. Compared
to these two regions Jena shows a much higher number of research cooperations.
Starting with a number of 161 research cooperations in 1998-2000, which is more
than twice the amount of both other regions together. This number constantly
decreases to 152 research cooperations in the last period. The number of research
cooperations in both German networks are decreasing over time and the formal
interactions are much higher in Jena than in the other two networks.
The second row of each panel provides information about the number of labor
mobility ties. For Northern Hesse in 1998-2000 we find 52 connections and 56 in
1999-2001. After that there is a sharp decline to 34 and to 18 in 2001-2003. A
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similar development is to be observed for Alpes-Maritime. Here the number of
labor mobility ties decreases from 114 in 1998-2000 to 86 in 2001-2003. As for
research cooperations the number of labor mobility ties in Jena is much higher
than in the other two networks. However, their development is similar to the one
of Northern Hesse and Alpes-Maritime. In 1998-2001 we find 838 connections.
This number decreases over time to 612 relations in 2001-2003.
Combining both kinds of connectivity makes up the regional innovator net-
work. The respective aggregated numbers are found in the third row for each
panel in table 2.4. They reflect the total number of connections in the network.
Dichotomizing the observed ties provides information on the number of actors
connected to each other. With respect to get information on the systemness of
the regional innovative activities the dichotomized measure is to be preferred.
Not surprisingly the innovator network in Jena (915 in the first period) contains
the most connections followed by Alpes-Maritime (143) and Northern Hesse (47).
Comparing the first and the last period the number of connections decreases in
all three networks.
The last indicator provided in table 2.4, the network density, completes the
description of the three innovator networks and their development. The density
of a network is computed by the ratio of all ties observed over the number of all
possible ties for the dichotomized network. Hence this indicator relates number
of connections and number of network actors.
While the three innovator networks are rather similar in their number of ac-
tors, with respect to the number of connections clear differences show up. Due
to the much higher number of connections in Jena, the network there shows a
much higher density (about tenfold) than the other two networks. Over time we
observe a slight decrease of the network density in all three regions. For North-
ern Hesse it is the drastic decline in the number of relations (-43%) combined
with a less pronounced decline in the number of actors (-18%) that provides for
a slight decrease of the density from 0.0021 in 1999-2001 to 0.0018 in 2001-2003.
Compared to Northern Hesse the innovator network of Alpes-Maritime shows a
higher density in first period. Due to an increase in the number of actors (12%)
and a decline in the number of connections (-24%) the density declines in 2001-
2003 to 0.0017, a level close to the one in Northern Hesse. For Jena the number
of connections (-17%) as well as the number of actors (-5%) decreases - the lat-
ter much less. However, density stays at the same level (0.0285 in 1998-2000 to
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0.0245 in 2001-2003). Hence, in Jena rather less connected actors seem to leave
the network over time.
2.4.3. Fragmentation
Having shown differences in the density of the three networks, in this subsection
we discuss the structure of networks as a whole and their development. Table
2.5 includes in three panels of information about the structural characteristics of
each innovator network and their development over time.
Table 2.5.: Fragmentation and Components in regional knowledge networks
Panel A: Northern Hesse
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
Freeman Degree 0.769 0.855 0.585 0.406
Fragmentation index 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Number of isolates 121 136 116 114
Share of isolates 57.08% 60.71% 62.70% 65.52%
Number of components 5 6 4 4
Actors in largest component 12 9 4 3
Share of largest component 5.7% 4.0% 2.2% 1.7%
Panel B: Alpes-Maritime
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
Freeman Degree 1.563 1.557 1.505 0.594
Fragmentation index 0.994 0.995 0.989 0.991
Number of isolates 153 152 154 219
Share of isolates 48.11% 46.91% 47.68% 61.17%
Number of components 23 22 16 13
Actors in largest component 14 13 28 33
Share of largest component 4.4% 4.0% 8.7% 9.2%
Panel C: Jena
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
Freeman Degree 7.205 6.736 6.708 6.08
Fragmentation index 0.905 0.882 0.921 0.936
Number of isolates 68 66 69 62
Share of isolates 27.76% 24.91% 28.28% 25.62%
Number of components 2 3 6 7
Actors in largest component 112 114 87 78
Share of largest component 44.1% 43.0% 35.7% 32.2%
The knowledge flow within a network depends on the connectivity of all ac-
tors involved. The pure number of connections is misleading in this respect as it
is not related to the number of potential connections which are possible within
an innovation network. Thus, the Freeman degree7 reflecting the centrality of
7”The number of vertices adjacent to a given vertex in a symmetric graph is the degree of
that vertex” (Borgatti et al. 2002)
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each vertex is introduced here as a first indicator of the overall knowledge flow
within a network. This degree of centrality measures the overall network activ-
ity of individual actors. Concerning our sample the first rows for each panel in
table 2.5 show the Freeman’s degree for each subperiod. We observe (i) that
there exist clear differences between the three regions and (ii) that the values
decline in all three regions over time. So one can conclude for the innovator
network in Jena the entire network is more focused around a few central nodes
than in the two other innovator networks. Graf & Henning (2006) show the in-
creasing importance of public research institutes for the regional network of Jena.
As mentioned before nearly no empirical innovator network will be fully con-
nected. An aggregate indicator for the connectedness of a network is the frag-
mentation index. It denotes the share of pairs of actors that are unreachable
from each other in all pairs of actors; in the context of our innovator networks
this is interpreted as the share of pairs of actors between which no know-how flow
takes place. This index ranges from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates a fully fragmented
network. The second rows in table 2.5 show the fragmentation indices for all
networks and their development over time. In Northern Hesse the index is close
to 1 which means that for this innovator network the share of unconnected actors
is considerably high. The network in Alpes-Maritime has a lower fragmentation
index which is slightly decreasing over time; hence, the connectedness of actors
increases over time. The innovator network in Jena shows the lowest values.
They are slightly increasing over time reflecting the declining absolute number of
connection mentioned above.
The fragmentation of a network is caused by isolated actors and by actors
which are connected in separate components of the network. Two actors are
(not) member of the same component if there is (no) a direct or indirect path
connecting them (Borgatti et al. 2002). The occurrence of several components
in a network indicates that there are networking activities where the knowledge
flows are bounded within different cliques. In innovator networks these cliques
are often technology driven group formations.
Rows 5 to 7 of each panel in table 2.5 display the number of components, the
number of actors in and the share of the largest component.8 In our sample
the innovator network in Northern Hesse consists of 4 (3rd and 4th period) to 6
8In our analysis a component has to consist of at least three actors.
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(2nd period) components. In Alpes-Maritime this number is much higher. Here
starting with 23 components in the 1st period, the number is decreasing to 13
in the last period. Contrary to this development the number of components in
Jena is increasing but on a much lower level. In the first period there are only 2
components identified. This number increases over time to 7 components in the
last period.
In Northern Hesse the largest component comprises 12 actors (5.7%) in the
first period which is rather low. Furthermore, the share of the largest compo-
nent decreases over time to 1.7% in the last period. The largest component in
Alpes-Maritime comprises more actors (13-33) and its share is increasing over
time from 4.4% to 9.2%. In Jena the largest component comprises in the 1st
period 112 von 254 actors which are 44.1%; this share decreases to about 32% in
the fourth period.
The third and fourth rows in table 2.5 show the number of isolates and their
shares. The regional innovator networks in Northern Hesse and Alpes-Maritime
consist of much more isolated actors which are no member of any component. In
Northern Hesse the number of isolates is fluctuating around 120 out of 254 ac-
tors which means that around 60% of all actors are not connected either through
co-applications or scientist mobility. The number of isolates in Alpes-Maritime
is increasing in the last period from around 150 in the first three periods to 219
in the last one. Their share is nearly constant in the first three periods (around
50%) and jumps up in the last period to 61.17% which is highly comparable to
the value of the first observed network of Northern Hesse. The number of iso-
lated actors in Jena is much smaller. Their number is nearly constant over time
and fluctuates between 69 (3rd period) and 62 (4th period). Their share in all
innovative actors is about 25% throughout.
Based on the characteristics of the three regions’ innovator networks with re-
spect to the number of components (smaller for Jena and Northern Hesse; larger
for Alpes-Maritime) and the share of isolated actors (smaller for Jena; larger for
Northern Hesse and Alpes-Maritime) one can conclude that knowledge flows most
easily in the Jena network. The lowest rate of diffusion could be expected in the
regional network for Northern Hesse. Here, a high share of actors is isolated which
means that they are not participating in regional collective learning. The regional
network for Alpes-Maritime is somewhere in between. Interactive learning takes
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place, indicated by a lower share of isolated actors (except of the last period) but
these collective learning activities are concentrated in independent components
rather than in one larger research community (highest number of components;
low share of largest component). Thus, one could conclude that in this regional
network knowledge is shared by independent groups of researchers which might
be due to specificities of the regional technological endowment.
2.4.4. The Small World of Jena
The diffusion of knowledge, however, is not only dependent on the number of in-
teractions but, as already mentioned above, on the network structure. One way to
analyze the regional network structure according to its knowledge flow character-
istics is the small-world concept introduced by Watts & Strogatz (1998). In order
to test for SW properties of a network the largest component has to represent a
sufficient share of the whole network. For Northern Hesse and Alpes-Maritime
the largest component is not representative for the complete network so that we
cannot test for SW characteristics. For Jena, however, the share of the largest
component is always about 1/3 so that it can be used to test for SW character-
istics. Thus, the innovator network of Jena will be analyzed in this subsection
according its small-world-properties.
Small-world networks are identified as a class of random graphs by Watts &
Strogatz (1998). They noted that graphs could be classified according to their
clustering coefficient and their mean-shortest path length. Many random graphs
exhibit a small mean-shortest path9. Furthermore, they also usually have a small
clustering coefficient10. Contrary to random networks, many real-world networks
have a small shortest path but also a clustering coefficient significantly higher
than expected by random chance (Baum et al. 2003). Watts & Strogatz (1998)
propose a simple model of random graphs with (i) a small average shortest path
and (ii) a large clustering coefficient. The crossover in the Watts-Strogatz model
between a ”large world” (such as a lattice) and a small-world has been described
in several studies (e.g. Baum et al. 2003, Cowan & Jonard 2004, Fleming et al.
2005). The most prominent hypothesis regarding the importance of the network
9The mean-shortest path is a global property and measure the averages steps between all
actors of a network. Thus, all actors have to be connected with each other. It measures the
social distance between any two inventors as the minimum number of collaborative links
between them (Fleming et al. 2005).
10Following Watts & Strogatz (1998), the clustering coefficient indicates the the cliquishness of
a typical neighborhood and, thus, it is a local property. It is an indicator for frequent local
interactions.
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structure is that small-world networks should enhance the innovative creativity
(e.g. Watts 1999, Baum et al. 2003, Uzzi & Spiro 2005). According to Watts
& Strogatz (1998) the following network characteristics have to be required to
analyze for its small-world properties of a network:
n k  ln(n) 1
where n is the number of connections within a network, k the number of actors.
These requirements lead to a sparse but connected (k  ln(n)) network. Accord-
ing to the values shown in the first two rows of table 2.6, these requirements are
fulfilled for the largest components of the Jena network over all four periods.
Following Watts & Strogatz (1998) a small-world network lies between a regular
(long path length and high clustering coefficient values) and a random network
(short path length and low clustering coefficient values). Thus, a network which
possesses small world characteristics needs to have an average path length which
is comparable to a random network of the same size and density characteristics
but the cluster coefficient of the real network has to be much higher indicating
that this network is more regular than the random network.
To test for this, the average path length and cluster coefficient values for the
Jena networks and for corresponding random networks are presented in table 2.6.
Actors of the Jena network are connected over longer distances on average in
comparison to the random network. The differences, however, (2.844 in compar-
ison to 2.041 in the first period) are not that large. Thus we conclude that the
observed networks do have relatively short paths. This implies that knowledge
flows relatively rapidly within the component, and the diffusion knowledge pos-
sessed by distant actors, through successive rounds of innovation, can be an active
feature of the network. While the average path lengths are comparable between
regional and random networks, the cluster coefficients are obviously different. For
the first period the coefficient value of the regional network (0.775) is over six
times higher than the value of the random network (0.124). This discrepancy
declines over time which is due to an increase of the network’s density and, thus,
to an increase of the cluster coefficient values of the random networks whereas the
cluster coefficient of the regional networks is nearly constant over time. Based
on these results one can conclude that the network of Jena shows small-world
characteristics for all four periods.
Thus, referring to Watts (1999), Baum et al. (2003), Fleming et al. (2005) the
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Table 2.6.: Small World properties of Jena
1998-
2000
1999-
2001
2000-
2002
2001-
2003
Actors in largest component 112 114 87 78
Number of ties 284 264 228 196
Density 0.123 0.108 0.161 0.183
Network properties of Jena
Average path length 2.844 3.267 2.767 3.015
Cluster coefficient 0.775 0.812 0.773 0.737
Comparable random network
Average path length 2.041 2.125 1.941 1.886
Cluster coefficient 0.124 0.114 0.174 0.202
structure of the Jena network should enhance innovative capabilities of its actors
which is, however, not in the focus of this work. In fact, we are interested in
determinants influencing the cooperative innovation activities of all three regions
under consideration. Therefore, the regional cooperativeness and, thus, the re-
gional networks are represented in the following section by variables which do not
require a complete network like the share of isolated actors.
2.5. Regional knowledge pools and cooperative
innovation
Having discussed the structures of each region’s network and their development
we now want to turn to the two hypotheses formulated in section 2 suggested.
In principle they claim the network structure depends on the pool of knowledge
available within a region (Asheim & Coenen 2005). More specifically we are in-
terested in the impact the pool of regional knowledge spillovers (in the following
knowledge pool) and its structure (in terms of homogeneity) have on the region’s
cooperative innovation observed. Although the working mechanism relating the
regional knowledge base to the region’s innovator network is explained by theo-
retical concepts, empirical evidence on this relation is rather scarce. This is due
to the difficulties of measuring a regional pool of knowledge and the respective
spillovers. In the following we attempt to quantify and structure the knowledge
pools of our three regions and relate this to the hypotheses suggested. For this
we first discuss the regional knowledge base, its homogeneity and development
over time.
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2.5.1. Regional knowledge pools
Size of the knowledge pool
As this study is based on patent data we use the number of patent applications
within a certain period as a rather rough indicator for such a pool. The number
of patents that have been filed for over a longer time span might be much more
adequate as an indicator, but, yet, our sample comprises only information over a
6-year time span. The knowledge pools are indicated through patent applications
in the respective period. This information is displayed in the 1st rows of each
panel in table 2.7.
Table 2.7.: Pool of regional knowledge spillovers and its complementarity
Panel A: Northern Hesse
1. period 2. period 3. period 4. period
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
no. of patents 590 574 463 440
no of technological fields 38 37 36 36
top 5 tech. fields F42 F42 F42 F42
F20 F20 F20 F21
F22 F22 F22 F17
F25 F21 F21 F22
F27 F25 F17 F20
share of top 5 techn. fields 50.51% 54.18% 52.70% 52.73%
Herfindahl Index 0.068 0.068 0.069 0.063
Panel B: Alpes-Maritime
1. period 2. period 3. period 4. period
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
no. of patents 356 389 460 662
no of technological fields 32 33 35 36
top 5 tech. fields F35 F35 F35 F35
F28 F28 F28 F28
F13 F13 F13 F13
F10 F37 F37 F37
F37 F10 F38 F38
share of top 5 techn. fields 51.69% 54.76% 57.39% 62.23%
Herfindahl Index 0.079 0.090 0.090 0.101
Panel C: Jena
1. period 2. period 3. period 4. period
Years 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003
no. of patents 730 814 772 810
no of technological fields 39 38 38 37
ID of top 5 tech. fields F38 F38 F40 F40
F40 F40 F13 F38
F13 F13 F38 F13
F37 F37 F37 F37
F10 F10 F10 F10
share of top 5 techn. fields 77.26% 78.37% 77.59% 79.38%
Herfindahl Index 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.093
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Following hypothesis 1 we would expect that the knowledge pool in Northern
Hesse has to be the smaller than than the one of Alpes-Maritime, while Jena
has to have the largest knowledge pool. For the first period under consideration
we, however, find Northern Hesse (590) has a larger knowledge pool than Alpes-
Maritime (360). The pool of Jena (730) is the largest in this subperiod.
For the following periods we found for all three networks that the interaction
intensity in terms of numbers of connections and in terms of densities is declin-
ing over time. Hence, one should expect the same development to hold for the
respective knowledge pools. Here, however, a development different among the
regions is observable. Whereas the knowledge pool of Northern Hesse knowledge
pool is constantly declining, as expected, the knowledge pool of Alpes-Maritime
is increasing over time. Furthermore, the knowledge pool in Jena is increasing too.
Complementarity of the knowledge pool
In order to test for hypothesis 2 we have to specify the notion of complementar-
ity. This term is used to indicate the average reciprocal understanding between
two member of an innovation network. Therefore, the diversity of the regional
knowledge base is taken into account which means that the amount of knowl-
edge will later on be separated among a technological space. The understanding
within a technology is taken for granted, whereas we assume that there is no
understanding between different technologies. This assumption allows us to dis-
cuss complementarity of the regional knowledge base in terms of its homogeneity.
This procedure limits, somehow, the explanatory power of our empirical analysis,
thus, we will be careful with the interpretation of our empirical results.
To account for the complementarity of the regional knowledge pools we make
use of the IPC, the international patent classification. Each patent shows dis-
tinct IPC codes which characterize the technological knowhow represented by the
patent. The IPC classification allows a detailed view into the technological di-
mensions of knowledge, as the IPC is much too broad to be used in our analysis,
we implement a concordance list developed by Schmoch et al. (2003) in order to
reduce the IPC to 43 technological fields that correspond with NACE industry
codes on a 3-digit level.11
11As the contents of the technologies play no role in this chapter we will use only codes. The
corresponding descriptions can be found in appendix A.
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The registration procedure at the EPO or the DPA allows to list more than
one IPC class on a patent. Therefore, it is possible that a patent is classified for
more than one of the 43 technological fields. In these cases a patent is assigned
to each technological field with the same weight.
To characterize the complementarity of the knowledge base in each region table
2.7 shows (i) the number of technological fields the actors are engaged in for each
period and (ii) the ranking of the 5 most frequented fields (each one identified by
a number between F1 and F43) in each region over time.
We first have a look at the range of technology fields covered by each region.
Obviously, at any point in time no region is engaged in all of the 43 technological
fields. In Northern Hesse the number of active fields is between 36 (3rd and 4th
period) and 38 (1st period). Hence, it is slightly more dispersed than the network
in Alpes-Maritime (increase from 32 to 36). The activities in Jena (39 - 37) show
a similar spread as those in Northern Hesse.
Looking at the most important technologies addressed in table 2.7 we list for
each region the 5 most frequented fields and find a considerably stability of these
structures over time. Looking at the share of patents that have been filed for in
the 5 most frequented technological fields for all three regions this is larger than
50%. The highest share is found for Jena, followed by Alpes-Maritime and then
Northern Hesse, indicating a higher degree of specialization for Jena compared
to the other two regions. The development of this share over time is increasing,
rather stronger for Alpes-Maritime and only slightly for the two other regions.
To further illustrate the technological diversity of the three regions and their
development, we make use of the the concept of Salter curves developed by Salter
(1960). These represent technologies ranked in descendent order by their number
of applications. They ”allow to judge the extent of mobility within this rank-
ing by comparing the Salter curves pertaining to different periods” (Cantner &
Krueger 2004, p.268). Figures 1-3 show a plot for each region. The technologies
are descendently ordered according to their frequencies in the first period.
The figures show that there is a catching-up process taking place by the tech-
nologies following the leading technology in Jena and Alpes-Maritimes while the
general ranking of the technologies stays rather constant. In that respect, there is
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Salter curves of activities in technological fields
Figure 2.1.: Salter curves for
Northern Hesse
Figure 2.2.: Salter curves for
Alpes-Maritime
Figure 2.3.: Salter curves for
Jena
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not much structural change is taking place. In Northern Hesse, however, higher
fluctuations are observed. This leads to reordering of the technologies for that
region over time. Consequently, for Northern Hesse the technological composition
undergoes considerable structural change.
The last index indicating the homogeneity of a regional knowledge pool intro-
duced here is the Herfindahl index. This index takes the whole range of technolo-
gies into account. Actually this index measures the monopoly power on markets;
here it is used to account for the concentration of technologies in a region and
thus it measures the homogeneity of the regional knowledge base. The Herfindahl
index is here defined as the sum of the squared shares of the patent applications
of each technological field in all patent applications. Hence, it can range from 0 to
1 moving from a large amount of small technological fields to a single dominating
technology in a region.
Here, Jena and Alpes-Maritime are rather close together (with a tiny lead of
Alpes-Maritime) whereas Northern Hesse is much less specialized. The homo-
geneity of the knowledge pool in Northern Hesse is the lowest within the sample
(0.068 in the 1st period) and decreasing over time (to 0.063 in the 4th period).
Initially the knowledge base in Jena (0.087) is the most homogenous in our sam-
ple; over time it is increasing to 0.093. The knowledge pool in Alpes-Maritime
starts at a median level of homogeneity (0.079) and then constantly increases
over time (0.101 in the 4th period).
As already mentioned in the theoretical part of this chapter, the diversity of the
regional knowledge base is used as a proxy for its complementarity. This relation
is based on the assumption that there are no complementary effects between
different technologies, only within them. This issue has to be discussed in further
studies, as effects between in addition to effects within technological fields should
be taken into account.
2.5.2. Empirical results
Having characterized the innovation networks in terms of their actors and their
components and having described the size and homogeneity of the regional knowl-
edge pools over time, we are interested in the relationships between the degree of
interaction on the one hand and the knowledge pool variables on the other. As
the number of observations is restricted to three regions and four time periods,
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we have to neglect regional and time specific effects. As we are interested in the
relation between interaction and knowledge pool variables in general, we accept
the weaknesses of this procedure at this stage.
Regional interaction is represented by three variables. First, Ties is the num-
ber of relationships per actor in the regional knowledge network that comprises
labor mobility as well as research cooperation linkages. The more formal research
collaborations (co-patents) within a regional innovation system are included in
the variable Coop in terms of connections in the co-applications network per ac-
tor. Finally, we want to use a variable representing, somehow, the connectivity
of the whole network. As all three knowledge networks are not fully connected
in any time period, the SW variable cannot be used here. So we use the share of
non-isolated actors Noniso as an indicator of network connectivity.
The size of regional pool of knowledge spillovers App is represented by the
number of patent application within a certain time period. Here, the short time
span of our sample prevents us from constructing a regional knowledge stock ac-
cumulated over time. The homogeneity of the regional pool is expressed by the
Herfindahl index Herf .
Table 2.8.: Correlation matrix
Ties Coop Noniso App Herf
Ties 1.000
Coop 0.994** 1.000
Noniso -0.745* -0.698* 1.000
App 0.836** 0.838** -0.727** 1.000
Herf 0.428 0.497* 0.203 0.425 1.000
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Table 2.8 provides the correlation coefficients between the interaction and the
knowledge pool variables. Hypothesis 1 concerns the relationship between the
amount of regional knowledge and the regional interaction structure. Our results
show that the size of the regional knowledge pool Appis positively correlated to
the number of connections in the regional knowledge network Ties (0.836) and
to the number of research cooperations Coop (0.838), both at the 1% level of
significance. More interestingly, App is negatively correlated with the share of
non-isolated actors Noniso (-0.727). Hence, we conclude that an increasing re-
gional knowledge pool is positively related to an increasing participation in the
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regional network of those actors who are already connected to other members
of the network (either by more formal or more informal oriented interactions).
However, it does not enhance the probability of an isolated actor to get connected
to the network.
Hypothesis 2 deals with on the importance of the complementarity of the re-
gional knowledge base indicated by the Herfindahl index for the interaction inten-
sity. As it is shown in the last row of table 2.8, the only significant correlation of
the complementarity indicator is found with respect to the more formal oriented
interaction variable Coop. Thus, we conclude that it is rather the type of inter-
action labeled cooperation (Coop) than the interaction in general (cooperation
plus scientist mobility labeled Ties) that is related to the complementarity of the
knowledge base (Herf).
2.6. Conclusions and future prospects
This chapter deals with the concept of the regional innovation system and related
concepts explaining individual motives and incentives to engage in a collaborative
research project. We apply the theoretical framework of RIS to three regions and
we focus on the core of those systems, the networks of innovators. On the basis
of patent data, we analyze the development of the respective innovator networks
over four overlapping 3-year-periods. The network relationships comprise formal
research cooperations as well as informal labor mobility ties. Regional as well as
extra-regional actors have been associated to the network.
Although, the observed regions are similar in terms of number of actors and
share of internal actors, their networks show a rather different structure and de-
velopment. The actors of the innovator network in Northern Hesse are rather
scarcely connected, most of them are isolated patent applicants. Giuliani (2005)
argues that the dispersion and high rate of isolation of actors in a regional net-
work can be due to the cognitive distance between the actors (Giuliani 2005,
p.11). Right this constellation can be identified for the region of Northern Hesse,
where the dispersion of the regional knowledge base is constantly high over time.
In Alpes-Maritimes and Jena the share of isolated actors is much smaller. In
terms of the overall connectivity we find for Alpes-Maritime an innovator net-
work consisting of numerous components, whereas in Jena most of the actors
of the innovator network are interconnected in one large component. In this
43
sense the regional network in Alpes-Maritime shows a structural similar to the
wine cluster of Colline Pisane identified by Giuliani (2005), whereas the regional
knowledge network in Jena is similar to the network of Silicon valley analyzed by
Sorenson & Fleming (2004). Contrary to this development the homogeneity of
the regional pool increases in Jena and Alpes-Maritime.
The final part of the paper has been devoted to the impact of regional pool
of knowledge spillovers in terms of size and complementarity on the regional in-
teraction structures measured in terms of number of knowledge network ties, of
research cooperations and in terms of the share of non-isolated actors. We find
the size of the regional knowledge base to be positively related to the number
of ties as well as to the number of more formal oriented cooperation ties. This
result is in line with former empirical studies on the regional knowledge base and
its impact of interactions such as Fritsch & Franke (2004) or Sharpe & Martinez-
Fernandez (2006). This increasing tendency is, however, restricted to those actors
which are already engaged in the regional knowledge networks.
Regarding the complementarity of the regional knowledge base under consid-
eration, as indicated by the homogeneity of the regional knowledge base, we find
that there are no significant relations between the number of ties and the share
of non-isolated actors of the regional knowledge base. On the contrary, the ho-
mogeneity of the regional knowledge base is positively related to the number
of cooperations. Thus, we conclude that the technological proximity between
members of a regional knowledge network facilitates the more formal oriented
interactions, whereas more informal interactions take place. The positive impact
of a common technological knowledge base on the cooperation propensity has also
been identified on individual (e.g. Mowery et al. 1998, Cantner & Meder 2007)
as well as on regional level (Fritsch & Franke 2004, Cantner & Graf 2006).
Due to our restricted sample, we do not want to over-interpret our results. The
relations found have to be analyzed on a large sample over a longer time period.
Nevertheless our findings imply that regional actors need to have a common tech-
nological knowledge base to interact in more formal oriented ways.
Our comparative case study provides first insights into the development of re-
gional innovation systems and possible driving forces. Based on our findings, we
will concentrate on more formal oriented interactions when analyzing the rela-
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tionship between regional interaction structure and regional knowledge base more
deeply. Furthermore, the role of regional proximity in contrast to technological
proximity has to be discussed in further studies on firm as well as on regional
levels.
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3. Technological and geographical
patterns in the choice of
cooperation partner
3.1. Introduction
There is an increasing awareness in economic literature that knowledge and in-
tangible assets are crucial advantages for firms in market competition Winter
(1987).1 Thus, the mechanisms and processes of knowledge creation are more
and more in the focus of economic literature. Hereby, the level of analysis differ
between different streams of literature. Authors within the resource-based view
of the firm Penrose (1959) are concentrating on firm level, whereas studies based
on several innovation system approaches (e.g. Malerba & Orsenigo 1997, Edquist
1997) are interested in differences in the performance of whole systems.
Another focus of economic literature is on determinants effecting the willingness
to engage in a collaborative R&D project. Hereby, much has been written on the
impact of different dimensions of proximity on learning and knowledge creation.
These studies are mainly of conceptional (e.g. Nooteboom 2000, Boschma 2005)
or empirical nature, but restricted to case studies (e.g. Wuyts et al. 2005). The
few existing quantitative approaches using a broader data base concentrate on
the impact of one single dimension of proximity (e.g. Mowery et al. 1998, Cantner
& Meder 2007).
This chapter contributes to the literature providing a quantitative empirical anal-
ysis of the impacts technological and geographical proximity have on cooperative
behavior of economic actors and it analyzes the interplay of both dimensions in
this surrounding. More precisely, this chapter is on whether technological and
geographical proximity affects the choice of the cooperation partner. Hereby, the
decision whether to cooperate is not of interest.
In the following I want to shed some light on the question whether technological
1This chapter is based on Meder (2008).
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or/and geographical proximity increases the likelihood of a cooperation in R&D.
After a brief review of both dimensions of proximity in recent literature in section
2 concluding with 4 hypotheses that are going to be tested with the methodology
introduced in section 3, section 4 will provide the empirical results. Section 5 will
conclude.
3.2. Theoretical background
3.2.1. Effects of cooperativeness in R&D
Interorganizational cooperation in the field of research and development (R&D)
has been recognized as important in supplementing the internal innovative ac-
tivities (Hagedoorn 2002) and to increase the probability of innovative success of
organizations (Oerleman & Meeus 2000). There is a clear conclusion in recent
literature that firms improve their innovative capabilities by developing collabo-
rative R&D projects (Faems et al. 2005).
The ways how these cooperations affect the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts
to development new products and processes are manifold. First, cooperation
between firms or between firms and non-profit actors can reduce costs of R&D
among the involved partners (Hagedoorn 2002). This might lead to a reduc-
tion of uncertainty associated with these projects (Cassiman & Veugelers 2002).
This incentive to cooperate is mainly claimed in studies that are based on the
transaction-cost theory. Grounded on this theory, Kogut (1988) explains why
this particular mode of transaction is chosen over alternatives like acquisitions or
other governance mechanism.
Second, cooperation might be driven by the motive to get access to complemen-
tary knowledge and assets which are required for successful R&D projects and
the later commercial success of these (Teece 1986, Faems et al. 2005). Getting
access to complementary knowledge concentrates on the direct results of a R&D
cooperation or, more precisely, on the probability of success of this cooperation
project (Belderbos et al. 2004). This argumentation is contributed by the concept
of the resource-based view of the firm where a firm is seen as a bundle of strategic
resources which are hard to imitate (Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991). Within this
concept, Das & Teng (2000) show that the inducement of R&D cooperations is
influenced by the mobility, imitability and substitutability of internal resources,
and the cooperation structure is selected on the basis of whether resources are
property based or knowledge based.
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The third incentive to engage in collaborative R&D projects is to encourage the
transfer of knowledge (Ahuja 2000, Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996). This motive
is somehow related to the second one but as it deals with long run learning effects
(Ahuja 2000). The access to an external knowledge base does not only improve
the success probability of a single R&D project but it improves the efficiency of
internal R&D efforts. A further stream of literature argues in a very similar way.
Several authors have documented that economic actors can not fully appropriate
the benefits of their innovations. Knowledge flows between economic actors and
the importance of these flows for the innovativeness at the firm level (Jaffe 1986,
Cassiman & Veugelers 2002) and for long run growth of firms (Reinganum 1989,
Griliches 1992) is emphasized. Collaborative R&D projects are one channel to
internalize these knowledge flows (Cassiman & Veugelers 2002). D’Aspremont &
Jacquemin (1988) show that imperfect appropriability increases the incentives to
engage in a collaborative R&D project. Nevertheless, Cohen & Levinthal (1990)
show that the extent to which these knowledge spillovers can be implemented
into firms depend on their internal “absorptive capacities”.
The observation that cooperation has a considerable potential to contribute to
innovation strategies of firms does not mean that such voluntary agreements are
successful though (Faems et al. 2005). On the one hand, imperfect appropri-
ability of knowledge increases the benefits from collaborative R&D projects as
described above, on the other hand it enhances the incentives to free ride on each
other R&D efforts (Kesteloot & Veugelers 1995) and it enhances the possibil-
ity for free-riding by outsiders of the cooperation (Cassiman & Veugelers 2002).
Such unintended knowledge flows (Teece 2002) might be a major reason for the
estimated failure rate of collaborative agreements in general of 60 percent (Bleeke
& Ernst 1993). Other reasons might be ”learning races between the partners[...],
diverging opinions on intended benefits [...] and a lack of flexibility and adapt-
ability” (Faems et al. 2005, p.240).
Hence, the benefits that cooperation brings about are not guaranteed and whether
they are realized depends strongly on whether the cooperation partners fit to
each other in terms of complementarity of resources, aims, and working routines.
Furthermore, the benefits do not explain the mechanism of the choice of the co-
operation partner. Boschma (2005) provides a detailed overview of dimensions
of proximity which are relevant for interactive learning in collaborative R&D
projects.
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3.2.2. Dimensions of proximity in R&D cooperation
this chapter deals with two dimensions of proximity which are, following manifold
streams of literature, essential for interactive learning processes, the technological
and the geographical proximity.
Technological proximity
Following the learning economy approach (Lundvall 2004), knowledge is a club
rather than a public good which is exogenously given. Thus, economic actors
differ among the abilities and set of knowledge resources (Barney 1991). In order
to reduce uncertainty which is inherent in the innovation process, firms search for
routines (Nelson & Winter 1982). Therefore, innovative activities follow paths
(Foss & Klein 2005) where the current development depends on activities in the
past. With respect to the access to external knowledge as an assumed incentive
to cooperate in addition with the concept of the absorptive capacities, one can
conclude that economic actors search for cooperation partner with a comparable
knowledge base.
Recapitulating it can be stated that to absorb external technological know-how
both the sender and receiver of this know-how must have a certain common knowl-
edge base. The larger this common base the better is the understanding which
in turn increases the probability of a common research project. This relationship
is formulated in the following hypothesis H1.
Although interactive learning processes are initially a driving force to engage in
a collaborative R&D project, the knowledge resources are referred to as the com-
petitive advantages of firms. Thus, Nooteboom (2000) argue that the probability
of an involuntary knowledge flow between the cooperation partner increases with
an increasing technological proximity. Furthermore, Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff
(2000) claim that an innovation is often the first combination of already existing
knowledge. Thus, it is assumed in hypothesis 2 that the ability of a cooperation
to create something new decreases when the technological knowledge bases are
too close.
H1: A common technological knowledge base is a prerequisite of a
cooperative R&D project.
H2: If the technological knowledge bases between two actors willing
to cooperate are too similar, the probability of a cooperative R&D
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project decreases.
Geographical proximity
Economic actors willing to innovate rest on a knowledge base that they possesses
themselves or that must be obtain from partners (Cohen & Levinthal 1990).
Several streams of literature refer to geographical pattern in the relations of ac-
quisition of external knowledge such as studies on innovative milieus (Camagni
1991, Capello 1999), innovation networks based on computer simulations (Wer-
sching 2005), on knowledge spillovers (e.g. Jaffe et al. 1993) or regional innovation
systems (e.g. Edquist 1997). All these studies have in common that they pos-
tulate the beneficial effects of geographical proximity, which would seem to be
due in particular, to the possibilities offered by face-to-face contacts (Gallaud &
Torre 2004). According Lundvall (1992), this type of contact is required for the
exchange of tacit knowledge.
However, detractor of this argumentation do not criticize the importance of a co-
location per se, but the explanation behind. Boschma (2005) argue that although
the exchange of tacit knowledge is essential for interactive learning, this doesn’t
need spatial proximity in terms of permanent co-location. He highlights that of-
ten other dimensions of proximity are included into the geographical dimension
such as social proximity. Thus, a common cultural background facilitates the un-
derstanding within a cooperation rather than the pure geographical co-location.
According to these explanations, it is assumed in hypothesis 3 that a geographical
co-location encourage a collaborative R&D agreement, but whether the require-
ment of face-to-face contacts or a common social background is the driving force
behind remain unclear.
H3: The shorter the distance between the actors willing to cooperate
the higher the probability of a cooperative R&D project.
Other dimensions of proximity and interplay between different di-
mensions
On core aim of this chapter is to discuss and to analyze the interplay of differ-
ent dimensions of proximity with respect to the cooperative behavior of economic
actors. The former three hypotheses assume a positive relationship between tech-
nological and geographical proximity and the probability to cooperate. But up to
now, each dimension has been discussed at any one time. Now, it is questionable
whether and to which extent are the effects of technological and geographical
proximity independent of each other. Following the absorptive capacity concept
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by Cohen & Levinthal (1990), Antonelli (2000) suggests that technological prox-
imity is a must for a collaborative R&D project. Thus, Boschma (2005) concludes
that geographical proximity is a derivative requirement for economic actors to en-
gage in such a project. Taking this line of argumentation into account, I assume
in hypothesis H4 that the contemporaneous presence of geographical and tech-
nological proximity has an additional positive impact on the the probability of a
cooperative R&D project and that the geographical dimension of proximity will
lose its impact of this probability.
H4: The combination of geographical and technological proximity has
an additional positive impact on the probability of a cooperative R&D
project.
3.3. Data base
Patent data on firm level are used in order to test for the hypotheses made in
the last section. The data base contains information of patents which have been
filed for Germany between 1998 and 2003. Patents which have been filed by more
than one actor in the year 2003 provide the basis of the study. Using patent infor-
mation for the years before 2003 allows me to characterize various technological
relationships between firms. This information is then used to analyze whether it
is able to explain bilateral cooperations starting in 2003.
I’m careful with an interpretation of the results being aware of the problems
that arise using patent data. These data are suited to characterize the technolog-
ical knowledge base inside a firm which might attract other firms for cooperation.
Two qualifications, however, are obvious here. First, patent data do not represent
the whole knowledge base of a firm, but they are a reasonably good indicator. In
this sense patents satisfy the criteria Combs & Ketchen (1999) have claimed for
competitive relevant resources. They are supposed to be rare, as well as valuable
and specific in their nature. Therefore patent data at least indicate the technolog-
ical competitive advantages a firm has. Second, other incentives influencing the
choice of the cooperation partner likewise exist. Because of this broad German-
wide analysis I cannot include firm structure variables as size, age or industry, it
is acting in. Beside this theoretical justification of using patent data, Griliches
(1990) has shown that patents are sufficient indicator for the innovative output of
firms2. As an innovation is knowledge driven phenomena I assume that without
2For a deeper analysis of patents as innovative output you can read for example Trajten-
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the necessary knowledge base a firm cannot file for a patent.
Dependent variable (Coop)
According to figure 3.1 the formation of research cooperations in the year 2003
are in the focus of this study. In that year 1333 German actors filed for at least
one patent together with a cooperation partner, more precisely, they are named
as applicants with an other applicant on at least one patent application. Foreign
actors are dropped as the information of the independent variables are based on
German data so that the inclusion of foreign actors distort the information and
this tends to result in an overestimation of German actors activities.
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether geographical and technological
proximity matter for the choice of the cooperation partner. Although the incen-
tive to cooperate according to several streams in economics literature are briefly
discussed above, the decision making process whether to cooperate or not is not
of interest here. The initial process of a cooperative R&D project is here assumed
as a two-stage process with, first, a decision to cooperate or not and, second, a
process of searching for potential cooperation partner. In this chapter only the
second stage is observed.
Following this assumed initial process, the main question is not whether an ac-
tor is willing to cooperate or not, but why a certain partner was chosen. To take
this question into account and considering the notion of the resource-based-view
that each cooperation is a unique constellation, the analyses on the hypotheses
are tested on pairs of actors indicating cooperative constellations. More precisely,
only actors that have been willing to cooperate are included into the data set.
So this empirical study is based on information about 1333 German actors which
have been identified as cooperative in the sense described above. Overall, these
actors have been filed for 1089 collaborative patents. In order to answer questions
why these 1089 collaborative pairs were realized and all other combinations of po-
tential cooperation were not, the data set include all possible pairs of German
actors which have been willing to cooperate in the year 2003. So the data set ends
up with 887778 observations (possible pairs cooperation) with 1089 real cooper-
ation. Thus, the dependent variable for the analyses below has a binary nature
with a value of 1 if this pair of actors has filed for a patent in 2003 and 0 other-
berg (1990) who has introduced a weighted scheme to overcome shortcomings of counting
measures.
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wise. The problems of a sufficient estimation model for this unbalanced data set
towards the potential but not realized cooperation (”0s”) will be discussed below.
Measuring technological proximity (TProx)
The reciprocal learning activities depend on ”absorptive capacities” (Cohen &
Levinthal 1990) of both cooperation partner. This common understanding is
regarded in this chapter to technological knowledge which means that I’m inter-
ested in how much technological knowledge of an actor can be understood by a
potential cooperation partner. In a former study (Cantner & Meder 2007) the
term technological overlap was used to express the closeness of the knowledge
bases.
This closeness is expressed by technological differences among firms based on ac-
tivities in the past. To obtain that measure of technological proximity I refer to
information of patent’s technology listed on each document according to the in-
ternational patent classification (IPC). The IPC is a hierarchical system dividing
patents into classes, sub- and sub-sub-classes. In order to reduce this widespread
classification with 8-digit classes a concordance list developed by Schmoch et al.
(2003) is used to convey the IPC into a NACE-oriented classification, containing
43 technological fields.
Based on these fields a measure of technological proximity is constructed to indi-
cate the similarity of the technological knowledge endowment of two actors. As
it is shown in figure 3.1 the technological endowment T of an actor A is indicated
by the number of his patent applications for the years 1998 to 2002. It is possible
that a patent has been filed for in cooperation and in more than one technological
field. In these cases the respective patent is counted for each applicant and in
each technological field like a single-application in one technological field. The
technological proximity TProxA,B between actor A and B is twice the sum over
all minimum activities of both partner divided by the sum of all activities of both
partner.
TProxA,B =
2 ∗∑ni=1min(TAi , TBi )∑n
i=1 T
A
i +
∑n
i=1 T
B
i
(3.1)
This value increases with an enlarging of the technological proximity and has
a maximum of 1. This would imply that the pair of actors have an identical
knowledge base or, more precisely, both have applied the same number of patents
in the same technological fields so the absorptive capacities are at a maximum
for both actors. In the case both actors of a pair have no former patent activi-
ties (
∑n
i=1 T
A
i and
∑n
i=1 T
B
i = 0) the technological proximity between A and B is
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counted with 0. A pair containing a very large and a small firm researching in the
same technological fields would have a lower technological proximity value, be-
cause the understanding is unbalanced in favor of the larger firm which can fully
understand the technological knowledge of the smaller one but not vice versa.
2003
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Cooperation
Information
based on
Patent applications
Activities in 
techn. fields
2002
year
1998 2000
Cooperation experience
Attractiveness
Technological proximity
Figure 3.1.: Research concept
Measuring geographic proximity (GProx)
In the theoretical section of this chapter it is assumed that geographical proxim-
ity facilitates the exchange of tacit knowledge between the partner of a R&D
project. To take the distance in space into account and to test for the as-
sumptions of hypothesis 3, the geographical proximity (GProx) is calculated
by GProxA,B =
1
DistA,B
. Here, DistA,B is the distance between the locations of
actor A and B measured in kilometer according to the postal code which was
named on the patent application. This method has at least two shortcomings.
First, actors are located according to the applicant address listed on the patent
document. However, it is widely known that especially larger firms file for patents
with naming the headquarters address which does not have to be identical to the
location of the R&D process. On the other hand, inventor addresses, which are
named on the application too, are not always the same and for a co-application
it is impossible to differentiate to which firm an inventor belongs to. Hence, the
applicants addresses are used in this study for allocating the actors involved. The
second problem, is on the quality of the distance in kilometer to express ”easi-
ness” to exchange tacit knowledge. Gallaud & Torre (2004) differentiate between
real and functional distance. The later means the real time which is require to get
a face-to-face contact, while the former distance embodies the pure geographical
distance. Although, the functional distance would be a more appropriate mea-
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sure, as it includes aspects of social structures such as transport infrastructures
that facilitate accessibility (Gallaud & Torre 2004, p.5), these information are
not available for this data set and, therefore, I stick to the real distance between
actors.
Control variables
Attractiveness of being cooperation partner (Atr)
The concept of the absorptive capacities concentrates on the ability of the receiv-
ing actor to internalize valuable knowledge of the cooperation partner. Thereby,
the existence of this knowledge is assumed. Cantner & Meder (2007) show that
the existence of the knowledge has independently a positive impact on the choice
of the cooperation partner. To account for the valuable knowledge which is of-
fered by the actor of a certain pair in the data set, variable Atr is included. As it
is shown in figure 3.1, it contains the number of patent applications of the three
years 2000-2002. The values for this variable are calculated as follows:
AtrBA =
∑n
i=1 P
A +
∑n
i=1 P
B + 1∑n
i=1 P
A + 1
AtrA,B = ln(Atr
B
A ∗ AtrAB) (3.2)
So the attractiveness of B being a cooperation partner for A (AtrBA) depend
on activities of B (sum of PB) related to the amount of activities of A (sum of
PA). This is due to the results of Sadrieh & Verbon (2002) who claim that the
overall attractiveness depends not only on the pure amount of valuable knowledge
offered by the potential cooperation partner but also on its balance within the
cooperation. Therefore, in a second step both individual attractiveness values are
multiplied.
Former cooperation experience (Ocoex and Bcoex)
Beside the technological and geographical proximity, Boschma (2005) introduces
the organizational dimension as a further important aspect with respect to col-
laborative R&D agreements. The organizational knowledge of how to manage a
research cooperation is built up from collaborative experiences gathered in the
past. Decarolis & Deeds (1999) show that a stock of organizational knowledge in-
fluences the economic firm performance positively. This dimension of knowledge
is taken into account by two Dummy variables (Ocoex and Bcoex). For the case
that only one of a pair of actors has experience of how to manage a cooperation
the variable Ocoex has a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. The same for Bcoex if both
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actors of a pair of such experience. According to figure 3.1 both variables are
composed of information about the cooperation activities of the actors in the five
years between 1998 and 2003.
Public research agreements (Pr)
The field of economics of innovation public research actors have always been no-
ticed because of their research (e.g. Fritsch & Franke 2004) and their non-market
orientation as special actors within the research community (Balconi et al. 2002).
Jaffe (1989) show in a early work that at the state level the innovative success
in terms of number of patents is positively influenced by private R&D expendi-
ture and, independently, by R&D expenditures of the universities. Furthermore,
Fritsch & Schwirten (1999b) mention that, in the context of analyzing regional
development, public research actors and, more precisely, universities can absorb
knowledge external to a region and deliver this external knowledge to regional
actors. This ”antenna role” is taken into account by the inclusion of the variable
Pr which has a value of 1 if at least one actor in a pair has been identified as a
public research actor.
Descriptive statistics
The data set used in this chapter to test for the hypotheses made above contains
information of 1333 actors. As a cooperation is assumed to be a unique constel-
lation, such a cooperative agreement between two actors is the unit of interest.
These pairs can either be imaginary or real cooperation of the year 2003. So,
the data set includes 887778 pairs of cooperative actors of the year 2003, whereof
1089 are real cooperation and 886689 are imaginary ones.
Table 3.1.: Descriptive Statistics according to cooperative or non-cooperative
pairs
Coop stats TProx GProx Atr Ocoex Bcoex Pr
0
mean 0.011 0.005 0.948 0.398 0.075 0.002
sd 0.088 0.023 1.465 0.490 0.263 0.043
min 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
max 0.471 1.000 8.009 1.000 1.000 1.000
median 0.000 0.003 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of cases with Coop = 0: 886689
1
mean 0.350 0.019 1.039 0.244 0.228 0.001
sd 0.634 0.120 1.496 0.430 0.420 0.030
min 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
max 0.761 1.000 8.009 1.000 1.000 1.000
median 0.014 0.003 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of cases with Coop = 1: 1089
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables which will later on be
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included into the models differentiated by the dependent variable (Coop). First,
the technological proximity (TProx) has for the imaginary cooperation pairs a
mean value of 0.011, whereas the TProx for the real cooperation has a value of
0.350. This obvious difference between real cooperation and potential coopera-
tion supports the assumption of hypothesis 1.
In order to test for hypothesis 3 the reciprocal value of the geographical distance
(GProx) is included into the analysis. Here again, the value for real cooperation
(0.019) is higher than the value for the potential cooperation (0.005). More pre-
cisely, this means that the partner in real cooperation have on average to cope
a geographical distance of 52 kilometers, whereas the partner in the virtual co-
operation have to cope a mean distance of 185 kilometers. This finding supports
the assumption of hypothesis 3 that the geographical proximity facilitates the
exchange of tacit knowledge and, therefore, it fosters the cooperation probability.
Contrary to this, the median value is surprisingly the same for both groups. This
is due to a higher variance of the real cooperation values.
Atr is the first included control variable indicating the balanced attractiveness of
both cooperation partner. Here, the value for the real cooperation pairs (1.039)
is slightly higher in comparison to the value for the pairs of virtual cooperation
(0.948). Contrary to this are the values for the indicator of the cooperation ex-
periences. For Ocoex (only one partner has cooperation experience) the group of
the virtual cooperation show a higher mean value (0.398) than the group of the
real cooperation (0.244). On the other hand, the mean value for the other vari-
able indicating the organizational know-how in terms of how to manage a R&D
cooperation Bcoex is higher for the real cooperation (0.228) than for the virtual
ones (0.075). Finally, the values for the variable whether both cooperation part-
ner are public research actors (Pr) doesn’t differ obviously between both groups.
3.4. Empirical tests
3.4.1. Regression models
The aim of the study is to analyze whether technological and geographical prox-
imity affect the propensity of a collaborative R&D project with the result of a
co-applied patent. Therefore, a set of pairs of all German actors which filed for
at least one collaborative patent in 2003 is used as binary dependent variable.
The binary nature of the dependent variable asks for logistic regression mod-
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els. In logistic regression, a single outcome variable, Yi (i = 1, ..., n), is coded 1
(here for real cooperation) with probability pii, and 0 (here for virtual cooperative
pairs), with probability 1−pii. Then pii varies as a function of a set of explanatory
variables Xi, like technological or geographical proximity. The function is logistic
rather than linear and mathematically it is expressed as follows:
pii =
1
1 + e−β0−β1∗X1i
(3.3)
King & Zeng (2001) show that for strong unbalanced data sets logistic regres-
sions sharply underestimate the probability of rare events and lead to inefficient
results. They suggest two types of corrections, the so called ”prior correction”
(PC−Logit) and the ”weighted exogenous sampling maximum-likelihood estima-
tor” (WC − Logit). The first method computes the usual maximum likelihood
estimator based on prior information about the fraction of 1’s in the sample (King
& Zeng 2001, p.144). They suggest that this information should come from cen-
sus data for example. The data set of this chapter contains information about
whole Germany, so that I assume that the fraction of 1’s for the data base is very
similar to the real value, even if it is calculated for only one period. This first
method to correct for rare events data is easy to apply for each logistic regression
model. The second method suggest by King & Zeng (2001) is to weight the data
to compensate for differences in the sample. This estimator based on the notions
of Manski & Lerman (1977) maximizes not the usual log-likelihood function but
the weighted log-likelihood. Scott & Wild (1986) show that this second method
is less efficient for smaller sample. Although the used data set is sufficient large,
the WC − Logit estimator is not included in this chapter.
3.4.2. Results
Hypothesis 1 is on the impact of the technological proximity (TProx) on the
probability that two actor engage together in a R&D agreement. In the first
regression model M1 the control variables are included into a prior correction
estimation. The coefficient for balanced attractiveness variable Atr show a sig-
nificant positive influence on the cooperation probability. This influence is still
significant when proximity variables are included later on. The organizational
variables show a significant negative impact for the case that only one member
of a pair has cooperative experience, whereas Bcoex indicating that both mem-
ber of a pair have cooperation experience possess a significant positive impact.
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Thus, one can conclude that the groups of cooperative and non-cooperative ac-
tors is highly persistent over time. At this stage it is not known whether actor’s
cooperative behavior is persistent over time or whether pairs of cooperation are
persistent. The latter is more restrictive than the former explanation, thus, I tend
to prefer the first explanation. Furthermore, I found no sufficient explanation for
the surprising significant negative coefficient of Ocoex. If both actors would need
managerial skill of ”how to manage a cooperation” the coefficient should rather
be insignificant. As cooperative agreements are in the field of innovations, this
result contributes to the notions of Malerba et al. (1997) about the persistence
of innovation activities.
Finally, the variable of pairs of public research actors show no significant influence.
Thus, one can conclude that cooperation between public research actors follow
similar rules like cooperation of private and market oriented actors. Notably,
the signs and impacts of all coefficients differ only slightly between both types of
estimations. Therefore, the interpretation will be done later on simultaneously.
Table 3.2.: Estimation models of H1 and H2
M1 M2 M3
PC-Logit PC-Logit PC-Logit
depend. var. Coop Coop Coop
Tprox 1.401*** 1.553***
(0.100) (0.091)
Tprox2 -0.028***
(0.002)
Atr 0.043** 0.047** 0.046**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Ocoex -0.488*** -0.524*** -0.528***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075)
Bcoex 1.118*** 0.685*** 0.654***
(0.076) (0.086) (0.085)
Pr -0.200 -0.199 -0.203
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
(Intercept) -6.742*** -6.755*** -6.755***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Observations 887778 887778 887778
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In order to test for hypothesis H1 TProx is included in model M2. As it is pre-
sented in table 3.2, the coefficient is significant and positive. Thus, hypothesis H1
cannot be rejected for this data base. A small technological distance enhances the
cooperation probability and, so, firms choose their cooperation partner in their
technological neighborhood. This fortifies the statements about the absorptive
capacity theory (Cohen & Levinthal 1990) as well as the resource-based-view of
the firm (Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991). Furthermore, this result contributes to
empirical studies on firm level (e.g. Mowery et al. 1998, Wuyts et al. 2005) as well
as studies dealing with the impact of sectoral innovation systems on the innova-
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tive respectively cooperative behavior of actors within a system (e.g. Carlsson
et al. 2002, Malerba 2005).
In hypothesis H2 it is assumed that this positive impact diminishes when the
technological proximity becomes to large. With respect to technological knowl-
edge this can be due to the fear of involuntary knowledge flows between the
actors (Ronde & Hussler 2005). Another possible explanation of this decrease
in the incentive to cooperate is due to a lower success probability as an inno-
vation is mostly the recombination of already existing knowledge (Etzkowitz &
Leydesdorff 2000). Thus, if the knowledge bases are too close the ability to create
something new decreases (Nooteboom 2000). This assumed negative influence of
a too close technological knowledge base is given for our data as it is shown in
the regression models M3 of table 3.2. Like stated before the linear term of the
technological proximity TProx has a positive impact, simultaneously the variable
TProx2 has a significant negative impact on the cooperation probability. At the
first glance, this result contributes hypothesis H2 because there is an inverted-U
relationship between technological proximity and cooperation probability. But as
it is shown in figure 3.2, the maximum value on the relationship between techno-
logical proximity and cooperation probability is outside the possible range of the
given data.
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Figure 3.2.: Relationship between technological proximity and cooperation
probability
As the technological proximity is a variable fluctuating between 0 and 1, hy-
pothesis H2 has to be rejected. All pairs of virtual and real cooperation constel-
lation are located at the very left hand side in figure 3.2 where the impact of the
technological proximity is strictly positive. This finding is contrary to other em-
pirical studies on firm level (Wuyts et al. 2005, e.g.). This discrepancy to existing
studies might be due to the definition of technological proximity. The 43 techno-
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logical fields based on IPC patent data that are used in this chapter to calculate
the technological proximity describe apparently related knowledge according to
Nesta & Saviotti (2005) rather than homogenous knowledge. Thus, actors filing
for patents in the same technological fields can understand each other, while their
probability to create something new within a R&D cooperation does not decrease.
After testing for the impact of the technological proximity, now hypothesis H3
is tested on the given data base. Here, it is assumed that a low geographical
distances facilitates the exchange of tacit knowledge (Boschma 2005) and, thus,
an increasing geographical proximity boosts cooperation probability. In order to
test for this relationship the variable GProx is included into the regression model
as it is shown in table 3.33.
Table 3.3.: Estimation models of H3
M4 M5
PC-Logit PC-Logit
depend. var. Coop Coop
GProx 3.438***
(0.24)
Atr 0.043** 0.044**
(0.019) (0.019)
Ocoex -0.488*** -0.489***
(0.074) (0.074)
Bcoex 1.118*** 1.111***
(0.076) (0.076)
Pr -0.200 -0.453
(1.00) (1.02)
(Intercept) -6.742*** -6.768***
(0.047) (0.047)
Observations 887778 887778
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The coefficient for GProx in model M5 is significant and positive. Therefore,
hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected for the given data base. The closer two actors
are located, the higher the probability of a collaborative R&D project. This
result contributes to the results of former empirical studies which confirm that
knowledge externalities are geographically bounded (e.g. Jaffe 1989, Audretsch
& Feldman 1996). A shortcoming of this finding, beside the disadvantages that
occur by using the applicants address as discussed above, is the integration of
effects of other dimensions of proximity. Following Boschma it is ”essential to
define geographical proximity in such a restricted manner and to isolate it from
3The coefficients for all four control variables show in model M4 and M5 the same signs and
significance levels. Thus, there will be no deeper discussion of the impact of these variables
in the following.
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the other dimensions of proximity”(Boschma 2005, p.69). In this study effects of
social and geographical proximity are, due to the given data base, summed up
under to notion of geographical proximity. The assumed positive relationship be-
tween geographical proximity and the probability to cooperate can be confirmed
for our data base according to the coefficients of GProx in table 3.3. Given the
same coefficient sign for the control variables as in table 3.2, a nearby location
in geographic space facilitates the initiation of a collaborative R&D project of
two actors. This result is in a line with empirical studies mentioned above and
contributes to the concept of regional innovation systems (Lundvall 1992) where
the individual innovation activity including cooperation in R&D is affected by
co-located actors. Furthermore, it confirms the notion by Gertler (1997) and
Breschi & Lissoni (2001) of tacit knowledge being a common property that is
shared between members of an ”epistemic community” (Breschi & Lissoni 2001,
p.980).
Nevertheless, according to Antonelli (2000) it is hard to imagine that interactive
learning takes place without cognitive proximity, independently of the geograph-
ical location. Thus, Boschma concludes that a combination of geographical and
technological proximity is sufficient for interactive learning, whereas the geograph-
ical dimension can be substituted by another dimension of proximity (Boschma
2005, p.69). Thus, hypothesis 4 is on the interrelatedness of geographical and
technological proximity for the given data set. In order to analyze whether the
combination of geographical and technological proximity has an additional im-
pact on the cooperation probability and whether the results presented in tables
3.2 and 3.3 are persistent if the interaction term is included into the regression
models.
The estimation results of model M6 in table 3.4 show positive significant im-
pacts of the technological and the geographical proximity. The inclusion of the
square term TProx2 in model M7 doesn’t change the significance levels. Thus,
the influence of both dimensions hold on if they are included simultaneously. The
results estimator in the former tables are persistent, more precisely, technologi-
cal as well as geographical proximity facilitates collaborative R&D agreements.
Now, interaction terms according to former models are included into the model,
first, without TProx and GProx (M8) and, second, with them (M9). The linear
interaction term has no influence at all and the squared interaction term has a
significant negative sign in model M9. I conclude, based on the results of M8, that
there is no interplay of both dimensions for the given data set. This conclusion is
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Table 3.4.: Estimation models of H4
M6 M7 M8 M9
PC-Logit PC-Logit PC-Logit PC-Logit
depend. var. Coop Coop Coop Coop
Tprox 1.367*** 1.520*** 1.530***
(0.10) (0.095) (0.095)
Tprox2 -0.028*** -0.027***
(0.002) (0.002)
Gprox 2.958*** 2.948*** 3.011***
(0.32) (0.32) (0.31)
Tprox ∗GProx -2.439 0.148
(3.89) (0.50)
Tprox2 ∗GProx 0.904 -0.120***
(0.91) (0.038)
Atr 0.0477** 0.0471** 0.0465** 0.0469**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Ocoex -0.523*** -0.527*** -0.488*** -0.528***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075)
Bcoex 0.682*** 0.651*** 1.074*** 0.649***
(0.087) (0.086) (0.077) (0.085)
Pr -0.419 -0.429 -0.191 -0.446
(1.02) (1.02) (1.00) (1.02)
(Intercept) -6.774*** -6.774*** -6.746*** -6.775***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Observations 887778 887778 887779 887780
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
confirmed by the significant impacts of TProx and GProx in model M9. Thus,
hypothesis 4 has to be rejected for our data base. However, both dimensions of
proximity independently facilitate the probability of a R&D cooperation. This
finding is for the geographical dimension contrary to the conclusion of Boschma
who claim that ”geographical proximity as such [...] is unlikely to enhance inter-
active learning and innovation. (Boschma 2005, p.71). This discrepancy might
be due to the definition of the term geographical proximity. As mentioned be-
fore this label may include other dimensions like social proximity. Nevertheless,
one can conclude that beside the technological proximity at least a mix of other
dimensions facilitates collaborative projects in R&D independently.
3.5. Discussion and conclusion
Cooperation in the field of R&D has been widely discussed in several streams of
economic literature. One focus is on effects of such agreements on performance
on individual (e.g. Combs & Ketchen 1999, Oerleman & Meeus 2000, Belderbos
et al. 2004) as well as on systemic level (e.g. Raspe & van Oort 2006, Asheim
& Coenen 2005). Another body of literature is on determinants influencing the
willingness to engage in such cooperation projects. this chapter is related to the
second focus by asking how economic actors which have made their decision to
cooperate search for an appropriate cooperation partner.
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In this chapter patent data are used to identify the influences of technological and
geographical proximity on the probability of cooperation agreements in the field
of R&D. Thus, it contributes to the manifold existing literature on the incentives
to cooperate by analyzing the impacts of single dimensions independently and
how these influences are related to each other. The main findings of this chapter
are:
• Technological proximity between two economic actors enhance the proba-
bility that they initiate a collaborative R&D project together.
• A negative effect of knowledge bases that are too close related as suggested
by Nooteboom (2000) and other studies can not be shown for this data base.
This might be due to measurement of technological proximity. Here in con-
trary to Wuyts et al. (2005) for example, the relatedness of the knowledge
bases is calculated rather than the similarity.
• Actors located nearby in geographical dimension are more likely to initiate
a R&D project together than actors located far away to each other.
• Contrary to Boschma (2005), this effect persists when both dimensions are
tested within one model and when an interactive term of both dimensions is
included into the regression model. Thus, I conclude that there is an effect
of geographical proximity which is independent of technological proximity.
In economic literature there is a long and still ongoing discussion about the
usage of patent data for empirical studies. Griliches (1990) show that patents are
a sufficient indicator for innovative success. Beyond using patent for indicating
the innovative performance of firms or regions, economists interested in innova-
tion networks often use patent citation data to identify the impact of networks
on the innovative performance (e.g. Sorenson et al. 2005). In this chapter patent
data are used (i) to identify collaborative R&D agreements, to allocate actors in
(ii) technological and (iii) geographical space. As already discussed above this
methodology has some important shortcoming like the problem of using the ap-
plicants postal code for geographical allocation, but nevertheless, patents are a
core resource for firms Combs & Ketchen (1999). Furthermore, the availability
and the objectively measurement are strong advantages of this methodology.
The findings of this chapter contribute to the learning economy approach in a
sense that it could be shown that firm A is more likely to engage in collabo-
rative R&D projects with partner possessing valuable knowledge which can be
understood by firm A due to a common knowledge base. Furthermore, firm A is
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searching for partner that are located nearby which is a hint for the requirement
of face-to-face contacts for the exchange of tacit knowledge according to Polanyi
(1966). After analyzing determinants influencing the choice of the cooperation
partner, deeper studies on how these determinants affect the success of collabo-
rative projects are necessary. Thus, further studies on the rate of granted patents
might be a next step as this chapter is only on patent applications.
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4. Regional and technological
effects on cooperative innovation
activities
4.1. Introduction
Looking at how innovative activities are distributed over time, between regions
and among actors delivers non-equal distributions.1 Industry life cycle approaches
(e.g. Klepper 1996) take into account the time dimension, regional economics
refers to the spatial dimensions and entrepreneurship research is devoted to par-
ticular innovative actors. Equivalent observations can be made with respect to
cooperative innovation activities, which shows up when particular innovations
are not performed by a single actor but a group of actors. For this Allen (1983)
coined the notion of collective invention. And also here non-equal distributions of
collective invention/innovation are observed with respect to time (e.g. Hagedoorn
& Schakenraad 1992), to regions (e.g. Cantner & Graf 2006) and to actors. The
focus of this chapter is laid on cooperative innovation activities and the influ-
ence regional factors on the one hand and technological factors on the other have
herein.
Why do actors engage in cooperative innovation activities? Generating inno-
vations in terms of new products and processes is often closely connected to and
dependent on knowledge bases outside the innovating firm (Powell 1990). To get
access to these external knowledge sources, firms or actors engage in joint (for-
mal and informal) research projects. Hence, those collaborations are not only a
device to share costs and risk of development as mentioned in the approach of
the ”transaction cost theory” (Williamson 1985), but also to get access to exter-
nal knowledge (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996, Mowery et al. 1998, Combs &
Ketchen 1999, Das & Teng 2000). In this context a major issue is the way or
1This chapter is based on Cantner & Meder (2008b).
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the criteria by which firms select external knowledge sources. This choice seems
to be dependent on (1) the relationship between an actor’s or firm’s internal and
external knowledge and (2) the ease by which firms or actors can get access to
external knowledge sources. Furthermore one may ask for whether actors in order
to improve their innovative performance look for complements or for substitutes
of their own knowledge (Caloghirou et al. 2004, Belderbos et al. 2006).
Answers to these questions are found in the literature on innovation systems
(Edquist 1997). Such systems are to be seen as a device allowing the exchange
of knowledge and cooperative innovation activities between a system’s actors.
Generally, firms and innovative actors are member of several of those innovation
systems, starting from the level of national innovation systems, comprising sev-
eral layers of technological or sectoral innovation systems, and finally integrating
in regional and local innovation systems.
For an understanding of cooperative innovation activities of actors one obvi-
ously cannot rely on only the one or the other of those levels. In principle they
all should be considered simultaneously. In this chapter, however, we do not take
into account the layer of national innovation systems as we are only concerned
with panel data from Germany. Hence, we presume that all actors in Germany
are equally affected by the German national innovation system.
Within the frame of this system we focus on technological and on regional
systems. These two systems represent each a specific aspect of the easiness to
access knowledge external to the firm, the former one on the basis of technological
proximity and the latter one on the basis of geographical (or social) proximity.
Investigating differential cooperative innovation of actors both of these views are
relevant. Take first actors located in different regions and observe differences in
cooperative innovation. Obviously regional factors and hence spatial proximity
play a role; but we cannot exclude that technological proximity and hence the
technological or sectoral composition of the regions are negligible. Secondly, look
at differences in cooperative innovation between technologies and sectors. Again,
technological proximity and therefore technological and/or sectoral determinants
have to be considered; but you also cannot neglect regional factors whenever we
observe a spatial clustering of those technologies or sectors.
This chapter is just on the relationship between both kinds of proximity ex-
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plaining regional differences in cooperative innovation. Looking at cooperative
innovation taking place in and between certain technologies and certain regions
one may ask as to what degree do observed regional differences relate to the tech-
nological composition of a region and to what degree does a region itself have
an influence? In the following we want to shed some light on this question and
suggest a solution to identify the differential regional impact on regional differ-
ences in cooperative innovation. After a brief review of literature in section 2, in
section 3 we show how a methodology attempting to identify regional effects in
cooperative innovation. Section 4 and 5 contain an application of this method
to patent data for Germany between 1998-2003 allowing us to track cooperative
innovation. Section 6 concludes.
4.2. Theoretical background
The focus of this chapter is laid on regional differences in cooperative innovation
and the influence regional factors on the one hand and technological factors on
the other have herein. To understand the procedure in section 3 where we suggest
to distinguish between regional and technological effects, we first will have a brief
look at the literature on cooperative innovation and the related literature on
innovation systems.
4.2.1. Cooperative innovation
The manifold literature on voluntary, collaborative projects in the field of research
and development differentiate between three main motives for the engagement of
individual firms in such projects. Beside the incentives to (i) reduce risk and
sharing R&D costs (Deeds & Hill 1996, Baum et al. 2000) and (ii) to combine
complementary assets in order to enhance to propensity of a successful develop-
ment project (Teece 1986, Nooteboom 1999), (iii) the internalization of knowledge
spillovers is another reason to engage in R&D collaboration (Griliches 1992).2
An explanation why firms consider the internalization of knowledge spillovers
useful is found in the concept of the resource-based-view of the firm (Penrose 1959,
Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991). There, the main incentive to engage in a research
2The positive impact of knowledge spillovers is a fundamental issue of recent approaches to
growth theory (Krugman 1991) as well as to concepts of innovation systems (Lundvall 1992,
Malerba & Orsenigo 1997). Both can be applied to the regional level leading to the concepts
regional growth (Fritsch 2004b) and of a regional or local innovation system.
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cooperation is to get access to productive resources, here mainly technological
knowledge, of the partners (Das & Teng 2000, Sher & Yang 2005) with the aim
to improve its own performance. The role of a firm’s or actor’s environment for
this performance in general and on its innovative performance in particular is
highlighted and discussed by the concept of innovation systems (Lundvall 1992).
4.2.2. The general concept of innovation systems
In the literature on technological and economic change the aspect of collective
invention and collective innovation is taken up by the so-called systemic approach
which meanwhile offers various levels of ”systems”. Generally systems are defined
as a ” set or arrangement of things so related or connected as to form a unity or
an organic whole (Webster Collegiate Dictionary).
According to Carlsson et al. (2002), a system is made up of components, re-
lationships and attributes. A component is a operating unit of a system. This
can be either a physical unit such as a firm and other actors or it can posses
a more intangible nature as institutions in the form of legislative artifacts such
as regulatory laws, traditions, and social norms. The systemic nature shows up
whenever these components do not act in isolation but are related to and interact
with each other. Hence, a development of relationships can be observed which,
however, does not necessarily predict a specific action but it implements a re-
action of components to an action by an other component. So each component
depends on the properties and behavior of all other system members.
Therefore, a system cannot be divided into several subsystems that are inde-
pendent of each other (Blanchard & Fabrycky 1990). According to Carlsson et al.
(2002), the components of a system will react if another component is removed
from the system. Both the components and the relationship between them con-
stitute the whole system. The attributes, as described by Carlsson et al. (2002),
define the characteristics of a system. The boundaries of a system (Edquist 2001)
isolating the system from the rest of the world depend on the respective attributes
of actors.
Applying this abstract definition to the field of innovation economics, one finds
a strong systemic view of innovative activities and a respective literature on in-
novation systems considering innovation as an evolutionary and social process
(Edquist 2004). Here innovations in terms of new processes and products are
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stimulated by factors internal as well as external (Doloreux & Parto 2005) to
actors. The social aspect of these innovations refers to collective invention (Allen
1983) and in a systemic view to collective learning processes between indepen-
dently acting system entities.
With respect to the motivation of individuals to engage in cooperative inno-
vation the main purpose of innovation systems is the generation, diffusion and
utilization of knowledge (Lundvall 1992). Thus, the key features of a system
are different capabilities which are related to this main purpose. Carlsson et al.
(2002) differentiate between selective, organizational, functional and learning ca-
pabilities. Furthermore, these features are related to the dimension in which
systems are analyzed.
4.2.3. Co-existing levels of innovation systems
Levels of systemic innovation
Based on the constituting elements of a system one can distinguish several kinds
or levels of analysis. The combination of several attributes makes up the respec-
tive level and for that the type of actors, their location, their kind of activity, the
type of relationships are relevant. With respect to systemic innovation we dis-
tinguish analyses towards national innovation systems (Freeman 1988, Lundvall
1992), technological systems (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991), sectoral innovation
systems (Malerba & Orsenigo 1997), regional innovation systems (Cooke 1992),
local innovation systems (Breschi & Lissoni 2001), urban innovation systems (Fis-
cher et al. 2001) etc.
Taking the perspective of an individual actor, ”membership” in various inno-
vation systems is obvious. A firm located in a certain region may belong to the
regional system, one or several technological or sectoral systems (multi-product
firm), one or several national innovation systems (multinational firm) etc. This
multiple membership constitutes in various activities related to cooperative in-
novation and, in turn, the firm’s general attitude towards cooperative innovation
is influenced and dependent on the very features of all the levels of innovation
systems involved. Hence, they all have to be considered simultaneously. In doing
so and in order to understand cooperative innovation and differences herein the
respective effects have to be disentangled.
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This process of disentanglement runs in two stages: First, in view of the relevant
research questions one selects the level of analysis and systems to be considered.
Second, on this basis one attempts to identify the effects accruing form the various
system levels considered. However, as it turns out, rather generally one is only
able to determine differential effects, that is effects above or below the average
influence of a certain system. A method how to perform this is suggested in the
next section.
For this chapter which deals with cooperative innovation of German firms the
disentanglement runs as follows: For the various feasible levels of analysis we do
assume the national innovation system to affect all the firms the same way.3 We
then consider the regional dimension on the one hand and the technological di-
mension on the other as major determinants of cooperative innovation. In doing
so, regional, local and urban innovation systems represent the regional aspects,
whereas technological and sectoral systems are related to the technological di-
mension.
Technological proximity
The concepts of technological innovation systems (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991,
Carlsson et al. 2002) or sectoral innovation systems (Malerba et al. 1997) point
to the fact that actors engaged in the same technology or the same sector are
more able to understand the others’ technological knowledge than actors from
different technologies or sectors. In both concepts the boundary of the innova-
tion systems is justified by the specificity of a sector or the technology in terms
of a certain knowledge base and key interactions within this sector or technology
system (Malerba et al. 1997). The main idea behind this concept is that inno-
vative and cooperative behavior of actors is mainly driven by proximity in their
individual knowledge bases.
The concept of technological proximity is a rather vague one. It has at least
three, closely interrelated dimensions. First, there is the degree of common un-
derstanding in the sense of common or overlapping knowledge bases among the
actors. Second, understanding is not only related to the type of the knowledge
3We are aware of differences in the legal and fiscal frame and thus in the national innovation
system between countries. However, we apply this method as a tool for testing differences
between regions within one country so that we can neglect the framework of a national
innovation system and methodological problems that occur by comparing regions located in
differen countries.
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base but also to the respective actors level of knowledge and hence to the so-called
technology gaps between actors. Third, so-called technological regimes charac-
terizing a sector or a technology play a role. Here the degree of appropriability
of know-how - which never is fully complete - determines the easiness by which
of know-how spills over from one actor to another and how cooperation works
herein. This degree of appropriability differs considerably among technologies
(Doloreux & Parto 2005).
Technological proximity defined in this way can now be used to describe co-
operative innovation. And here one may conclude if actors are engaged in the
same technology or industry this proximity is rather close. Obviously, the higher
(lower) the technological proximity the more likely the knowledge stocks of the
actors are substitutive (complementary).
Spatial proximity
The regional innovation system approach (RIS) developed from the empirically
based acknowledgement that innovation is a geographically bounded phenomenon
(Asheim & Isaksen 2002, Cooke et al. 1997). The discovery of the importance
of the regional scale and of regional resources in stimulating the innovative ca-
pabilities of firms is the major issue of this approach (Asheim & Isaksen 2002).
The concept of a local or regional innovation system (RIS) (Cooke et al. 1997)
emphasizes interactive research and development activities on a face-to-face ba-
sis and, thus, low geographical proximity as a main driving force of cooperative
innovation. The concept of geographical proximity comprises several dimensions
such as low transaction costs compared to long distance interaction, advantages
of face-to face interaction in exchanging tacit knowledge, and the importance of
social relationships especially with respect to trust.
Recent literature on RIS often deals with certain regions and describes their de-
velopment in a rather narrative way. In regional science approaches the existence
of a RIS is appreciated by pinpointing cooperative innovation to constitute a main
ingredient to explain regional economic growth (Fritsch 2004c). It is close spa-
tial and social proximity that promotes and eases the exchange of knowledge and
information and thus contributes to collective learning and creation of knowledge.
With respect to system boundaries in the RIS concept those boundaries are
given by the geographical term ”region”. Following Cooke (2001) a region is a
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meso-political unit above local governments and below nations. It might have a
certain homogeneous culture and history (Cooke 2001, p.953). The operational-
ization of this concept, however, is not an easy task and one more than often
relies on political or administrative boundaries.
Based on these brief characterization of the regional and technological dimen-
sion of innovation systems, we conclude that within the broad concept of inno-
vation systems there exist several independent streams focusing on different at-
tributes of actors and, thus, dealing with different kind of innovation systems. We
argue that a main shortcoming of the innovation system concept, beside method-
ological issues (deeply discussed in Carlsson et al. 2002), is the co-existence of
different types of innovation systems at the same place and at the same time.
Empirical studies dealing with one of type of system usually ignore the presence
of other levels and types of innovation systems.
In answering our research question whether there are differences in coopera-
tion behavior among regions, we want to take into account that effects from the
technological dimension are also prevalent. In doing so identifying differences be-
tween regions with regard to the number of cooperative innovations or even the
share of cooperation agreements in all applications is not a sufficient measure for
the differential strength of the respective regional innovation systems. A simple
reason for this is that a region with a high tendency to cooperate consists of
establishments, mainly firms, that show characteristics of sectors or technologies
that are more likely to engage in co-application or in R&D cooperation (Fritsch
2003). Hence, in the next section we suggest a method able to distinguish be-
tween regional effects of cooperative innovation and the effects accruing to the
technological dimension.
4.3. Concept of Relative Regional Impact
Based on the theoretical background introduced in the last section, in the fol-
lowing we suggest a method allowing to identify (differential) regional effects on
cooperative innovation. Our methodology is based on the assumption that re-
gional and technological innovation systems are the two most important types
of innovation systems innovative agents are engaged in. A further assumption is
that regional and technological effects are independent of each other so that they
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can be isolated.
4.3.1. General Methodology
Our analysis requires several types of information about innovations: (1) the
actor(s) involved in generating an innovation, (2) the region(s) those actors are
located in, and (3) the technology field(s) an innovation belongs to. With (1) we
cover the issue of cooperative vs. non-cooperative innovations, with (2) we take
into account the regional dimension, and with (3) we have at hand information
about the technological dimension. For these three categories we introduce a for-
mal representation.
First, we take into account n innovations indexed by i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}. The
technological space within which innovations are created is f with different tech-
nologies index j ∈ F = {1, .., f}. Here it is entirely possible that an innovation
i ∈ N is related to more than one technology j ∈ F . The spatial dimension of
innovative activities is represented by the regions r indexed by k ∈ R = {1, .., r}.
Here it is also possible that the R&D activities for innovation i have taken place
in more than one region k ∈ R. This is the case whenever innovation i is the
result of a cooperation between actors located in different regions. However, we
will observe a spatial distribution of innovation i also in the case where the inno-
vative actors belong to different branches of the same firm which are located in
different regions. To distinguish between both possibilities we take into account
information on whether an innovation i has been developed in cooperation or not.
The relationship between innovations, technological field, spatial distribution
and cooperative innovation are formalized as follows. The assignment of all in-
novations n to the technological fields f is are summarized in matrix A. A is a
n× f matrix with a typical element:
aij =
1 if innovation i is related to technology j0 otherwise (4.1)
The spatial distribution of innovations N is represented by the matrix B. B is
a n× r matrix with a typical element:
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bik =
1 if innovation i has been developed by actors located in region k0 otherwise
(4.2)
A spatial distribution of an innovation i occurs whenever different research
groups cooperated in a R&D project resulting in innovation i. Whether these
research groups work for different economic actors (e.g. firms or universities) is
indicated in vector γ. γ is a vector of length n with a typical element:
γi =
1 if innovation i has been developed by more than one actor0 otherwise (4.3)
In addition and as a variant to general cooperative innovation we suggest a
vector γ˜ which contains information about cooperative innovation taking place
within a region. This vector is again of length n with a typical element:
γ˜i =

1 if innovation i has been developed by more than one actor,
all located in the same region
0 otherwise
(4.4)
Given this information we propose a method able to identify regional effects
on cooperative behavior by separating technological effects. Hence, the first step
is to account for the technological effects.
The technological dimension of cooperative innovation
Our first step focusses on the technological dimension of innovation. The aim is
to indicate the propensity of cooperative innovation for each of the technologies.
Since innovations regularly are related to several technologies we need to know to
what degree an innovation i is related to each of the f technologies. Hence, for
each innovation i we determine weights with respect to each of the f technologies.
Matrix A which contains the unweighed values is the starting point. Dividing
each element aij of row i by the sum of all elements
∑f
j=1 aij just leads to the
weights required. Matrix Aw contains these weights. It is a n× f matrix with a
typical element:
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awij =
aij∑f
h=1 aih
(4.5)
The sum of the elements of row i in matrix Aw is equal to one. We here
assume that all technologies related to innovation i show the same weight.
In order to distinguish between innovative and cooperative activities among
technologies, each row i of matrix Aw is multiplied with the corresponding value
γi of vector γ. The result is a matrix A
wc comprising only the technology weights
of cooperative innovations. Awc is a n× f matrix with a typical element:
awcij =

awij∗γi∑f
h=1 a
w
ih∗γi
if γi = 1
0 otherwise
(4.6)
Matrices Aw and Awc are now used to determine average cooperation behavior
for each technology. For that we sum up the elements of each column (technology
field) in Aw and Awc. In the former case we get an account of the number of
innovations related to technology j, in the latter case of the number of related co-
operative innovations in that technology. The ratio of both magnitudes indicates
the propensity of cooperative innovation in technology j. The ratios of all the
technologies are included in vector pc.4 It is a vector of length f with a typical
element:
pcj =
∑n
i=1 a
wc
ij∑n
i=1 a
w
ij
(4.7)
At this point, however, one has to be careful in interpreting this ratio as a purely
technological effect. Since the cooperative innovations considered are affected by
both technological as well as regional effects the ratio computed contains the spe-
cific technology based propensity to cooperate as well as an average influence of
regional effects.
Equivalently to the procedure above we can restrict the analysis to cooperative
innovation taking place only within the region. For that each row i of matrix
Aw is multiplied with the corresponding value γ˜i of vector γ˜. The result is a
matrix A˜wc comprising only the technology weights of cooperative innovations
which have taken place within regions. Using now matrices Aw and A˜wc we can
compute the propensity of cooperative innovation represented by vector p˜c which
does not only comprise the technological effects but also the average intra-regional
4We assume that there is at least one innovation in each technology. Therefore, we do not
distinguish several cases in equation 4.7
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effect.
The regional dimension of cooperative innovation
In a second step we focus on the regional distribution of innovation in general
and of cooperative innovation in particular. Equivalent to the procedure above,
we determine the weights by which an innovation i is related to regions k ∈ R
where the actors innovating i are located. Matrix B contains the unweighed
relationships. Dividing each element of row i by the sum of all elements of row
i delivers the respective weights; here to each region related to innovation i the
same weight is assigned. Matrix Bw contains the results. It is a n × r matrix
with a typical element:
bwik =
bik∑r
l=1 bil
(4.8)
Multiplying each element bwik of matrix B by the element γi of vector γ leads
to the spatial distribution of the cooperative innovations. The resulting matrix
is Bwc. It is a n× r matrix with a typical element:
bwcik =

bwik∗γi∑r
l=1 b
w
il∗γi
if γi = 1
0 otherwise
(4.9)
Matrix Bwc contains information about the regional distribution of cooperative
innovation independent of whether the cooperation is within the region or between
different regions. Using γ˜ instead of γ leads to a matrix B˜wc which contains
information on cooperative innovations internal to the region.
The expected value of regional cooperative innovation In a third step, we
compute an indicator stating the expected number of cooperative innovations in
a region k. For this index we take into account the technology specific propensity
for cooperative innovation of the previous section which contains also the average
regional effect. We start by computing the number of innovations of technology
j in region k. The respective numbers are stated in a matrix C with r rows
(regions) and f columns (technology fields).
This r × f matrix Cw contains information about the number of innovations
that have been developed in technology j by actors from region k. Cw is computed
by:
Cw = Bw
′ ∗Aw (4.10)
Bw
′
is the transposed matrix Bw. Cw is used to create an indicator of what
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we call the ”expected number of cooperative innovation” (eck) of region k. It
indicates how many cooperative innovations are to be expected in region k taking
into account the technology specific propensities for cooperative innovation pcj of
those technologies which are used in region k. Vector ec contains the expected
number of cooperative innovation for all regions k. It is a vector of length r with
a typical element:
eck =
f∑
j=1
cwkj ∗ pcj (4.11)
Observed and expected value of regional cooperative innovation Were coop-
erative innovations within a region solely affected by technological determinants
(and an average regional effect) - implying that their are no differential regional
effects on cooperative innovation - the observed number of cooperative innova-
tions has to be identical to the expected number. In order to test for this, in a
final step, for each region r the ratio between observed and the expected coopera-
tive innovations is determined. For that we compute the column sum of elements
of matrix Bwc. This just leads to number of all cooperative innovations observed
in each region. For each region we take this sum and divide it by the respective
expected number of cooperative innovations eck. The region specific ratios further
called ”relative regional impact”-index or RRI are contained by vector v. It is a
vector of length r with the typical element:
vk =
∑n
i=1 b
wc
ik
eck
(4.12)
This ratio takes values between 0 and infinite. At a ratio of 1 the number co-
operative innovations observed in a region is just equal to the expected number.
A ratio different from 1 indicates that there exists a differential regional effect
above or below the average regional effect. Regional cooperative innovation above
(below) the average is indicated by a positive (negative) ratio.
Using instead of Bwc the matrix B˜wc one achieves at a vector v˜ which contains
the ratio of realized intra-regional cooperations to the expected ones. The inter-
pretation is equivalent to the one above. The difference is that above we identify
regional effects on cooperative innovation in general whereas here we look at re-
gional effects on intra-regional cooperation.
Using this ratio to determine differential regional effects of cooperative inno-
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vation has two advantages. First, it is independent of the data base. Below we
will use patent data to test whether these regional effects on cooperative innova-
tion exist; but this method can be applied to any other data base on innovation
activities which includes information about technology, spatial distribution and
cooperation. This data for example can be based on firm survey data.
Second, this indicator is independent of the size of a region as measured by the
number of cooperative innovations observed in that region. Hence, agglomera-
tion effects or the strength of a regional innovation system we want to measure
cannot be attributed simply to the size of the region but have to do with above
average propensity to cooperate. Here, one alternatively may think of the ra-
tio cooperation per innovation doing the job. However, this ratio is not able to
take into account the differences of cooperative innovation related to the spe-
cific technologies a regions hosts. Taking into account the pure intra-regional
dimension may deliver additional information on the regional innovation system.
Because of these advantages, we suggest our ratios to be used for indicating the
strength/weakness of a regional innovation system and to track its performance
over time.
4.3.2. Method application
Before we start to apply the method to real data we want to exemplify it with
the help of a simple example. We consider three innovations, hence i = {1, 2, 3}
and n = 3. These innovations are related to two technologies (TF1 and TF2),
so that j = {1, 2} and f = 2. The inventors are located in two different regions
(R1 and R2), hence k = {1, 2} and r = 2. Two of those three innovations are
generated by two actors and are identified as cooperative innovation. We do not
consider the case of intra-regional cooperation but the more general case. The
data are as follows:
Table 4.1.: Example - data
Innovation Techn. field Region Cooperative innovation
Innovation 1 TF1 R1 and R2 coop
Innovation 2 TF1 and TF2 R1 and R2 no coop
Innovation 3 TF2 R2 coop
With respect to this example matrix A is a 3× 2-matrix:
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A =

1 0
1 1
0 1

Matrix B is a 3× 2 matrix:
B =

1 1
1 1
0 1

Vector γ indicating whether innovation i is cooperatively generated contains
the following elements:
γ =

1
0
1

With these data, first the technological dimension is analyzed. The absolute
values in matrix A are weighted by the number of technologies j innovation i is
related to. The outcome is matrix Aw:
Aw =

1 0
0.5 0.5
0 1

Proceeding the same way for cooperative innovations (γi = 1) leads to the
matrix Awc:
Awc =

1 0
0 0
0 1

The two matrixes contain information about the relationship between all in-
novations on the one hand and cooperative innovations on the other hand to the
two technology fields. Both matrices are used to compute the propensity for co-
operative innovation in each of the two technologies. The result is contained in
vector pc:
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pc =
(
0.66
0.66
)
Here for both technologies we get the same propensity to cooperate of 0.66.
In a second step, the regional dimension of innovation and cooperative inno-
vation is considered. Proceeding analogously to the technological dimension we
obtain Bw for the regional distribution of all innovations and Bwc for the coop-
erative innovations:
Bw =

0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0 1

Bwc =

0.5 0.5
0 0
0 1

The third step sets into relation the technological and the spatial dimension
using all innovations. The result of multiplying the transpose of matrix Bw
′
and Aw is shown in matrix Cw which has the dimension 2 × 2 (2 regions and 2
technologies):
Cw =
(
0.75 0.25
0.75 1.25
)
The expected share of cooperative innovations for each region is computed by
multiplying matrix Cw with the vector of the cooperation propensity pc. The
result is a vector ec which has a length of 2 according to the number of regions:
ec =
(
0.66
1.33
)
According to the technological classification of all innovations in region 1 and
2, the expected cooperation value in region 1 is twice (1.33) the value for region
2 (0.66). Finally, the observed number of cooperative innovations for each region
k, indicated through matrix Bwc, is related to these values. The final result are
RRI indexes included in v.
v =
(
0.75
1.25
)
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In our example in the first region the observed cooperative innovations are less
than one could expect (0.75) according to its patent application behavior among
all technologies, whereas in the second region observed cooperative innovations
exceed their expected value (1.25). Within our theoretical context this suggests
that for region 2 there is a regional effect working fostering cooperative innova-
tion above the average; in region 1, contrariwise, factors seem to be present not
fostering or even preventing cooperative innovation.
4.4. Data base
The methodology introduced to identify differential regional effects on coopera-
tive innovation will now be applied to a specific source of information about in-
novations, patent data. The sample contains data about patent applications for
Germany between 1998 and 2003. This information is taken from the ”Deutsche
Patentblatt” publication which includes data from the German patent office as
well as data from the European patent office (EPO). The use of patent data to
account for innovations implies that we in fact do not consider innovations but
inventions. Since any economic results reaped by the new idea are not included.
Consequently, here we are concerned with cooperative invention and not cooper-
ative innovation.
Technological dimension in patent data
Regarding the methodology introduced before, the first dimension of interest
refers to differences in innovation and cooperation concerning different technolo-
gies. Therefore, the code according to IPC, the international patent classification,
is used which allows to classify patents technologically. The characterizing codes
are stated on each patent document. This classification allows a detailed view on
certain technologies. However, for our purposes the IPC classification appears to
be too much differentiated. In order to reduce the number of dimensions, we use
a concordance list developed by Schmoch et al. (2003) which in the end contains
43 main technological fields; those correspond well with NACE industry codes on
a 3-digit level. On this basis the technological space comprises 43 technological
fields, so that f = 43.
The registration procedure at the EPO or the DPA allows to list more than
one IPC class on a patent. Therefore, rather regularly a patent is classified for
more than one IPC class. The transformation of the IPC assignment to the 43
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technology classes obviously reduces the number of cases where several technolog-
ical classes are ”mentioned” - the remaining cases of co-classifications, however,
are non-negligible. For those cases we assume that each of the technology fields
addressed has the same weight.
Regional dimension in patent data
According to the regional dimension, patents have to be assigned to certain re-
gions. The patent document allows for two modes of allocation, the address(es)(1)
of the applicant(s) or (2) of the inventor(s). The first alternative has a strong
weakness as many companies and institutions filing for a patent state the head-
quarter’s address. This necessarily assigns a too high emphasis on agglomeration
areas where headquarters are more common. An example proper is the city of
Munich where the headquarters of Siemens as well as of the Fraunhofer and Max-
Planck-Institute are located. Relying on applicants’ addresses would push Mu-
nich in an exaggerated top position since not all inventions behind the patents
by Siemens, Fraunhofer and Max-Planck were generated in the region ”city of
Munich”. They were generated in many other places in Germany (or elsewhere),
just the places where the inventors are located. Hence, the second alternative
just overcomes this pitfall. Accordingly, a patent is allocated just to that regions
the addresses of the inventors listed on the patent document belong to.
Just like a patent may be filed for several technology fields, there may be more
than one region the inventors of a patent are located. We accordingly assign the
patent activity to all regions where the inventors come from. And to each region
addressed the same weight will be assigned.
For the spatial grid we use the concept of the planning regions (”Raumord-
nungsregionen”, later on we will use the abbreviation ”ROR”) developed by the
”Deutsches Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumplanung”. Due to this concept
Germany is divided into 97 regions with the objective of including all - or at least
as much as possible - labor mobility within one region. Therefore, we assume that
the residence and workplace address of an inventor lies within the same planning
region. Based on this regional grid the set of regions in our study amounts to
r = 97.
Cooperative patents
Patent data can also be used to account for cooperative innovation. Cooperative
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innovation is understood here as any innovation where more than one actor has
been involved in the generation of innovative knowledge. This cooperation can
be formal or informal, it can be explicitly stated or implicitly assumed.
In principle patent data allow to identify two modes of interaction between
innovative actors, co-application and scientist mobility Cantner & Graf (2006).
With respect to the former, a co-application is given when on a patent document
more than one actor is stated as applicant. With the data at hand we neither
can distinguish between formal and informal cooperation nor can we differenti-
ate between different kind of actors. Hence, a co-application may be the result
of a common R&D project among firms, between firms and public research in-
stitutes or among public research institutes. Even a co-application between an
individuum and one of these three kind of actors can be observed, although this
case is rather rare. Since we have no information at hand about the ”creative”
share of each applicant we consider their contribution as of the same ”amount”.
Consequently, we weight each co-applicant equally.
There, however, exists an additional source of the occurrence of cooperative in-
novation, scientist mobility. Consider the case where inventor Z works for firm X
during the whole period of time and is listed on a first patent I; a second patent II
is the result of a R&D cooperation between X and Y, where, however, only Y has
filed for this patent and where inventor Z has been involved. Since in general all
the inventors are listed on the patent application, we find Z as inventor on both
patents. By this, even without a co-application for patent II we can assume that
there has been knowledge exchange between X and Y by the mean of inventor
Z. This is labeled cooperation by scientist mobility. Accounting for the empirical
relevance of this case, in a firm survey done in 2006 only every fourth patent being
the result of an R&D cooperation has been applied by both cooperation partners.
A caveat of this indicator is that knowledge flows by scientist mobility link only
in one direction. For these two reasons we decided to further analyze cooperative
innovation only on the basis of the first mode of interaction, co-application.
In applying our approach to the German patent data by the way of 43 techno-
logical classes and the 97 regions we refrain from treating intra-regional cooper-
ative patents. This decision is based on the fact that the 43/97 assignment does
not allow us to observe a sufficient number of intra-regional cooperative innova-
tions. Hence, when we refer to regional effects on cooperative innovation than
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it is the regional effect on being cooperative in general, that is independent of
whether the cooperation partners are inside or outside the own region.
Descriptive data
Our analysis is based on patent data for the period between 1998 and 2003. These
data are available on an annual basis. Some descriptive statistics as given by ta-
ble 4.2 characterize our data base.
Table 4.2.: Description of the data base
Abbr. Description Database
T time series 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N number of patent N1 =
28151
N2 =
31736
N3 =
34206
N4 =
33842
N5 =
17045
N6 =
24254
applications
C No. of co-applications C1 =
1459
C2 =
1584
C3 =
1684
C4 =
1625
C5 =
765
C6 =
910
Propensity of 5,18% 4,99% 4,92% 4,8% 4,49% 3,75%
co-applications
I number of technologi-
cal fields
43 43 43 43 43 43
R number of regions ob-
served
97 97 97 97 97 97
First, the number of patent applications increased slightly over time and shows
an abrupt cutback in 2002 related to the burst at the worldwide stock mar-
kets. Second, the number of cooperative patents followed a similar development.
Third, a slightly declining propensity of cooperative patenting can be observed
over time. Fourth, in each year at least one patent has been assigned to each of
the 43 technological fields spanning our technological space (I). Fifth, in each
year at least one inventor is assigned also to each of the 97 regions of our spatial
space (R).
To smoothen variations over time, our approach is applied to moving periods
with one year overlap. We use a moving 3-year average, leading to 4 subperiods t.
To ease notation we label each of these subperiods by the middle of the respective
three years, hence, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002.
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4.5. Results for cooperative innovation activities in
Germany
4.5.1. Technological dimension of cooperative innovation
This section looks at the differences in patenting behavior between technologies
and focusses on co-applications and their development over time. We consider
each of the four subperiods.
Figure 4.1.: Amount and development of patent applications
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Figure 4.1 shows the number of patent applications for each technology class
(F = 43) for each period t. In each period most of patents have been filed for in
technology class 43 (motor vehicles). The technology with the fewest number of
patent applications in each period is class 12 (paints and varnishes). Hence, there
obviously exists an unequal distribution of patenting activity among technologies.
To have a closer look at those differences we refer to Gini coefficients.5 For
that table 4.3 states the number of both the total patent applications and the
5The Gini coefficient developed by Gini (1921) is a measure of inequality of a distribution. It
is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1: the numerator is the area between the
Lorenz curve of the distribution and the uniform (perfect) distribution line; the denominator
is the area under the uniform distribution line.
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total number of co-applications. For both we computed the Gini coefficient with
respect to the 43 technology classes. Since the data is normalized in this proce-
dure, the coefficients between the two different variables can be compared.
Table 4.3.: Application and co-application distribution regarding technological
fields
Period
1
Period
2
Period
3
Period
4
1999 2000 2001 2002
Applications no. of 31364 33261 28364 25047
Gini coefficient 0.557 0.560 0.562 0.568
Co-applications no. of 1563 1619 1358 1100
Gini coefficient 0.534 0.532 0.532 0.539
Co-appl. Prob. mean 0.061 0.059 0.053 0.048
median 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.048
min 0.015 0.015 0.000 0.000
max 0.129 0.135 0.106 0.095
Gini coefficient 0.238 0.242 0.218 0.231
We first observe that the inequality between technologies concerning patent
applications is always above 0.55 and considerably constant over time. Hence,
the number of patent applications is not equally distributed between the observed
technologies. Tracking the Gini coefficients over time indicates that the inequal-
ity is not changing much. Obviously this does not tell us anything about the
development in each of the technology classes. However, the visual inspection of
figure 4.1 shows some persistent pattern herein.
Although these finding seems to be somehow trivial they are of importance
for our understanding of regional innovative performance. For this we refer to
Griliches who shows that the relationship between patent applications and R&D
is close to be proportional for all industries (Griliches 1990, p.1702). We conclude
from this that differences in number of patents in each class is an indication for
differences in the innovative activities and in the innovative performance among
those classes. Hence, the distribution of patent applications mirrors the distribu-
tion of innovative activities in the technology classes. For our research question
this implies that the level of regional innovative activities and performance de-
pends among others on the respective regional composition in terms of industries
or technologies.
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We secondly find the Gini coefficient for co-applications being slightly lower
than the one for patent application. Its value is always above 0.53 and also
remains rather constant over time. The same interpretation applies here: the
degree of regional cooperative innovation is dependent of the regions type and
composition of industries and technologies.
This result easily can be related to literature on R&D cooperation. Respective
empirical studies often deal either with firm characteristics influencing cooper-
ation behavior (Miotti & Sachwald 2003, Belderbos et al. 2004) or concentrate
on the impact of cooperations on firm performance (Oerleman & Meeus 2000,
Lo¨o¨f et al. 2001, Thornhill 2006). In this context of certain interest are orga-
nizational practices affecting firms’ performance for which one often observes a
slow diffusion of best practices due to difficulties in imitating complex organiza-
tional capabilities (Teece 1986). Applying this to the organizational device ”to
cooperate” may already explain sustained performance differences of firms within
and between industries. And extending the argument one may discuss differences
between certain technologies (characterizing industries). The empirical evidence
on this issue, however, is rather scarce.
Both the development and the distribution of this co-application propensity
are shown in figure 4.2. The mean value of the co-application propensity declines
from 6.1% in 1999 to 4.8% in 2002. In other words the number of co-applications
decreases more than the number of applications. The inequality between the 43
technological fields remains rather stable. However, its level is much lower in
comparison to the Gini coefficients shown for applications and co-applications.
Obviously, there are differences between technology fields in terms of the propen-
sity to co-apply. The lowest value is in the first two periods slightly above zero
(1.5%) and 0 for the last two periods, while the maximum value is about 13%
in the first two periods and about 10% in the third and fourth one. Interpreting
these propensities one has to take into account that they contain the respective
technological or sectoral dimension but also the (for all the technologies the same)
average regional effect on cooperative innovation.6 This is due to the fact that
for the observed co-applications we cannot extract the sheer technological effects.
6More precisely, for each technology this propensity contains the technology specific effect
and and the average regional effect pertaining to those regions the respective technology is
”located” in. However, due to the broad definition of the 43 technology classes we observe
each technology at least once in each of the 97 regions.
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Figure 4.2.: Distribution and development of the propensity for co-application
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On the basis of the observed differences in co-application propensity between
technologies or sectors the question is whether this already can explain regional
differences in cooperative innovation in the following sense: Consider two regions
differing in their composition of technologies or industries. Take into account
the observed sectoral or technological differences in cooperative innovation. If
one of the regions consists of more cooperative sectors and the other region of
rather non-cooperative sectors, then regional differences can be readily explained
by regional composition of industries and their respective propensity to co-apply.
Then an additional regional factor is not working.
4.5.2. Regional innovative and cooperative behavior
Having shown that there exist differences in cooperative patenting among tech-
nologies, differences in regional cooperation behavior are analyzed now. In a first
step we observe regional differences in patent application. Figure 4.3 shows how
the overall number of patents is distributed over all 97 regions.
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Figure 4.3.: number of regional applications and its development
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There are two outstanding regions, Stuttgart (ROR 72) and Munich (ROR 93)
with the highest number of patent applications. While this can attributed to
automobile industry in the former case, in the latter it is due to public research
institutes such as Fraunhofer or Max-Planck whose headquarters are located in
Munich.
Equivalently to table 4.3, the regional distribution of patent applications and
co-applications is shown in table 4.4. The Gini coefficient of about 0.54 for the
regional distribution indicates a regional inequality similar to the one among
technology fields (about 0.56). This level remains roughly constant over all four
periods. Accordingly, in addition to technology related effects on patenting there
are regional effects to be considered.
Looking in a second step at co-applications they regionally are obviously more
equally distributed than applications. The Gini coefficient is somewhat lower at
about 0.49 and rather stable over time. This observation suggests that for ex-
plaining cooperative innovation effects related to technological classes addressed
are more discriminatory than effects related to the regions the innovators are lo-
cated in.
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Table 4.4.: Regional distribution of patent applications and co-applications
period
1
period
2
period
3
period
4
1999 2000 2001 2002
Applications no. of 31364 33261 28364 25047
Gini coefficient 0.547 0.551 0.545 0.545
for regional distr.
Co-applications no. of 1563 1619 1358 1100
Gini coefficient 0.493 0.491 0.501 0.482
for regional distr.
Equivalent to the technological differences in co-application, the observed dif-
ferences in cooperative innovation on the regional scale comprise both regional
effects and the average effect of those technologies contained in the respective
regional composition of industries or technologies. The next step now is to ex-
tract the technological effects. This is done by applying the technology or sector
oriented propensity to co-apply.
4.5.3. Differential regional effects on cooperative innovation
In this final step we separate the technology specific effect and the average re-
gional effect on cooperative innovation in order to get an index for the differential
regional effect. For this we use the expected regional number of co-applications
computed on the basis of the industry or technology composition of a region and
relate it to the observed number of co-applications.
Figure 4.4 shows for the 4 periods analyzed and for all 97 ROR the observed co-
applications (black line) as well as the expected number of co-application (bars).
We find first that the expected number of co-applications for each region differs
from the observed one. However, comparing regional differences in the absolute
numbers leads to a size dependent bias. Therefore a relative account is required.
Following equation 11, the ratio between observed and expected regional inter-
action just renders this as it looks at cooperative innovation above or below
average. This RRI index is shown for each of the 97 regions and for each of the
4 sub-periods in figure 4.5.
A RRI of 1.0 means that the level of regional cooperative innovation is as high
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Figure 4.4.: Observed and expected regional co-applications
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as the realized one and thus that cooperative innovation in this´regions is aver-
age. RRIs below and above one indicate a level of cooperative innovation below
and above average. Looking at the computed RRIs the disparity between the
regions is considerably high.
This observed disparity of the RRIs among the regions indicates that there are
regional effects on cooperative innovation. Since we here focus on cooperative in-
novation in general and not on the restricted case of only intra-regional relations,
the regional effects detected for RRIs above respectively below 1 can neither be
interpreted as the existence or lack nor as the strength or weakness of a regional
innovation system in the respective region. For that to hold, a closer inspection of
the cooperative arrangements and an additional analysis of intra-regional cooper-
ative innovation are required. Hence, the differential regional effects we computed
work on the region-specific attitude of actors to engage cooperative innovation
independent of whether the cooperation partners belong to the same region or not.
Having shown visually that there are differences of regional effects of coopera-
tion behavior, we want to show that the distribution of RRIs is significant different
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Figure 4.5.: Ratio of observed to expected regional co-applications
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from 1. If the calculated values do not differ significantly from this value, this
would imply that to explain regional differences in cooperative innovation one
has to refer only to the regional composition of technology classes. Therefore, the
distribution of the RRIs has to be tested. First, we apply a Shapiro-Wilk test to
test for normal distribution. Table 4.5 shows that the RRIs in all four periods are
not normally distributed. Referring on this result, we use Kolmogorov-Smirnov
equality-of-distributions test in order to calculate whether the RRIs differ signif-
icantly from a normal distribution with an expected value of 1. In table 4.5 the
corresponding corrected p-values are presented. For all four periods we found
p-values below a critical 1% level which implies a refusal of the null hypothesis
that the distribution of the RRIs have a mean value of 1. We can conclude from
these results that the RRIs have a non-normal distribution with a higher variance
than a normal distributed variable and a mean value which differs significantly
from 1.
Hence, our visual impression on the existence of differential regional effects on
cooperative innovation are substantiated by the statistical tests in table 4.5. Con-
sequently, for our sample regional differences in cooperative innovation are not
only affected by the composition of regional technology base (technology classes)
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Table 4.5.: Tests on differences between observed and expected co-application
amount
period 1 period 2 period 3 period 4
ratio minimum 0.300 0.308 0.323 0.456
maximum 3.195 3.000 3.820 3.647
std. dev. 0.583 0.546 0.619 0.599
Shapiro-Wilk-test
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
but also significantly by specific regional effects.
Looking more specifically at the results we find the lowest RRI over all peri-
ods except the third for the city of Trier in Rhineland-Palatinate with 0.299 to
0.456. Technologies located in that region call for a much higher number of co-
applications than observed. The highest RRIs of the first and the fourth period
are found for Hochrhein-Bodensee in Baden-Wuerttemberg (3.195 and 3.647); in
the second and third period the region of Uckermark-Barnim in Brandenburg
shows the highest RRIs (3.000 and 3.820).
A different visual representation is chosen in appendix A where we show a
map of Germany with 97 regions. The regions are colored in accordance to their
respective RRIs. A darker color indicates a higher RRI for this region. Two
observations are interesting. First, those regions which are assigned as most in-
novative in terms of total patent applications, especially those in the southern
part of Germany, show a considerably low RRI. Hence, here the level of coop-
erative innovation is lower than expected. Secondly, by and large all regions in
Eastern Germany show a higher level of cooperative innovation than expected.
These differences in the cooperative innovation between East German actors
in comparison to actors located in the Western part has been discussed already
in Cantner & Graf (2003) and Graf (2006). There a significant higher level of co-
operative patenting has been found for the regional innovations systems of Jena
and Dresden (two East regions) and the systems of Heidelberg and Ulm (two
West regions). To find an explanation for this one may refer to other empirical
work related to comparison between the eastern and the western part of Germany
such as Brixy & Grotz (2004) or Fritsch (2004b). Looking at the firm level such
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work concludes that differences of the performance between newly founded firms
in both parts of Germany that these differences are due to ”the region-specific
stock of knowledge capital and knowledge spillovers, as well as other locational
conditions, such as density of economic activity, the industry mix, and the char-
acteristics of the regional innovation system.” (Fritsch 2004b, p.540). It would
be interesting to dig deeper into those relationships and to ask for influence of
regional innovation systems, to discuss the necessity and efficiency of cooperative
innovation, and to look at the role of knowledge bases, human capital and actors’
structure.
However, one reservation has to be made. One obviously may in this context
question whether the higher RRIs in East German regions can really be attributed
to a higher intensity of co-application and therefore cooperative innovation. One
may argue that this may also have to do with a different attitude towards apply-
ing for patents. With respect to the latter one could think of a higher propensity
for ”private applications” in East Germany. Graf & Henning (2006) suggest that
many firms in the respective regions are young. If these start-ups fail the patent
rights are a part of the insolvency. In order to prevent this the inventors in
Easter Germany might tend to list themselves as applicants. Consequently, al-
though those inventors belong to the same firm and the same region we have to
consider them as co-applying since they a listed with different private addresses.
This case seems to be more frequent in Eastern Germany with the consequence
of a higher number of co-applications.
To substantiate this a more in-depth investigation along the lines briefly men-
tioned above is required and left over for future work. For this we consider the
characteristics of the regional innovation systems as most interesting to be ana-
lyzed.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter suggests a method to disentangle regional and technological effects
on cooperative innovation activities. The importance of both effects are main-
tained by approaches on the sectoral and on the regional innovation system.
Generally, studies on cooperative innovation activities deal only with one of the
both concepts although actors engaged in cooperative innovation activities can be
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considered to be member of both types of systems. The difference between both
concepts lies in the definition of the boundaries of a system, i.e. how they define
the set of system members in contrast to the rest of the world. Authors like Carls-
son & Stankiewicz (1991) or Malerba & Orsenigo (1997) stress the technological
proximity within technological or sectoral systems that furthers cooperation. The
regional innovation system approach (Cooke 1992) looks at spatial proximity and
face-to-face contacts which ease the exchange especially of tacit knowledge.
We show how to distinguish between both effects and how to disentangle them
in empirical work. For this we introduce the RRI which relates the expected
degree of cooperative innovation activities of a region to the observed one. Ap-
plying this method to patent data for Germany between 1998-2003 we identify
regional differences in cooperative innovation activities for Germany which can
not be explained by technological determinants and the technological or sectoral
composition of a region.
Having identified differential regional effects on cooperative innovation activi-
ties are necessarily has to go on with an analysis of the intra-regional cooperative
innovations - which we left out as explained above. This will be the next step we
will pursue.
Furthermore a deeper analysis of where those differences come from is required.
We expect the regional knowledge base according to several dimensions to have
a major impact. This will be a second focus of future work.
Related to this another avenue of future research follows from the implicit as-
sumption in this chapter that the propensity to cooperate in each technology
is exogenously given. Other work on cooperative innovation activities such as
Hagedoorn & Schakenraad (1992) indicates, however, that cooperative innovation
activities shows a certain time pattern. Hence, an issue here is to concentrate on
regularities of cooperative innovation activities among technologies with respect
to the age of the technology or the age of the sector. Insights from technological
life cycle studies can be used to explain why there are differences in the cooper-
ation propensity among certain technologies. For this to work out, a data base
comprising information about a longer time period is required. This will be the
third focus of our future research.
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5. Regional effects on cooperative
innovation activities and the
related variety of regional
knowledge bases
5.1. Introduction
In the past decades the conditions of economic growth evolved to be focused on
knowledge, learning and innovation as the driving forces.1 Through improve-
ments in communication and transport technologies the traditional production
factors labor and capital become minor important. The wealth of a nation re-
lies on the ability to create new knowledge and commercialize such knowledge
(OECD 1996, Acs 2002, Sharpe & Martinez-Fernandez 2006). Innovations are
characterized as new products or processes with a certain economic value (Cooke
et al. 2004). Several analytical framework deal with the conditions, requirements
and environments of creating and developing innovations.
This chapter focuses on the ”Regional innovation system” – approach. This con-
cept developed in the last 15 years stress on the importance of regional factors
for the innovative capability of firms. Based on a survey of recent literature we
conclude that this approach recognizes the importance of regional interactions
between certain kind of actors, but doesn’t explain the individual circumstances
and incentives of an actor to engage in an interactive process with other actors.
As the concept is on the regional innovative capability, we are interested in the
development of German regional interactive structures. With using concepts of
the learning and knowledge based economy we argue that the regional interac-
tive structure depends on the regional knowledge base and in particular on the
heterogeneity of the knowledge present within a region.
The study is organized as follows. First, a theoretical part, where we introduce the
1Thus chapter is based on Cantner & Meder (2008c).
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theoretical concepts and the roots of the RIS–approach, is presented. Through
a critical survey of theoretical and empirical literature about this topic, we as-
sume three hypotheses. Afterwards, we concentrate on our methodology where
a measure of regional effects on cooperative innovation activities and a concept
of how to measure the dimensions of regional knowledge will be introduced. The
results based on this methodology are presented and discussed in the last part of
the chapter.
5.2. Theoretical background
This chapter analyzes regional innovation systems, their performance, and the
factors determining the working and the success of such systems. The increasing
popularity of this and related concepts leads to a confusing jungle of definitions,
while the presence of such innovation systems in real world remains obscure (Do-
loreux et al. 2004, p.143). In this section a shaped concept is provided starting
with a rather abstract definition of a system. Based on that, we consider systems
in the context of innovation and here focus on regional innovation systems.
5.2.1. Systems of Innovation
Starting rather generally, a system may be defined as a set of entities, real or
abstract, comprising a whole where each component interacts with or is related
to at least one other component. As a system forms a more or less dense ”whole”,
one should be able to discriminate between the system and the rest of the world
(Edquist 2001, p.4). A straightforward solution does not exit as different systems
serve different purposes, so that the observed variety of systems is not surprising
(Carlsson et al. 2002, p.233). Hence, any specification of this abstract definition
of a system requires distinguishing between important and unimportant entities
and interactions. The identification of what is unimportant depends on the pur-
pose of the system.
Applying the idea of a system to innovation issues acknowledges that the ma-
jority of innovative activities are not pursued by individuals in isolation but that
innovation is a social and interactive process, where the behavior of a single actor
is stimulated by his environment (Edquist 2004). Interaction in the context of
innovation systems mainly refers to the exchange of knowledge and information -
on a formal as well as on an informal basis - with the ultimate aim to create new
knowledge allowing for innovations. The entities or components of the systems
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are individual actors and organizations such as firms or public organizations on
the one hand and on the other hand institutions (Edquist & Johnson 1997, p.47)
governing interaction among these organizations (Kubeczko et al. 2006, p.706).
These institutions comprise trust, reciprocity and reputation, special technolog-
ical fields and competence areas. They are developed within the system and
further the overall function of an innovation system to finally create and com-
mercialize innovations (Asheim & Coenen 2005). The systemic view of innovation
is based on ”complicated two-way-relationship of mutual embeddedness between
organizations and institutions” (Edquist 2001, p.6). First, each component is re-
lated to the whole system, that is the behavior and development of organization
like firms, universities or political actors, is driven by the set of institutions within
the system. Second, the development of system’s institutions is a process due to
the systems actors. In a nutshell, the principal goal of an innovation system to
increase innovative and economic performance of a region is pursued by the sys-
temic interactions (Doloreux 2004, p.483) of various actors.
Any analysis of innovation systems has to take into account first that a system
is a connected ”whole” which cannot be divided into subsystems without loosing
any interactions or relations: As Blanchard & Fabrycky (1990) show a system
is more than the sum of its parts. Second, as institutions and organizations are
related two-sided and there are feedback processes between relations and compo-
nents, a system approach is always dynamic (Carlsson et al. 2002, p.234).
Based on this more general description of innovation systems, research in this
field developed ways to categorize different systems. Here one mainly refers to the
boundaries of a system with respect to the outside world. Initially this approach
was used by Lundvall (1988, 1992) and Nelson & Winter (1982) to describe the
development of certain national innovation systems. The discrimination between
different systems is politically determined by the national borders. A second
field, sectoral innovation systems justifies the boundaries by the specifities of
sectors in terms of a certain knowledge base and key interactions within a sector
(Malerba & Orsenigo 1997). A third stream of research looks at the dynamics
of innovative processes within regions. This concept will be introduced in the
following subsection.
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5.2.2. Regional innovation systems
The regional innovation system approach developed from the empirically based
acknowledgement that innovation is a geographically bounded phenomenon (Asheim
& Isaksen 2002). The discovery of the importance of the regional scale and of
regional resources in stimulating the innovative capabilities of firms is the major
issue this approach deals with (Asheim & Isaksen 2002). Close spatial (often
implying social) proximity promotes and eases the exchange of knowledge and in-
formation and thus contributes to collective learning and creation of knowledge.
This applies especially in cases where we find a high degree of tacitness of knowl-
edge, where direct personal contacts are required for transfer and exchange. The
concepts of the learning economy (Lundvall 2004) and the knowledge economy
(Cooke 2001, Raspe & van Oort 2006) just emphasize this complexity as well as
the path dependency of those processes.
As mentioned above a system has to have identifiable boundaries to become a
whole different to the outside world. For the RIS concept those boundaries are
given by the geographical term ”region”. Following Cooke (2001) a region is a
meso-political unit above local governments and below nations. It might have a
certain homogeneous culture and history (Cooke 2001, p.953). The operational-
ization of this concept, however, is not any easy task and one more than often
relies on political or administrative boundaries.
In view of this description of what a regional innovation systems broadly is all
about, namely a regionally bound group of actors interacting in a specific way,
the RIS approach may gain from a discussion of the individual incentives and
requirements to engage in interaction and thus in research cooperation. To do so
the following subsection dwells on the concepts of the learning economy and the
resource-based theory of the firm. As a result of this discussion we achieve what
we consider as the core of an RIS, the network of interactive actors.
5.2.3. Innovation, learning processes and the incentives to
cooperate
The basic idea of the learning economy approach as well as the more static
knowledge-based economy approach is that the knowledge base of firms is ”the
most strategic resource ... for competitiveness” (Asheim & Coenen 2005, p.1174).
This view is quite familiar with the theories of the resource-based view (RBV) of
the firm going back on the initial work of Penrose (1959). This approach focuses
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on specific firm assets that determine the performance of a firm (Barney 1991)
and by her competitive advantage. These assets are called resources. Due to
Combs & Ketchen (1999) those resources satisfy three criteria. First, they have
to be valuable, that is there exists a demand which appreciates the resources’
output. Secondly, an asset must be rare to be considered a productive resource
in the sense of the RBV. Third, the resource has to be specific to a firm. With-
out a certain degree of uniqueness a firm will not be able to gain a competitive
advantage over competitors (Combs & Ketchen 1999, p.869). Within the RBV
concept technological knowledge is considered an important intangible resource.
Both the learning economy concept and the resource-based view of the firm
stress the process of knowledge generation/accumulation and describe this dy-
namics as an often path dependent and by this firm specific process (see for
example Conner 1991, Lundvall 2006). In this sense knowledge as a dynamic re-
source evolves over time and constitutes among others ”the learning capacity of a
firm” (Lockett 2001, p.725). The path-dependent feature of knowledge accumu-
lation provides firm specific technological know-how and competencies and thus
for heterogeneity among firms. This specifity may in many cases contribute to
the competitive advantage of a firm but in as many cases it may be constraining
the opportunities for future own progress. Therefore, in pursuing further progress
a firm may attempt to overcome this constraint by accessing knowledge gener-
ated by other firms or actors. Following the concept of the absorptive capacities
introduced by Cohen & Levinthal (1990) existing knowledge is required to par-
ticipate in a knowledge base external to the firm, the knowledge base of a region
for example. In this sense knowledge a firm has accumulated and which serves as
a learning capacity allows a firm to absorb knowledge generated elsewhere which
then in turn combines with the own knowledge base to generate new knowledge.
These concepts of path-dependent knowledge accumulation, of absorptive ca-
pacities, and of the relevance of knowledge external to a firm offer the theoretical
frame for an approach towards RIS based on individual decisions to access exter-
nal knowledge and to exchange know-how and information. A crucial question in
this context refers to the criteria by which firms select other actors to engage in
this exchange. Cantner & Meder (2007) show that actors are more likely to coop-
erate when they differ at least to some degree in their knowledge bases, when the
respective amount of knowledge received form the partner is comparably high,
and when reciprocity is given, that is both benefit by the exchange.
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These findings on the firm level can now be applied to the regional level of the
RIS. There one observes that research activities with respect to their intensity
and design are not equally distributed in space. These differences ”can be more
or less completely explained by R&D spillovers” (Fritsch & Franke 2004, p.253).
The intensity of regional R&D spillovers in turn is determined by the number of
actors involved and their incentives to engage in knowledge exchange and net-
working.
Thus, regional differences in the affinities to cooperate in innovation and to
exchange know-how may first be explained by the size of knowledge base available
in a region. The more technological knowledge available in a region the more it
may pay to search for a cooperation partner and to exchange-knowledge. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: The degree of regional effects on cooperative
innovation activities in innovating depends posi-
tively on the amount of knowledge available within
the region.
In addition to this, however, for a beneficial exchange of knowledge it is required
that each cooperation partner understands the knowledge he ”receives”. In this
sense the regional knowledge pool has an individual value (Cantner & Meder
2007) for all firms acting in this region. Assuming the case that the firms in a
region hold highly idiosyncratic knowledge - that is the regional knowledge base
is highly heterogeneous. In this case a firm’s ability to understand and integrate
others knowledge is rather low or there may be even no common understanding
so that this value is zero for all firms. Hence, for a positive value the knowledge
bases of the potential cooperation partners have to have some technological over-
lap (Mowery et al. 1998) in their knowledge bases and accordingly the regional
knowledge base should show some homogeneity. As mentioned the path depen-
dent nature of knowledge accumulation just provides for heterogeneity (Combs
& Ketchen 1999). According to Breschi et al. (2003) span innovative activities,
like research cooperation, out of technologies innovators are currently involved in.
This is due to the fact that learning over time generates knowledge which is close
to the existing one and opens new opportunities for innovations. With respect to
research cooperations this implies that with knowledge bases too dissimilar firms
incentive to engage in the exchange of knowledge is low. On the other hand as the
knowledge is seen as a rare and valuable firm asset (Barney 1991) disadvantages
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in terms of involuntary knowledge flows can occur if the knowledge bases are too
close related. More precisely, Mowery et al. (1998) and Wuyts et al. (2005) show
on firm level analyses that the incentives to cooperate decreases if the knowledge
bases of potential cooperation partner are too similar.
Based on this the following hypotheses are suggested:
H2a: The more related the regional knowledge
base the higher the regional effects on cooperation
innovation activities.
H2b: If the related variety of the regional knowl-
edge base comes too close, the positive effect is
dominated by disadvantages of possible knowledge
drain and, thus, the effect on the strength of the
regional innovation systems gets negative.
Breschi et al. (2003) show that the cumulation and relatedness of knowledge
enhance innovative activities independently but that there is an additional effect
if both dimensions of knowledge exist strongly at the same time. According
the analysis of regional effects of cooperative behavior this implies the following
hypothesis:
H3: The combination of amount and relatedness of
the regional knowledge called the regional knowl-
edge base affects the regional effects in cooperation
behavior positively.
5.3. Methodology
5.3.1. Data sources and regional boundary
In order to test the hypotheses above we draw on two data sources which allow
us to describe the regions under investigation. First, information about patents
that are filed for Germany between 1994 and 2003 are provided from the German
patent office. The second data source, taken from the German Federal Statistical
Office, contains information about German inhabitants and GDP data on the
regional level. The data are comprised to a panel data set including five 2-year-
periods.
A first consideration refers to defining regional boundaries. A conceptual prob-
lem arises here as unified definitions of the RIS-approach are missing. Thus
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any empirical research on Regional innovation systems has to define the regional
boundaries. As Cooke (2001) mentioned a region as a political unit above local
and below federal units, we follow Fritsch & Franke (2004), who made an anal-
ysis of differences in the regional research efficiency, by using German planning
regions (Raumordnungsregionen; ROR) as regional boundaries. These units de-
fined by the ”Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumordnung” (BBR) divide the
federal states of Germany, the Bundeslnder, into 97 subunits. Our database con-
tains information about those 97 regions between 1994 and 2003.
A second consideration refers to the usage of patent data. We use patent data
in a threefold way, (a) for describing the interaction structure within a region,
(b) for taking account of the regional technological performance, and (c) for the
regional knowledge base. For that we use all the patents applied for by firms
belonging to the same ROR region. We are aware of a controversial debate on
the quality patent data possess to indicate the innovative output of firms, regions,
networks or whatever.
As to (a) firm patents are suited to characterize the technological knowledge
base of that firm and in this sense also indicate whether that firm is attractive
for other firms to cooperate and exchange know-how. Two qualifications are ob-
vious here. First, patent data do not represent the complete knowledge base of a
firm, but they are a reasonably good indicator for her technological competitive
advantages. In this sense patents satisfy the criteria Combs & Ketchen (1999)
have claimed for competitive relevant resources: they are supposed to be rare, as
well as valuable and specific in their nature. Second, other incentives influenc-
ing the choice of the cooperation partner likewise exist. However, for our broad
German-wide analysis firm structure variables as size, age or industry, first are
not available or second are difficult to combine with the patent data we use.
As to (b) and (c) Griliches (1990) has shown that patents are sufficient indicator
for the innovative output of firms. Acs et al. state that patents provide a fairly
reliable indicator measure of innovative activities (Acs et al. 2002, p.1080). This
reliability is restricted to technological innovations and has some shortcomings in
regression fitness. Of course there some sceptical papers about using patents as
innovative output measure (e.g. Encaoua et al. 2006). They mainly criticize the
restricted manner of patents in comparison to the wide range of different types
of innovation. Following Edquist (2001), process or organizational innovations
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are also part of the innovation system, but are not captured by counting patents.
Nevertheless, we assume patents as a sufficient indicator for the innovative suc-
cess of regions. And in the sense that innovation is knowledge driven phenomena
where a firm cannot file for a patent without the appropriate knowledge, we con-
clude that patents are also an indicator for the knowledge base of a region.
5.3.2. Measuring regional effects on cooperative innovation
activities
Our main focus in this chapter is on regional effects on cooperative innovation
activities, or put more precisely, we are interested in whether features of the re-
gional knowledge base have an impact on differences of cooperative innovation
among regions.
The easiest indicator for the latter is to take the number of regional coopera-
tion, measured in whatever way. To avoid systematic discrepancies through level
effects, the ratio between cooperations and innovations can be used as an indica-
tor of regional cooperation behavior.
Considering the existence of two concepts of innovation systems, regional and
technological innovation systems, at the same point in time and space, these
rough indicators seems, however, to be insufficient.
In order to avoid misinterpretations of differences in cooperation behavior among
regions that are in fact driven by technological effects, we apply now a method-
ology how the measure differences in the regional cooperative innovation where
technological effects are absent.
Thus, differences of cooperative innovation among technologies is a core assump-
tion of this chapter. To apply this methodology information about the tech-
nological and regional distribution as well as information about the number of
actors involved are required for each innovation. Although we will use patent data
for applying this method to test our hypotheses, it can be applied to other kind
of data bases where these information are given, like firm survey data for example.
Before describing single steps of this method, the required information are
related to the available patent data. First, information about the technological
space a patent is concerned with are gathered from the ”International Patent Clas-
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sification” (IPC) code which are listed on each patent document. This classifica-
tion allows a detailed view on certain technologies, but it is much too widespread
to be used in our analysis. Therefore, we use a concordance list developed by
Schmoch et al. (2003) in order to reduce the widespread IPC to 43 technologi-
cal fields which are related to NACE industry code on 2- and 3-digit-level. The
registration procedure at the EPO or DPA allows to list more than one IPC on
a patent application2. Thus, more than one technological field can be listed on a
patent document. In this case the patent is equally distributed over all involved
technological fields.
The regional distribution is based on the inventor addresses listed on a patent
document. As especially larger firms (like Siemens) or research institutes (like
Fraunhofer or Max-Planck-Institutes) commonly file for a patent using the ad-
dress of the headquarters, we do not use the applicant addresses for regional
distribution. Comparable to the technological distribution, it is possible that a
patentable improvement has been developed by inventors located in more than
one region. In this case the patent is allocate to a region according to the share
of inventors located there. The final information which is required to apply our
methodology is on the collaborative nature of an innovation. Regarding to the
given data base, a cooperation is defined as a co-application of a patent by at
least two economic actors.
The now introduced methodology includes three steps. First, the cooperation
propensity of each technology is calculated by dividing the total number of co-
operations by the total number of innovations within a technology. This first
step accounts of specific technological effects whose impact on the cooperative
innovation is assumed.
In the second step, the innovations are assigned to the regions of their inven-
tors. This distribution reflects to technological endowment of each region. This
endowment is used in a third step to calculate an expected cooperation value.
This value indicates to number of cooperations that can be expected within a
region due to the number of innovations in each technology for this region and
the respective cooperation propensities for these technologies which have been
calculated in the first step.
2These listed IPCs are differentiated by one main and several sub-classes. We do not follow
this differentiation here and, therefore, we weight all listed classes equally.
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In the final step, for each region the number of observed cooperation is divided
by the expected cooperation value. This calculated ratio indicates the ”relative
regional impact (RRI) on cooperative innovation”. The RRI values show whether
the regional effects are below or above the German wide average with an absence
of technological effects at all. We can not measure the regional values themselves,
but this RRI value indicates how strong the strength of the regional effects differ
among German regions. In the case that all values are more or less equal to one,
the conclusion would be that the strength is always the same and that differences
in the cooperative innovation respectively the innovative success among regions
are only due to differences in the regional endowment. Furthermore, this RRI has
the advantage of being size independent and it is independent of the data base
which is used.
5.3.3. Measuring the size and related variety of regional
knowledge bases
The main aim of this chapter is to detect the impact of the regional knowledge
base and its related variety to regional effects of cooperative behavior. This sub-
section deals with the quantification of the former.
Following recent literature on the learning economy, both dimensions of the
regional knowledge base have a positive impact on the innovative success of the
regional innovation system3. Thus, we assumed in our hypotheses that both di-
mensions affect positively the regional effects of cooperative behavior.
The cumulativeness or, in our terms, the size of regional knowledge, is measured
in number of patent applications (ln(App)). According to the resource-based-view
concept, knowledge is developed in a path dependent process (Combs & Ketchen
1999). Taking this into account, the amount of valuable knowledge available
within a region is indicated by the innovative success of its actors in the former
period t− 1. To avoid influences of extreme values we use the natural logarithm
of the number of patents. We are aware of the simplification we use to indicate
the amount of the regional knowledge base. Although their later economics value
will be very different, all patents are weighted equally.
3Breschi et al. (2003) use the terms ”cumulativeness and proximity” for both dimensions. We
consider these as equivalent to size and related variety of the regional knowledge base.
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The second relevant dimension of knowledge affecting regional effects of co-
operative behavior is the related variety of the knowledge base. In our analysis
the actors can file for patents in 43 different technologies. To indicate how eas-
ily one regional actor can participate on the amount of regional knowledge, it is
first necessary to analyze how related are these technologies in general and to
apply this general relatedness to the knowledge available within a certain region.
We use the Cosine index (Cosinet) concept to evaluate the relatedness of the 43
technological fields. Therefore, we generate a 43x43 matrix including values of
the relatedness of all technologies available using this concept at time t− 1. This
index measures the closeness (cosineij) among technological fields i and j which
does not depend on the number of patents 4. It measures the angular separation
between the vectors representing the co-occurrences of technological classes Appi
and Appk (Breschi et al. 2003, p.13).
Cosineik =
∑43
l=1 Appil ∗ Appkl
(
√∑43
l=1 App
2
il)
√∑43
l=1App
2
kl
(5.1)
Typically, Cosineik is a relatedness measure with a positive value and may be
thought of as the strength of technological relationship between technologies i
and k, or relatedness (Nesta 2005). Ronde & Hussler (2005) argue that a Cosine
index value above 0.25 indicates a technological neighborhood of two technolo-
gies. The table in appendix C all cosine values are presented for the year 1999.
Technological field 8 (Petroleum products) seems to be an essential chemical in-
put for several other products, because it shows the highest average relatedness
to other fields. Energy machinery (Field 20) and motor vehicles (41) show the
highest relatedness (0.422) in comparison to all other possible combination of
technologies.
After calculating the relatedness of technological fields in general, information
about specific related variety of each regional knowledge base are required for
testing our hypotheses. Therefore, in a first step the shares of all technologies on
the whole regional endowments are calculated. Then, the product of the shares of
technology i and k is multiplied with the general cosine value Cosineij. Finally,
this product is added for all combinations for each region j for each time period
t. These three steps are summarized in equation 5.2.
Cosjt =
43∑
i=1
43∑
k=1
Cosineikt ∗ (Reg − Applijt ∗Reg − Applkjt
Reg − Appljt ) (5.2)
4For a detailed description of this index, please see Breschi et al. (2003)
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Each value of Cosjt is strictly positive and the higher the more related the
regional knowledge base in a certain region is.
In a final step, according to hypothesis H3, the amount (ln(App)jt) and the
indicator of the related variety of a region (Cosjt) are combined through mul-
tiplication. The new variable QKBjt indicates what we called the quality of
the regional knowledge base, because it conjoins both dimensions of knowledge
Breschi et al. (2003) have claimed as relevant with respect to the regional effects
on cooperative innovation.
QKBjt = ln(App)jt ∗ Cosjt (5.3)
5.3.4. Control variables
Population density (Density)
In order to account for agglomeration effects independently of patent activities we
include the number of inhabitants per square kilometer as control variable. These
data are taken from statistics of the German Federal Statistic Office. Starting in
the early nineties of the last century, a vast quantity of empirical research has
accumulated on the issue of agglomeration externalities (Raspe & van Oort 2006).
A general statement in this body of literature is that agglomeration areas have
an advantage for innovative success and economic growth in comparison the rural
areas. This advantage is based on hard factors like a better infrastructure as well
as on soft factors like an easier recruitment of external high-qualified employees
(Acs 2002). Thus, we expect a positive relationship between the population den-
sity and the strength of the regional innovation system.
GDP per capita (GDP )
Over fifteen years after unification the former socialist parts of Germany are still
lagging behind considerably in their economic potential, although large subsidies
are still transferred from the western part of Germany (Roehl 2000). Fritsch &
Mallok (2002) show that the way how existing physical capital stock is used dif-
fers between both parts of Germany. To account for the existence of two growth
regimes (Fritsch 2004b) and to test for the presence of a catch-up process in
Eastern Germany, we include the GDP per capita (GDP ). As we will later on
use dynamic panel data estimations a time invariant dummy variable would be a
inappropriate indicator.
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Dummy for dot-com bubble (Dot− com− bubble)
The ”dot-com bubble” was a speculative bubble covering roughly 1995 − 2001
during which stock markets in Germany as well as in other countries of the West-
ern hemisphere saw their value increase rapidly from growth in the new Internet
sector and related fields. The period was marked by the founding (and, in many
cases, spectacular failure) of a group of new internet-based companies commonly
referred to as dot-coms. The bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001 marked
the beginning of a relatively mild yet rather lengthy early 2000s recession in the
developed world. We account for this development on the stock market and at
least in the whole economy by including a binary variable which has a value of 1
in the last period (2002− 2003) and 0 otherwise.
5.3.5. Descriptive statistics
The strength of the regional innovation system indicated by RRI is in fact an
indicator of the differences in the strength of the regional innovation system.
Therefore, the RRI values fluctuate around 1 and the natural logarithm of this
values around 0. The mean of RRI, which is shown in table 5.1, is slightly above
0 while the median is below 0. This implies that there are more extreme high
values and relatively few extreme low values. More precisely, the majority of all
regions are cooperating less than expected, but there are some regions with an
extra-ordinary cooperative behavior.
The regional knowledge base is measured according its size (ln(Pa)) and related
variety (Cos). There are patent applications in all regions in all time periods,
the minimum number of patent applications is 11.33 in the fifth period (burst of
the dot-com bubble) in the region of Altmark in Saxony-Anhalt (ROR 31). The
most patent (6780) have been filed for in the third period in Stuttgart in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg (ROR 72). The highest related variety (0.31) was calculated for
the region Braunschweig in Lower Saxonia (ROR 22) in the fourth period. The
regional knowledge base of Hochrhein-Bodensee (ROR 78) has the lowest related
variety value (0.082) in the fifth period. The quality of the regional knowledge
base variable (QKB) which is the product of ln(Pa) and Cos shows the highest
value (2.397) again in Braunschweig.
Berlin (ROR 30) has the most inhabitants per square kilometer (3889) and the
region of Vorpommern in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (ROR 8) shows the
lowest density value (49,925). The regions Hamburg (ROR 6) and Munich (ROR
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Table 5.1.: Descriptive Statistics. Pooled Sample
Variable Explanation Obs Mean MedianStd.
Dev.
Min Max
ln(RRI) The natural logarithm of the ratio between real and
expected amount of regional cooperations which are
measured in number of co-applications. The expected
amount of regional cooperations is composed of the co-
operation propensity per technological field in general
and the patent application behavior of the regional
actors.
485 0.01 -
0.03
0.50 -
2.28
1.61
ln(Pa) The natural logarithm of the number of regional
patent applications indicating the amount of valuable
knowledge available within the region.
485 5.864 5.927 1.107 2.428 8.822
Cos This variable indicates the related variety of knowl-
edge available within a region. It is the sum of all
products between the general relatedness between two
technologies and the product of their shares of patent
applications within a region.
485 0.118 0.109 0.033 0.082 0.31
QKB This variable called ”knowledge base” is the product
of cos and ln(Pa)
485 0.699 0.635 0.272 0.37 2.397
Density The number of inhabitants per square kilometer.
(rounded values
485 328 179 492 49 3889
GDP The Gross domestic product measured in mio. Euro
per inhabitant.
485 22.5 22.3 5.4 9.0 44.9
Dot− com Dummy variable for the last period 485 0.2 0 0.401 0 1
bubble
93) have the highest GDP per capita over time. The lowest value (8,918) was
measured for Eastern Thuringia (ROR 56). There exists a East - West divide as
well as, but with exception like Hamburg, a North - South divide in our data. The
gap of the East-West divide is getting smaller over time, but is still tremendous
in the last period. The third control variable Dot− com− bubble is only included
for the sake of completeness.
5.4. Empirical tests
The hypotheses made in section 2 will be tested with the data base introduced
in the former section. There, it was already mentioned that it is a panel data
set which implies specific requirements to the used estimation models. Innova-
tion development in general is a dynamic process, so we have to take time lags
between dependent and independent variables into account. We assume that the
actor’s decisions are made with the knowledge of features from the last period.
Thus, the RRI indicating the regional effects on cooperative innovation activities
depends on regional characteristics of period t−1. To test for these relationships
we are using a dynamic panel-data model based on Arellano & Bover (1995) and
Blundell & Bond (1998). This model is based on Arellano & Bond (1991) who
developed a Generalized Method of Moments estimator that treats the model
as a system of equations, one for each time period. The equations differ only
in their instrument/moment condition sets. The predetermined and endogenous
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variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels.
Blundell & Bond (1998) show that the widely used linear generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimator are biased on show poor precision for certain panel
data structures. These distortions of the estimators occur for data sets where
the autoregressive parameter is moderately large and the number of time series
observations is moderately small (Blundell & Bond 1998, p.115). They propose
an extended linear GMM estimator that uses lagged differences as instruments
for equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels as instruments for equations
in first differences according to Arellano & Bover (1995). This estimator show
for panel data sets with 100 observations and 4 time periods a dramatic improve-
ment on the performance of the usual first-difference GMM estimator. The data
set used in this chapter include 97 observations over five periods. Therefore, we
have to test first a test for serial correlation to decide about an appropriate esti-
mator to test our hypotheses. We use a method described by Wooldrige (2002)
which performs a Wald test of the null hypothesis of no serial the residuals from
the regression of the first-differenced variables should have an autocorrelation of
-.5. This null hypothesis for RRI can be rejected with an error probability of
0.008, so we conclude that the variable indicating the strength of a regional in-
novation system follows a path in its development. Thus, we apply a so called
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation which is a
system estimator that uses additional moment conditions based on the work of
Blundell & Bond (1998).
The system GMM estimation are presented in table 5.2. To test the validity
of the instruments we apply a Sargan test for each estimation which tests for
overidentifying restrictions. The hypothesis being tested with the Sargan test
is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to some set of residuals, and
therefore they are acceptable, healthy, instruments. If the null hypothesis is
confirmed statistically (that is, not rejected), the instruments pass the test; they
are valid by this criterion. This requirement is fulfilled for all five system GMM
estimations. A second test we run to show the structure and quality of our
models we run Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced
residuals. The moment conditions of these GMM estimators are valid only if
there is no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors (Arellano & Bond 1991).
Because the first difference of white noise is necessarily autocorrelated, we need
only concern ourselves with second and higher autocorrelation. The high p-values
for the AR(2) in table 5.2 suggest that there are no problems of AR(2) errors in
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our estimation models.
Table 5.2.: Estimation results
model M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
System
GMM
System
GMM
System
GMM
System
GMM
System
GMM
OLS
dep. Variable ln(RRI) ln(RRI) ln(RRI) ln(RRI) ln(RRI) ln(RRI)
ln(RRI)t−1 0.148** 0.128* 0.140** 0.155** 0.155**
(0.021) (0.054) (0.043) (0.029) (0.033)
ln(Pa)t−1 0.122
(0.49)
Cost−1 9.012**
(0.029)
Cos2t−1 -24.85*
(0.067)
QKBt−1 1.319* -0.067
(0.053) (0.914)
QKB2t−1 -0.521** -0.022
(0.037) (0.918)
densityt -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.003
(0.068) (0.070) (0.057) (0.025) (0.114)
GDPt 0.015 -0.004 -0.007 0.001 0.001
(0.23) (0.89) (0.65) (0.97) (0.76)
D2002 0.046 0.061 0.063 0.062 0.061
(0.38) (0.29) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28)
Intercept 0.664
(0.35)
p - values
Sargan test 0.223 0.268 0.311 0.504 0.442
serial autocorrelation
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.833 0.921 0.891 0.881 0.810
Observations 383 383 485 383 383 383
Number of ror 97 97 97 97 97 97
Robust z statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Our primary interest is to elucidate the nature of the statistical relationship
between the regional knowledge base according to two dimensions and the inter-
action structure of the regional innovation system. More precisely, we want to
know whether the related variety of the knowledge base affects the strength of
the regional interaction system.
An actor who is willing to cooperate has to offer valuable knowable by him-
self to become an attractive research partner, as we have show in an analysis on
firm level basis (Cantner & Meder 2007). Transferring this insight to a regional
level, we assume that a large amount of valuable knowledge which is available
within a region increases the incentives to cooperate of regional actors. This as-
sumption is contributed by suggestions of the learning economy approach where
innovative activities like cooperation in research and development are determined
among other things by the cumulative base of knowledge (Lundvall 1992, Sharpe
& Martinez-Fernandez 2006). Concerning this approach, an actor recognizes
the potential external knowledge base in his surrounding and the more external
knowledge is accessible, the more this actor is willing to participate in it. An-
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alyzing this relationship we have to take into account a time lag between the
knowledge base available in the region and the engagement within a research
cooperation. Therefore, as already mentioned before, the regional effects of co-
operation behavior (ln(RRI)t) depends on the knowledge amount ln(Pa)t−1, its
related variety Cost−1 and its regional knowledge base QKBt−1 of the former
time period.
In table 5.2 we use system GMM estimator to test for the hypotheses H1, H2a,
H2b and H3. The first regression model (M1) shows once more the endogeneity
effects that are given for the dependent variable ln(RRI)t. The lagged dependent
variable ln(RRI)t−1 has significant positive impact on the dependent variable. In
the regression model the three control variables are included. The coefficients of
density show a weak significant negative influence on the dependent variable.
These results for all system GMM estimations do not contribute the literature
dealing with agglomeration effects like Acs et al. (2002), Sorenson et al. (2006)
or Bettencourt et al. (2007). Neither GDP nor the dummy variable for the last
period show a significant influence on the strength of the regional innovation sys-
tem variable. So we find no differences between East and West Germany (GDP )
and no structural break for the last period.
The third regression model refers to hypothesis H1. Although the coefficient
of the variable indicating the available regional knowledge ln(Pa) has a positive
sign, as it has no significant influence on regional effects of cooperative behavior
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between both
variables for this data base. So we have to reject hypothesis H1 for our sample.
This finding is contrary to results in other empirical studies like Fritsch & Franke
(2004) or Asheim & Gertler (2004) and the theoretical statements made by the
learning economy approach (e.g. Lundvall 2004, 2006). One possible explanation
of this non-significance could be the mention by Jaffe (1986) and Griliches (1990)
who suggest that such using count patent data as regional knowledge base is a
too rough measure and therefore not appropriate. We try to find a more conve-
nient measure of the regional knowledge base with including information about
the related variety of the regional knowledge base.
So the main focus of this chapter is on the hypotheses H2a and H2b. The
findings are embodied in the coefficients of Cost−1 in the regression model M4 to
test for hypothesis H1a and in the coefficients of Cos2t−1 to test for the inverted-U
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relationship as assumed in hypothesis H2b. The coefficient of the linear cosine
term is significant positive, so we can not reject hypothesis H2a for our sample.
This finding contributes suggestions by studies dealing with the learning econ-
omy approach (Breschi et al. 2003, Lundvall 2004) as well as empirical studies on
firm level (Mowery et al. 1998, Wuyts et al. 2005). In H2b we assume that the
relationship between the related variety of the regional knowledge base and the
strength of the regional innovation system is not a strict positive one as the nega-
tive effects of a too similar knowledge base can dominate the positive effects if the
related variety indicator exceeds a certain threshold. To test for this, we include
in model M4 a squared term for Cos called Cos2. The inverted-U relationship
which is assumed in hypothesis H2b is given in our data the linear term has to be
positive and the squared term has to show a negative coefficient. The results for
model M4 presented in table 5.2 show these assumed signs. So we cannot reject
hypothesis H2b for our sample. This finding is in a line with existing empirical
studies on firm level (Mowery et al. 1998, Wuyts et al. 2005, Cantner & Meder
2007). The alluded threshold from which on the relationship turns out to be
negative is for our sample around 0.182. This threshold is exceeded by 8 regions
in at least one period. The left graphic in figure 5.1 present this relationship
without absolute term so that the values for ln(RRI) are strictly positive but the
maximum of the curve is not affected by this.
Finally, we follow in hypothesis H3 the argumentation of Breschi et al. (2003)
that the combination of both dimensions of the regional knowledge base. There-
fore, the product of ln(Pa) and Cos representing the regional knowledge base
(QKB) is introduced into the model in M5. As the linear term is positive and
significant and the squared term has a negative significant coefficient, we cannot
reject hypothesis H3 on the influence of the structure of the regional knowledge
base on the strength of the regional innovation system. The relationship be-
tween the regional knowledge base variables (QKB and QKB2) and ln(RRI) is
shown in the right graphic of figure 5.1. So we find evidences for the arguments
Breschi et al. (2003) made about the importance of two dimensions of the regional
knowledge base on the interaction structure.
Again, we find for the regional knowledge base an inverted-U influence on the
strength of the regional innovation system (ln(RRI)). For our empirical model
QKB has its maximum in 1.27, as it is shown in the right graphic of figure 5.1. As
the mean (0.699) as well as the median value (0.635) of QKB are below this value,
we can conclude that for the majority of our sample the positive influence of a
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Figure 5.1.: Relationships between the related variety (left side) and the qual-
ity of the regional knowledge base (right) and strength of regional
innovation system
larger and more related knowledge base on the strength of the regional innovation
system is given.
5.5. Concluding remarks
This chapter contains an analytical and empirical exploration of the RIS ap-
proach. The main objective is to explore the effects of the regional knowledge
base and its characteristics on the strength of the regional innovation system.
Following the literature on system approaches, the increase of interactions as
relations connecting the entities of a system is the principal goal of a regional
innovation system. Based on the analysis of regional development in Germany,
the following conclusion can be drawn with respect to the theoretical assumptions
we state in three hypotheses:
1. For regional cooperative activities in terms of regional co-application, we
find evidences for positive but not significant influence of the amount of
knowledge present with the region.
2. Contrary, the related variety of the knowledge base indicated by a method
based on the Cosine index concept does affect the strength of the regional
innovation system significantly.
3. The combination of both indicators representing the overall regional knowl-
edge base has an inverted-U influence on the strength of the regional inno-
vation system.
As we are mainly interested in explaining the strength of the regional inno-
vation system with the regional knowledge base available within the region, we
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combine theoretical and empirical results mainly of firm level analysis with the
RIS approach. As knowledge is a factor affecting the competitiveness of firms and
regions, we have to take into account the nature of knowledge and its develop-
ment over time more seriously. With this German wide analysis we are going an
unusual way of RIS analysis. As recent literature emphasizes the importance of
institutions and regional specifities, factors which we have totally neglected in this
study, it makes an objective analysis of more than a few regions quite difficult. So
mainly empirical studies are concentrating on comparing a couple of preselected
regions in order to cover regional institutions and specificizes (e.g. Sternberg 2000,
Doloreux & Parto 2005, Asheim & Gertler 2004, Sharpe & Martinez-Fernandez
2006). We attempt to find evidence on a more abstract and general level. Of
course, doing so we can not include many information that might explain the
interaction within the regional innovation system in certain regions, as do results
stemming from case studies.
Nevertheless, we have find general results from an economic point of view if the
regional innovation systems approaches will be considered seriously. Beside the
methodological improvements the general view is one main advantage of this
chapter, at least in our opinion.
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6. The dark and bright side of R&D
cooperation
6.1. Introduction
Recently, cooperativeness has gained a wide attention in the literature.1 By seeing
cooperation as being mutually beneficial for the involved partners, it is widely
claimed and empirically confirmed that cooperation play a significant role for
firms’ performance. In particular, their cooperation are crucial for research and
development (R&D) activities (e.g. Oerleman & Meeus 2000, Hagedoorn 2002).
While there are also studies pointing towards potential negative effects of coop-
eration resulting from, e.g., leakage of knowledge (Granovetter 1985), in general,
cooperation are being viewed positively for firms’ R&D success.
In the literature on regional innovativeness, cooperativeness takes a central
position in the popular concepts ‘innovative milieu’ and ‘regional innovation sys-
tem’ which are argued to characterize regions that are outstandingly innovative.
These concepts emphasize that regional collective learning processes which can be
realized via cooperation, can promote firms’ innovative abilities (see, e.g., Allen
1983, Ronde & Hussler 2005).
Hence, in light of this it can be hypothesized that “regional differences in co-
operation behavior are to a considerable extent responsible for differences with
regard to innovation activity, particularly the efficiency of R&D” (Fritsch 2004a,
p. 831). However, while there is qualitative evidence for a positive impact of co-
operativeness on regions’ innovativeness the quantitative empirical evidence for
this is rather thin. For example, Broekel & Brenner (2007), contributing one of
the few quantitative studies, finds no support for this hypotheses.
The present study adds to the literature by providing a quantitative empirical
1This chapter is based on Broekel & Meder (2008).
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analysis of intra-regional and inter-regional cooperativeness’ effects on regions’
innovation performances. More precisely, an empirical investigation is conducted
for the case of the Electrics / Electronics industry and 270 German labor market
regions in the years 1999-2003. Moreover, in the study some of the challenges
inherent to the empirical endeavor are discussed. These challenges result from
the tight-knit of regions’ endowment with factors relevant in firms’ R&D activ-
ities and the level of intra- and inter-regional cooperativeness. With respect to
this empirical problem, it is argued that a nonparametric frontier approach is
particularly an helpful technique in the investigation of cooperativeness’ impact
on regional innovation performance.
The obtained results suggest that the relationship between intra-regional and
inter-regional cooperativeness with regions’ innovation performances are charac-
terized by the existence of a ‘bright’ and a ‘dark side’. It is shown that below a
turning point both types of cooperativeness foster innovativeness while when this
point is exceeded they yield negative effects. Moreover, we find that to a certain
extent intra- and inter-regional cooperativeness are characterized by a comple-
mentary relationship. This gives some quantitative evidence for the existence of
regional lock-in situations.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 gives an overview of the litera-
ture on cooperativeness and its relation to firms’ and regions’ innovativeness. In
Section 6.3 the empirical challenges as well as the methodology to overcome them
are described. This is followed by a presentation of the employed data on intra-
and inter-regional cooperativeness, regional factor endowment, and regional in-
novativeness in Section 6.4. The results of the empirical analyses are presented
and discussed in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2. Theory
6.2.1. Cooperativeness and its effects on R&D activities
Interorganizational cooperation in the field of research and development (R&D)
has been recognized as important in supplementing firms’ internal innovative
activities (Hagedoorn 2002) and to increase the probability of their innovative
success (Oerleman & Meeus 2000). There is a clear conclusion in recent litera-
ture that firms improve their innovative capabilities by developing collaborative
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R&D projects (Faems et al. 2005).
The ways how these cooperation affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the
development of new products and processes are manifold. First, cooperation be-
tween firms or between firms and non-profit actors can reduce R&D costs for the
involved actors (Hagedoorn 2002). For example, the achieved sharing of risk can
reduce the uncertainty firms associate with these projects (Cassiman & Veugelers
2002). This incentive to reduce costs by cooperating is mainly claimed in studies
that are based on the transaction-cost theory. In this manner, e.g. Kogut (1988)
explains why this particular mode of transaction is frequently chosen over alter-
natives like acquisitions or other governance mechanism.
Second, cooperation can be driven by the motive to get access to complemen-
tary knowledge and assets which are required for successful R&D projects (Teece
1986, Faems et al. 2005). Getting access to complementary knowledge concen-
trates on the direct results of a R&D cooperation or, more precisely, on the
probability of success of this cooperation project (Belderbos et al. 2004). This
argumentation is contributed by the concept of the resource-based view of the firm
in which a firm is seen as a bundle of strategic resources that are hard to imitate
(Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991). Within this concept, Das & Teng (2000) show
that the inducement of R&D cooperation is influenced by the mobility, imitability,
and substitutability of internal resources. Moreover, the cooperation structure is
selected on the basis of whether resources are property based or knowledge based.
The third incentive to engage in collaborative R&D projects is to encourage
the transfer of knowledge (Ahuja 2000, Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996). This
motive is somehow related to the second one but it is stronger concentrated on
long-term learning effects (Ahuja 2000). The access to an external knowledge
base does not only improve the success probability of a single R&D project, it
can also improves the efficiency of internal R&D efforts.
Several studies have documented additionally that economic actors can not
fully appropriate the benefits of their innovations. Knowledge tends to spill-over
and “flows” between actors. Empirical evidence for the importance of these flows
for firms’ innovativeness at the firm level has been found by, e.g. Jaffe (1986),
Cassiman & Veugelers (2002). Collaborative R&D projects are one channel to
internalize these knowledge flows (Cassiman & Veugelers 2002). In line with this
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D’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) show that imperfect appropriability increases
the incentives to engage in a collaborative R&D project. However, Cohen &
Levinthal (1990) point out that the extent to which firms R&D activities can
profit from these knowledge spill-overs depends on their internal “absorptive ca-
pacities”. Later empirical studies highlight that technological proximity between
actors takes effect on their ability to internalize knowledge spill-overs as well
(Mowery et al. 1998, Sorenson et al. 2005). Hereby, the cooperation probability
is larger in case of that firms are technological neighbors (Wuyts et al. 2005,
Cantner & Meder 2007).
The observation that cooperation has a considerable potential to contribute to
innovation strategies of firms does not imply that such voluntary agreements are
always successful though (Faems et al. 2005). On the one hand, imperfect appro-
priability of knowledge increases the benefits from collaborative R&D projects as
described above. On the other hand, it enlarges however the incentives to free
ride on the cooperation partners’ R&D efforts (Kesteloot & Veugelers 1995). In
addition, it enhances the possibility for free-riding by outsiders of the coopera-
tion (Cassiman & Veugelers 2002). This can cause the estimated failure rate of
collaborative agreements of about 60 percent (Bleeke & Ernst 1993). Other rea-
sons for failure can be ‘learning races between the partners[...], diverging opinions
on intended benefits [...] and a lack of flexibility and adaptability” (Faems et al.
2005, p.240).
Hence, the benefits that cooperation brings about are not guaranteed and
whether they are realized depends strongly on whether the cooperation partners
fit to each other in terms of complementarity of resources, aims, and working
routines. Or in other words, it can be doubted whether the resource allocation
resulting from actors’ cooperation activities are always superior, in terms of in-
novation performance, to the case the case that no cooperation are established.
In particular, (regional) biases in the actors’ search for cooperation partners can
result in the establishment of inferior solutions (Broekel & Binder 2007). Fur-
thermore, the situation of a (regional) lock-in resulting in a lack of fresh ideas
(Grabher 1993), or certain policy activities that allocate factors according to, e.g
lobbying activities, can prevent actors from choosing their cooperation partners
such that innovativeness is maximized.
Despite this potential existence of a ‘dark side’ of cooperativeness for innovation
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activities, there is a large body of studies provide evidence that collaborative R&D
has a positive impact on the innovative performance of firms (Deeds & Hill 1996,
Baum et al. 2000, Oerleman & Meeus 2000, Boschma & ter Wal 2005).
6.2.2. Cooperation & R&D processes in a regional context
In the literature on regional innovativeness it is argued that firms’ innovation
performances depend upon others on their embeddedness into their geographical
surroundings. This implies that inter-regional differences in the levels of actors’
regional embeddedness can explain some variance in regional innovativeness.2
This embeddedness of firms into a regional context is in particular the focus of
concepts such as the ‘innovative milieu’ (Camagni 1991) and ‘regional innovation
system’ Cooke (1992, 2001). These concepts promoted the view that (some) re-
gions can be seen as systems of innovative actors. These systems consist of a set
of actors or entities (e.g., firms, universities) that interact in the creation, use,
and diffusion of innovative solutions (Carlsson et al. 2002). In contrast to con-
cepts of technological innovation systems, these territorial systems’ boundaries
are defined in a spatial dimension (Malerba 2005).
Different levels of firms’ regional embeddedness show as differences in their
interactivity with other regional actors. In these concepts it is argued that varia-
tions in the regional levels of interactivity cause innovativeness to differ between
regions. In other words, it is claimed that firms’ (and by this regions’) innovative-
ness can be fostered by, e.g. “regular and strong internal interaction” (Kostiainen
2002, p. 80), or “through synergetic and collective learning processes” (Camagni
1991, p. 3) that take place among actors located within the same region. It
has been pointed out before, one important way how actors can interact is to
cooperate.
The pronounced role of intra-regional interactivity is argued to result from that
geographic proximity in general, and regional proximity in particular, “promote
information transfer and spill-overs that lower the costs and reduce the risks as-
sociated with innovation” (Feldman & Florida 1994, p. 214). With respect to
cooperation, regional proximity tends to increase the chances that actors will
engage in a cooperative activities. Involved costs can additionally be lower and
2Regional innovativeness is to be understood as the aggregated innovativeness of the actors
located within a region.
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the rate of success is likely to be higher compared to cooperations between more
distant partners.
Beside theoretical contributions qualitative evidence is also provided that if spe-
cific patterns of cooperative behavior are shared by a number of regional actors,
their region is likely to be successful with respect to innovativeness and economic
performance (see, e.g., Storper & Venables 2003). However, the theoretical con-
ceptions as well as the qualitative evidence are difficult to be generalized because
of a number of problems.
A cooperation attitude that is (too) strongly focused on regional actors can
lead to a lock-in situations as for the Ruhr-Area described in (Grabher 1993). In
such situations geographically concentrated clusters can become insular, inward
looking systems. Such can occur not only in resource-based, mono-industry areas
like the Ruhr-Area, but also in case of inflexible modern industrial districts such
as the offshore engineering (Isaksen 2004). Certainly, such a pattern is likely to
go along with a comparatively low innovation performance.
Furthermore, Broekel & Binder (2007) emphasize that R&D employees’ search
for knowledge is likely to be biased towards regional knowledge sources. This can
even be the case if the resulting cooperation solutions delivers inferior results.
This ‘regional bias’ can be caused, among others, by frequent (unintended) con-
frontation with other regional actors. In addition, a strong dedication towards
regional networks may give rise to such patterns. Over time this leads to higher
familiarity with these actors that makes them, independently of their actual value
for the project, more likely to be chosen as cooperation partners. Hence, a strong
orientation towards regional actors that goes along with low inter-regional coop-
erativeness can result in a lack of fresh ideas from outside the region. Eventually,
this reduces a region’s innovation performance, despite a comparatively high level
of intra-regional cooperativeness.
While the above mentioned concepts mainly highlight the ‘bright side’ of coop-
erativeness for regional innovation performance, there are good theoretical reasons
that suggest the existence of a ‘dark side’ as well. This has however found little
attention in the literature so far.
Most likely the ‘bright’ as well as the ‘dark side’ play a role for regional innova-
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tiveness. On the one hand there is the danger of a becoming (regionally) locked-in.
On the other hand, if the advantages of geographic proximity are relevant, not
to cooperate intra-regionally reduces firms’ innovation performance compared to
firms’ that engage in cooperations with proximate actors. Thus, it needs intra- as
well as inter-regional cooperations for firms’ to be successful in their innovative
activities (Owen-Smith & Powell 2004). Bathelt et al. (2002) even suggests in
this context that both types of cooperation are mutually reinforcing.
In addition, to the possibility of a dark side to cooperativeness, the proclaimed
advantages of geographic proximity are not as clear cut as they are often argued
to be. There exist some studies that find spill-overs to be localized (see, e.g.,
Griliches 1992). However, for example, Jaffe et al. (1993) do not find that prox-
imity to public research institutions promotes collaboration between firms and
public research, nor does it increases the levels of received knowledge spill-overs.
Hence, it is still largely unclear whether geographic proximity fosters coopera-
tiveness.
From an empirical point of view additional problems exits. Bathelt et al. (2002)
argue that learning processes themselves are not observable and that the pure
agglomeration of innovative successful firms ”...seems to be assumed to signify lo-
calized learning.” (p.14). There are also few studies that include explicit regional
cooperativeness measures which is likely to be caused by the limited data avail-
ability approximating cooperative behavior. One of the few studies that takes a
broader quantitative approach is the study by Fritsch (2004a). Using firm-level
data for eleven European regions he finds though “no support for the suggestion
that cooperation or a relatively pronounced cooperative attitude in a region is con-
ducive to innovation activity” (Fritsch 2004a, p. 844).
While there is little quantitative evidence supporting the theoretical arguments
for a positive impact of cooperativeness on regional innovativeness, the support-
ive qualitative findings account for a limited number of regions. In addition they
seem to be selected rather arbitrarily. “The concept of innovation as a partly
territorial phenomenon is, to a great extent, based on the successes of some spe-
cialized industrial agglomerations or regionally concentrated networks” (Doloreux
& Parto 2005, p.135).
Summarizing, while there are theoretical reasons as well as qualitative evidence
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for why inter-regional differences in intra- and inter-regional cooperativeness take
effect on regions’ innovation performance, the “[t]he empirical picture of the re-
gional dimension of R&D activity and cooperation behavior is still largely unclear”
(Fritsch 2004a, p. 831).
The present chapter contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First,
it is tested simultaneously whether intra- as well as inter-regional cooperation
agreements influence the innovative behavior of firms on a regional level. Second,
evaluated the existence of positive as well as negative effects of either type of co-
operativeness for innovativeness. Third, a quantitative approach is chosen using
data on 270 German labor market regions and the Electric & Electronics industry.
Before the methodology is introduced it will be discussed that the endeavor
of empirically identifying an influence of cooperativeness on regions’ innovation
performance in a quantitative setting is a challenging task..
6.3. Method
6.3.1. An empirical challenge
The difficulty in quantitatively analyzing the effect of cooperativeness on regional
innovativeness arises from that there are two strongly inter-woven effects that can
cause innovativeness to vary between regions.
First, because of the fact that innovation are outcome of economic efforts (see,
e.g., Nelson & Winter 1982) a ‘endowment effect’ on innovativeness exists. This
refers to the idea that the probability of innovative success will increase with the
‘magnitude’ of efforts invested into the corresponding R&D activities. Hereby,
these efforts show as R&D staff, offices, laboratory equipment, venture capital,
etc. As these efforts cove a wide range of different things, they are referred as
input factors in the following. In the context of innovation processes the exact
definition of these input factors is rather difficult and will be discussed at the end
of this chapter. At this point, the input factors are defined as:
all elements that are necessary for the innovation process to be con-
ducted, except those elements that regard the organizational structure
of these processes.
Second, the mere existence of input factors is not a sufficient condition for them
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being actually utilized in R&D processes. Input factors are scattered and held
by various actors that are part of different organizations in diverse geographic
locations. This scattering of the input factors is likely to increase with growing
division of labor and specialization. Hence, R&D processes are largely about
searching for, accessing of, and absorbing these input factors (resources) (see, e.g.,
Nelson & Winter 1982). Or put differently, the input factors can be organized in
different ways for them to become utilized in R&D activities. The organizational
structure of the input factors determines the performance of R&D employees to
create innovative solutions to technological problems. Hence, we may refer to
them as:
the organization of input factors which determines the efforts that need
to be made in order to utilize input factors in R&D activities. Most
importantly, this regards the set-up of formal and informal institu-
tions, actors’ attitudes towards sharing resources, the actors’ know-
who, and know-where, etc.
This is to say that regions’ differ not only with respect to their input factor en-
dowment, but also with respect to the organization of these factors. The effect
of the inter-regional variance in this organization of input factors is denoted as
organizational effect in the following. In light of the previous discussion, it is
clear that cooperativeness is part of this effect.
In order to get an empirical grip on cooperativeness’ influence on innovative-
ness both effects have to be separated in a regional context. That is, when the
parts of the organizational effect, e.g. cooperativeness, are to be analyzed it has
to be controlled for the endowment effect. This is however problematic because
both effects in combination not only influence firms’ R&D activities, they are
also strongly inter-woven with each other. On the one hand, the existence of
input factors can depend on organizational aspects. For example, certain organi-
zational set ups may raise the attractiveness of a region. Eventually, other firms
or organizations will (re-) located their facilities to these regions and increase
the resource endowment in the region. As argued before, because of the endow-
ment effect, this tends to raise the number of innovations generated in this region.
On the other hand, the organizational set up in general, and cooperativeness
in particular, depend also on the input factors available in a region. This is
highlighted by, e.g. Isaksen (2001) who argues that “[i]n many areas a regional
innovation system does not exist due to lack of relevant actors (i.e. organization
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‘thinness’)” (p. 109). As regional innovation systems are characterized by strong
interactions among the regional actors (Kostiainen 2002), this illustrates nicely
that in order to interact (cooperate) it needs at least other actors that are attrac-
tive for interaction (cooperation). However, the input factor endowment does not
alone determine the organizational set-up because “geographical proximity only
creates a potential for interaction, without necessarily leading to dense local rela-
tions” (Isaksen 2001, p. 110). Hence, besides the input factor endowment there
are factors that influence regions’ organization of input factors.3
Furthermore, lacking regional input factors firms are forced to expand their
geographic search for cooperation partners to more distant locations (see, e.g.,
Mayer-Krahmer 1985). This suggests that to some extent firms’ inter-regional co-
operativeness depends upon the existing resource endowment in the region they
are located.
This inter-woveness represents a serious empirical challenge. In quantitative
empirical assessments variables that are thought to approximate the input factor
endowment effect, in fact, explain also parts of the organizational effect. For ex-
ample, a university (e.g. approximated by its graduates) does not only represent
the potential benefit that closely located firms gain from its resources, e.g. by
hiring graduates, renting laboratories, or out-sourcing parts of their R&D activ-
ities. In addition, a university can change the structure of regional networks, for
example by functioning as gatekeeper (Cantner & Graf 2006) and by serving as
cooperation partner itself. Hence, it can also have strong effects on the cooper-
ativeness level in the region. Too a considerable extent, this can result from the
attitude of its employees, i.e. its effect is independent of it’s endowment with
resources.
In order to disentangle this in an ordinary regression framework, interaction
terms, non-linearities, etc. have to be (explicitly) modeled. Furthermore, multi-
collinearity will certainly be a problem. We therefore refrain from apply a regres-
sion approach and instead propose an alternative, but elegant, empirical approach
which consists of two parts.
First, we define cooperative measures independent of the firms’ technological
3In this chapter we concentrate only on regional actors’ cooperativeness as one of the many fac-
tors that can have an influence in this respect. However, other factors, such as institutional
settings, the existence of externalities, certainly play a role as well.
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opportunities to cooperate intra- and inter-regionally. Or in other words, the used
cooperativeness measures reflect the degrees to which regional firms’ intra- and
inter-regional cooperativeness depart from what could be expected given their
region’s specific technological profile. This will be explained in detail in section
6.4.3.
Second, for the estimation of the regional innovation performance as well as
for the effect of cooperativeness we make use of a performance approach. It will
be shown that it nicely solves the problem of dealing with the inter-woveness of
endowment and organizational effect.
6.3.2. Nonparametric frontier analysis
Following Broekel (2008) we employ the non-convex order-m frontier approach
introduced by Cazals et al. (2002) in order to estimate the regions’ innovation
performances. In addition, the conditional order-m analysis developed by Daraio
& Simar (2005 a,b) and extended to a multivariate scenario in Daraio & Simar
(2007) is used for estimating the influence of the cooperativeness measures on
innovation performance.4
In comparison to traditional regression analyses the chosen approach has a
number of methodological advantages for analyzing R&D systems that result
from its character as nonparametric frontier analysis.5 However, here, it is of
greater importance that the method allows to disentangle the inter-woveness of
endowment and organizational effect. In particular, as it allows to compare the
organizational effect inter-regionally without the need to explicitly model it’s
inter-woveness with the endowment.
The idea behind the proposed performance approach is that a region’s innova-
tion performance is evaluated with respect to the performance of other regions.
Hereby, the regions’ input factors - innovativeness relations are compared on the
basis of the principle of weak dominance: if a region shows a lower level in the
4For an extensive treatment of the methodology see Daraio & Simar (2007). Detailed dis-
cussions about the applicability as well as the advantages of nonparametric performance
analyses in the context of (regional) innovation research can be found in Bonaccorsi &
Daraio (2007) as well as in Broekel (2008).
5Most importantly, there is no need to specify ex-ante a functional relationship between the
input factor and innovativeness space, and multiple input factors and innovativeness mea-
sures scenarios can easily be handled. Further, no universal production function is assumed.
The production frontiers are non-convex and can differ between regions.
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input factor vector and higher level in the innovativeness vector (if multiple inno-
vativeness measures are used) a higher performance is assigned to it.6 In case of
that according to this comparison, a region is not weakly dominated by another
it serves as benchmarking region, i.e. becomes part of the performance frontier
and is declared well-performing. Regions that are weakly dominated by such
best-practice regions are declared less-performing. In this chapter, their degree of
less-performance is estimated as the vertical distance between a less-performing
region and the best-practice region found on the frontier that has at maximum the
same level of input factor endowment.7 Because of the comparison the obtained
performances are ‘relative’ (relative to the group of reference regions) performance
measures.
A performance frontier estimated on this basis is likely to be shaped by outliers
and noise in the data. Cazals et al. (2002) suggest therefore to compare a region
not to the complete population of regions, but rather to a randomly drawn sub-
sample. Thus, only a sub-sample of the observations are enveloped and extreme
values are likely to lie outside the frontier (Cazals et al. 2002). The sub-sample’s
size has to be specified by the researcher and is denoted by m, giving the name
to the procedure.8 Based on this frontier the evaluation of the region’s innova-
tion performance as well as the estimation of the performance score is done as
described above.
However, what do performance measures estimated like this mean in the con-
text of regional innovativeness? Given that the level of regional innovativeness
is determined by the endowment and organizational effect we argue that the ob-
tained performance measures reflect inter-regional differences in the latter. Since
in this procedure regions with similar input factor endowment but different levels
of innovativeness are compared, the effect of different input factor endowments
are excluded from the results, the obtained performance measure represents dif-
ferences in the organizational effect. Hence, the simple idea of comparing re-
gions with similar input factor endowment solves elegantly the interrelatedness
problem. However, we do not obtain measures for the actual magnitude of the
6Following (Bonaccorsi & Daraio 2007) we add 0.001 to the input factors as well as innova-
tiveness values. This avoids distortion in the estimation but does not influence the results.
7Following Broekel & Brenner (2007) an output-oriented type of analysis is applied. For an
introduction into performance analyses see also Daraio & Simar (2007).
8We follow Bonaccorsi et al. (2005) in setting the level of robustness to below ten percent, i.e.
ten percent of the units are outside the frontier. Given 258 valid observations this is true
for m = 70.
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organizational effect on firms’ R&D activities. Instead, a measure is estimated
that accounts for the difference in the organizational effect between regions. This
means that we do not obtain information about the extent of cooperativeness
influences’ on regional innovativeness: The obtained measures reflects how its
variance causes regional innovativeness to differ between regions.
In order to analyze the impact of variables (denoted as ‘external factors’ in the
following) on this kind of performance measure, Daraio & Simar (2005 a) suggest
the estimation of two different measures. The first, the unconditional performance
measure, is calculated as described above: regions are evaluated with respect to
a randomly drawn sub-sample of other regions which are characterized by equal
or lower levels of input factor endowment.
The second measure, the conditional performance measure, is estimated simi-
larly to the unconditional one, in this case the sub-sample of regions used for the
comparison is not drawn randomly. Instead, it is drawn conditional on the values
(density) of a number of external factors.9 The conditional drawing is done in a
way that the sample of regions by which a region’s performance is evaluated is
positively biased towards those regions with similar values in the external factors.
In other words, the likelihood that a region is part of another region’s comparison
group, depends among others negatively on the difference between the values of
the regions’ external factors.
Further, the ratios between the conditional and unconditional performance
measures Qz are set into relation with the regions’ values in the external fac-
tors. From this relation inference can be made on the effects of the external
factors on the regional innovation performance. In a setting with two external
factors, i.e. two external factors are analyzed at the same time, Daraio & Simar
(2007) suggest to estimate three-dimensional regression plots showing the non-
parametrically estimated surfaces of Qz in dependence of the two external factors.
In addition, non-parametric regressions are conducted showing the relation ship
between each of the external factor on Qz for each of the other external factors’
first three quartiles.
From the shape of the surfaces and curves the following inference can be made.
9For the estimation of the probability we use the truncated gaussian kernel as well as the
bandwidth selection method for multivariate cases given in Daraio & Simar (2007).
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An increasing regression surface (curve) indicates a positive influence, while a
decreasing curve (surface) hints at a negative impact.10 In this chapter, intra-
regional cooperativeness and inter-regional cooperativeness are defined as two
external factors that effects on the innovation performance is to be analyzed.
For example, the case of a positive effect of intra-regional cooperativeness on
regions’ innovation performance shows as that regions characterized by lower lev-
els of intra-regional cooperativeness are dominated in terms of innovativeness
by regions with similar input factor endowment but comparably higher levels of
intra-regional cooperativeness.
In this chapter the performances analyses are conducted separately for each
year. However, the subsequent analyses of the influence of the two cooperative-
ness types are conducted on the basis of the pooled yearly performance measures.
Hence, in the plots, and the estimated regressions, each region is represented as
many times as years are considered.11 The motivation for this is that by using
the pooled ratios the impact of short term change (statistical noise) is reduced.
Moreover, the robustness of the nonparametric regressions used to illustrate po-
tential trends in the data increases.
From a methodological point of view such an endeavor is appropriate if the
underlying mechanisms determining a region’s innovation performance do not
change significantly in the considered time period. The theories on intra- and
inter-regional cooperativeness provide little reason for their levels to change sys-
tematically on a short term basis, see Section 6.2.1. Contrasting the theories,
the two cooperativeness indices show however considerable variance between the
years. In deed, from year to year they are weakly correlated, the correlation coef-
ficients are in all cases smaller than 0.25.12. This indicates the presence of short
term noise in their empirical estimation. In this chapter the interest is however on
the general influence of the two types of cooperativeness on regional innovation
performance. Hence, the influence of this “noise” needs to be minimized which
justifies this procedure.
10See for an extensive presentation of this method Daraio & Simar (2007).
11In this chapter this corresponds to four times because the performances are estimated for the
years 1999-2002, see Section 6.4.
12Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient is used.
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6.3.3. The definition of the regional resource endowment
While this approach seems to be very conclusive it assumes that the regions’ in-
put factor endowment can be defined properly and (in an empirical assessment)
correctly measured. The very nature of R&D processes makes the exact identi-
fication of a region’s input factor endowment impossible though (see Broekel &
Brenner 2005). For example, there may be regions in which the local university
is an active intermediate in R&D processes. In other regions it can play a rather
passive role. Should the university then be considered as a general input factor
and be taken into account when evaluating regions’ innovation performance?
The outcome of the performance analyses are however largely dependent on
the definition of the considered input factor set. In this case do the obtained
performance scores not only represent differences in the ‘organizational effect’.
In addition, they reflect the effects of omitted but relevant input factors.
Being aware of this dilemma, Broekel & Brenner (2005) argue that it is impos-
sible to set up an ‘optimal’ or ‘correct’ performance analysis that would fit every
region’s particular situation. Instead they suggest to estimate different perfor-
mance analyses using varying input factor sets and compare the obtained scores.
“... [D]ifferent approaches measure different things, and measuring innovation
performance in different ways provides us with additional information about the
causes of the different performances” (Broekel & Brenner 2005, p. 12). We fol-
low their approach and estimate two types of regional innovation performance
measures.
In the first one the R&D employees of a single industry are defined as input
factor endowment. In this setting the emphasize is on the endowment effect of
firms internal resources invested into R&D activities (see Section 6.4 for the exact
definition). It is denoted as firm-oriented analysis in the following.13
In the second analysis this input factor set is expanded by a number of firm
external (regional) input factors which are frequently considered to be relevant
in empirical regional innovativeness research. The setting takes up the idea of
seeing regions’ as systems of interactive actors. By taking additional regional
characteristics into account, the evaluation of cooperativeness effects on the in-
novation performances accounts not only for firms’ R&D efforts, but also for,
13Lacking firm-level data we are restricted to the use of regional data to model this situation.
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e.g. the availability of skilled labor, cooperation partners (universities, science
institutions), and financial capital. This analysis is denoted as region-oriented as
it corresponds to a regional innovation system view.
For both settings the effects of the two cooperativeness measures are estimated
as described before. By comparing the results of the two analyses two goals
are achieved. First, the two analyses function as robustness checks whether the
obtained results are driven by varying definitions of the considered input factor
set. Second, this allows us to get additional insights on the impact of firm ex-
ternal input factors on the relation of cooperativeness and regions’ innovation
performances.
6.4. The employed data
6.4.1. Data on patent applications and R&D
The 270 German labor market regions are chosen as units of analysis, because they
seem to fit best to the theoretical arguments of a regional dimension of innovation
processes (see, e.g., Broekel & Brenner 2007).14 As it is common in innovation re-
search innovativeness is approximated by patent applications. The data on patent
applications for the years 1999-2005 are published by the Deutsches Patent- und
Markenamt (German Patent Office) in Greif & Schmiedl (2002) and Greif et al.
(2006) (called Patentatlas in the following). The applications by public research
institutes, e.g., universities and research societies (e.g. Max Planck Society) as
well as the patent applications by private inventors are not included. The latter
is because the corresponding R&D employment data covers only industrial R&D.
Hence, only the patent applications of industrial R&D should be considered.
Data on R&D employees is obtained from the German labor market statistic.
Following Bade (1987) the R&D personnel is defined as the sum of the occu-
pational groups: agrarian engineers (032), engineers (60), physicists, chemists,
mathematicians (61) and other natural scientists (883).
Conducting industry specific analyses requires definitions of industries that,
in the context here, cover the input factor as well as the innovativeness measure
side. In other words, the industries’ R&D employees need to reflect those firms to
14We use the up-to-date definition of labor market regions in contrast to the older definition
used in Greif & Schmiedl (2002) and Greif et al. (2006).
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which the patent applications of the Patentatlas correspond. This is an important
issue because in the Patentatlas the patent applications are classified according
to 31 technological fields (TF). In contrast, the industry specific R&D employ-
ment is organized according to the German Industry Classification (‘Deutsche
Wirtschaftskzweig Klassifikation’) which is the German equivalent to the inter-
national NACE classification. Thus, the technological fields classification in the
Patentatlas as well as the German Industry Classification need to be matched.
We rely the concordance between these two classifications developed by Broekel
(2007). The concordance defines five ‘sectors’ for which it is possible to assign
a number of the Patentaltas’ technological fields to a number of industries de-
fined by the German Industry Classification (see for further details Broekel 2007).
In this chapter we concentrate on one industry, the Electrics & Electronics
(ELEC). Its definition, i.e. the considered technological fields and NACE in-
dustries, are presented in table D.3. For this industry patenting represents an
important property rights protection mechanism (Arundel & Kabla 1998). This
ensures that the innovativeness measure captures most, or at least a significant
share of, innovations in this industry.
In Broekel (2007) five technological fields are assigned to ELEC. This implies
that the R&D employees apply for five technologically different types of patents.
However, in this chapter the patent applications of the five technological fields
are summed which results in a single innovativeness measure. This is motivated
by the existence of a great number of zeros in most of these fields. While this is as
such not a problem in the analyses, it reduces the number of potential reference
regions, i.e. the number of regions a region can be compared with, see Section
6.3. Eventually this reduces the variance in the performance measures making
the detection of an influence of cooperativeness statistically more difficult. Thus,
the summing increases the analyses’ explanatory power. This is however achieved
at the costs of not taking into account the technological diversity on the innova-
tiveness side.
According to Broekel (2007), ELEC’s R&D employees are organized into three
different two-digit (NACE) industries, DL31, DL32, DL30. In the case of DL30
147 out of 270 regions are characterized by zero values in 1999. Similar as in for
the innovativeness measure this reduces the number of available reference regions,
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see above. We therefore add this industries R&D employees to that industry with
which it is correlated the highest. In this case this is DL32 (r = 0.72∗∗∗).15 This
leaves 258 observations which show at least one positive value in one of the two
R&D employment measures, DL31 and DL32 DL30 (sum of DL32 and DL30).
The twelve observations with zero values in these two variables are excluded from
the analyses as performance analyses with zero values in all input factors are
improper.
As has already been mentioned above, in the firm-oriented analysis apart from
firms’ R&D employees no further regional input factors are considered. Therefore,
the first analysis is conducted with a single innovativeness measure, the sum of
patent applications of ELEC, and the two input factors DL31 and DL32 DL30.
In addition, to this the region-oriented analysis takes additional regional input
factors into account.
6.4.2. Regional Factor Endowment
For the choice of the additional regional input factors we follow the idea of the
‘technological infrastructure’ by Feldman & Florida (1994) which:
“consists of sources of knowledge: networks of firms that provide ex-
pertise and technical knowledge; concentrations or research and devel-
opment (R&D) ... ; and business services” (Feldman & Florida 1994,
p.210-211).
Hence, in the region-oriented analysis additional input factors included that are
firm external. Nevertheless, these input factors are likely to influence regions’
innovativeness. We define a ‘German regional technological infrastructure’ to
be consisting of input factors with purely intra-regional effects and factors with
inter-regional effects. The first set of factors influencing firms’ innovation activi-
ties need to be located in the same region in order to become effective. In contrast,
the effects of inter-regional factors are to a lesser extent regionally bounded. In
their case, firms might benefit from the presence of these factors in neighboring
region.16 In addition to firms’ R&D employees that are already considered as
input factors, eight firm-external input factors are included in the region-oriented
15Pearson’s correlation coefficient is used.
16All variables are only briefly presented due to space limitations. A more detailed description
and literature references of most of the employed variables can be found in Broekel & Brenner
(2005).
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analysis. They are summarized and their data sources are given in table D.4.
In order to account for urban agglomeration advantages the population density
is employed (POP DEN). The financial situation of the region as well at its eco-
nomic activity is approximated by the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
Furthermore, the literature highlights the importance of business services (see,
e.g., Feldman 1994) so that the variable SERVICE has been added. This repre-
sents the share of employees in industry KA74 (according to WZ03) on a region’s
total employment. In a common fashion we compute the influence of SERVICE
by using the ‘production structure specialization index’ (PS) (see Feldman & Au-
dretsch 1999). This index is however non-symmetric, i.e. in case of below average
specialization the index takes values between zero and one, and in case of above
average specialization its values range between one and infinity. This makes it
“basically not comparable on both sides of unity” (Laursen 1998, p.3). Therefore,
the index (PS) is made symmetric as proposed by Laursen (1998) in a different
context by calculating PS−1
PS+1
+ 1 (see for more details Broekel 2008). This index
ranges from 0 to +2. One is added to it in order to keep some similarity to the
traditional PS. Unity represents that there is no difference between a region’s
degree of specialization and the national average.
The potential impact of the share of employees with high qualifications
(EMP HIGH) is also considered because it is an often used measure for the qual-
ity of local human capital (Weibert 1999).
An industry specific variable (ELEC PS) accounts for the specialization of a
region with respect to ELEC. In a common fashion it is approximated by the PS
of the employees of ELEC which is made symmetric as described above. It enters
the analysis as variable ELEC PS. In order to account for effects stemming from
the absolute regional employment of ELEC (see Brenner 2004), we include it as
EMPL ELEC. Accounting for the effects of the presence of large firms in ELEC,
the average firm size (SIZE) is considered as well.
These six input factors are argued to affect only firms located in the same
region. In contrast, the regional input factors presented below are argued to be
regionally less bounded. For example, this applies to university graduates that
do not stay in the region where they obtained their degree (Mohr 2002) and
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hence other regions benefit from the educational efforts conducted in universi-
ties’ host regions. However, in the statistics they are assigned only to these host
regions. Following Broekel (2008) we use a distribution procedure to assign ad-
equate shares of such inter-regionally ‘mobile’ resources to the regions in which
they are potentially effective. The parameters of the hyperbolic function that
‘distributes’ the quantities across the regions are fitted by a maximum likelihood
calculation, using geographic coordinates and population counts for 8.196 Ger-
man five digit postal code areas as well as empirical findings from the literature
on the mobility of graduates (see Legler et al. 2001, Mohr 2002).17.
To control for size effects regarding a region’s industry endowment, the dis-
tributed graduate counts enter the analysis as ratios of the region’s total em-
ployment. For technological innovations in particular, graduates of engineering
and natural science faculties of technical colleges and universities are of spe-
cial interest. They enter the analysis in form of the variables GRAD ENG and
GRAD NAT.
Similar to universities, public research institutes are important actors in in-
novation processes. Beise & Stahl (1999) show that a significant part of their
influence operates inter-regionally. Furthermore, we argue that their effects on
firms’ innovativeness decreases with a growing distance. In order to approximate
the influence of these institutes, the structural factor SCIENCE is constructed.
It is defined as the sum of the number of employees working at different public
research institutes in a region. Included are the ‘big four’ institutions in Ger-
many: the Helmholtz Association of German Research Centers, the Max Planck
Society, the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft and the Leibnitz Association.18
In line with the findings of Beise & Stahl (1999), we assume that the influ-
ence of the public research institutes decreases with growing geographic distance.
Hence, they are distributed hyperbolically in an identical manner as the univer-
17Because the mobility data is available separately for the graduates of technical colleges and
universities, we had to weight them with their shares in the total numbers and sum them
for the analysis of each subject. Furthermore, note that the α values which determine the
slope of the hyperbolic functions, are estimated by using the combined data for 1999/2000
because no year specific data on the mobility parameters are available. See Broekel (2008)
for a more detailed description of this procedure.
18We only consider institutes that are active in technical, engineering, or natural science fields.
For the Leibnitz-Association no data is available for 2001 and 2003. In this case data on the
previous years are used. In case of the Helmholtz Association, data was only available for
2000 and 2003. Hence, the employment numbers in 1999, 2001 are approximated by that of
2000, and the year 2002 is approximated by 2003.
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sities’ graduates. The employees of these institutes are distributed via the same
procedure as the graduates.19 Table D.2 summarizes the distribution parameters.
SCIENCE is also computed as a ratio of total employment to control for regions’
industrial endowment.
It is one of the advantages of the nonparametric performance analysis to eas-
ily handle multiple input and output scenarios. In detail this means that the
variables approximating the regional factor endowment are simply entered as ad-
ditional input factors. However, in order to avoid including variables which are
statistically redundant, i.e. highly correlated, we check the input factors with
respect to their correlation structure. In case that two or more variables are cor-
related with r = 0.8 or above, the variables with less theoretical relevance are
excluded.20
Applying this rule, seven variables enter the analysis as input factors: the two
R&D employee variables (DL32 DL30 and DL31); average firm size (SIZE), gross
domestic product (GDP), the share of highly qualified employees (EMP HIGH),
spatially distributed graduates of engineering faculties (GRAD ENG), and the
regions’ specialization in business services (SERVICE). With respected to the
excluded variables GDP is kept in favor of POP DEN; DL31 for EMPL ELEC;
GRAD ENG for GRAD NAT and SCIENCE; SIZE for ELEC PS. Tables D.6 and
D.7 in the Appendix show the corresponding correlation coefficients and table D.5
summarizes the selection.
6.4.3. Two cooperativeness measures
This subsection gives a brief introduction into the construction of the the intra-
regional and inter-regional cooperativeness measures that are characterized by
the absence of technological effects .
The initial point is the notion that, according to two different literature streams
in the field of innovation systems, the cooperative behavior of firms is affected by
19The relevant parameters for the distribution procedure are calculated on the basis of the
findings of Beise & Stahl (1999).
20The threshold of r = 0.8 seems to be well fitting in this context because the number of
variables is moderately but sufficiently reduced. In addition, more than eighty percent of
an excluded variable’s variance is still ‘explained’ by one variable included in the analysis.
Robustness checks have been conducted showing that the results are not sensitive with
respect to the inclusion of variables that are correlated with 0.8 or above with already
considered variables.
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technological as well as regional influences independently. Assuming that only
these two have a relevant impact on cooperative behavior of firms21, we have to
control for technological effects when analyzing regional effects of cooperation
behavior.
In this context we need information on the technological and regional distribu-
tion, as well as on the number of actors involved, for each innovation. This infor-
mation is obtained from German patent data published in the German “Patent-
blatt”. Hence, the cooperativeness measures correspond to the innovativeness
measures in that they represent the same IPC classes assigned to this industry
by Broekel (2007).22
The methodology includes three steps23. First, the cooperation propensity of
each technology is calculated by the dividing the total number of cooperation
by the total number of innovations within this technology. Cooperation in this
respect is defined as an innovation which has been developed by more than one
independent economic actor. This initial step accounts for sectoral pattern of
innovative activities. The rate of innovation and the cooperation behavior differ
among technologies due to ”... some invariant features of learning and knowledge
accumulation” (Malerba & Orsenigo 1997, p.83).
In a second step, the innovations are assigned to the regions of their inventors
(inventor principle). This reflects the structure of regions’ technological endow-
ment. Next, an expected cooperation value is estimated. This is the number of
cooperation that can be expected within a region according to its technological
endowment in a certain technology. This expectation is calculated by the multi-
plication of the number of innovations in technology i (technological endowment)
and the cooperation propensity of i which has been calculated in step one.
In the final step, for each region the number of expected cooperation is divided
by the number of observed cooperation. The idea is that in the case of both, ex-
pected and observed, cooperation numbers being equal, this indicates that the re-
gional actors’ cooperation behavior is influenced by technological patterns alone.
The core assumption of this calculation is the presence of technological pattern of
21Boschma (2005) provides a very good review on existing concepts of proximity.
22Note however, that the cooperativeness measures are constructed from patent data while the
innovativeness measures are obtained from patent applications.
23This is a brief description of the RRI value concept that was introduced in chapter 4.
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innovation activities as well as of cooperative behavior. The observable amount
of cooperation within a region is related to these technological patterns and the
residual of this relation is interpreted as ”regional effects of cooperative behavior”.
Employing German patent data Cantner & Meder (2008c) show that this mea-
sure differs significantly between German region which implies that regional ef-
fects of cooperation behavior exist and that they are not caused by technological
pattern alone. Using this measure yields two advantages. First, it is independent
of the data base. In this chapter patent data is used, but this method can be ap-
plied to any other data base on innovation activities which includes information
about technology, spatial distribution and cooperation. Second, by construction,
this indicator is independent of regions’ size.
Regions in which no cooperation are observed, and given their technological
profile, no cooperation can be expected, are treated the same as regions with
no observed cooperation but for which positive levels of cooperativeness are ex-
pected. Empirically, both regions are indicated by zero values. We are expecting
an influence of cooperativeness on regional innovation performance and, thus,
regions lacking cooperativeness are expected to show lower performance levels
independently of the reason for this lack.
Again the index is made symmetric by I−1
I+1
+ 1. This allows an easier interpre-
tation as well as more meaningful graphical representation. Hence, a value of one
implies a level of cooperativeness that corresponds to what can be expected given
the technological structure of the region. Lower values indicated cooperativeness
below the expected level and values above one the opposite.
The intra-regional or inter-regional cooperativeness is constructed by that in
case of the first cooperations are indicated by co-applications of independent ac-
tors where the listed inventors being located within the same region. In case
of inter-regional cooperativeness, cooperations are indicated by the inventors be-
ing located in different German regions. The latter implies that in this chapter
inter-regional cooperativeness refers to national cooperations only. International
cooperation are not considered.
Because the cooperativeness measures are based on patent data as well we also
consider a time lag of one year with the input factors. Hence, the cooperativeness
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measures and the innovativeness measures are constructed on the same years’
data.
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Figure 6.1.: Density plot of coop. measures
Surprisingly, intra- and inter-regional cooperativeness measures are only weakly
correlated. Hence, there seems to be a difference in actors’ cooperative attitude
with respect other actors’ geographic location. Furthermore, this is an indicator
for differences in the strength of regional interaction structures.
Moreover, they also show weak correlations with the innovativeness measures.
For the pooled data of 1999-2002, the correlation between the two cooperative-
ness measures and the numbers of patent applications in ELEC (PAT) is just
r = 0.29∗∗∗ for CoopIntrat−1 and r = 0.08∗∗∗ in the case of CoopIntert−1. The
correlation between the two measures is only r = 0.01∗∗∗. This is illustrated also
in Fig. 6.1 and 6.2 showing the density of the two cooperativeness measures as
well as the corresponding contour plot.24 In addition, both measures’ histograms
are included in the Appendix, see top left graphs in Fig. D.1 and D.2.
The plots illustrate that the masses of observations are characterized by values
around one in both cooperativeness measures. However, there is also a significant
mass with zero values in both measures. In addition, a considerable number of
24For the estimating the density we used the truncated Gaussian kernel proposed by Daraio &
Simar (2007).
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Figure 6.2.: Contour plot of coop. measures
observations shows close to zero or zero values in CoopIntrat−1 and values of
one or close to one, in CoopIntert−1. Not surprisingly the latter ones are regions
with comparatively low R&D employment in ELEC. Lacking regional alterna-
tives, firms located in such regions need to cross regional boundaries in order to
find cooperation partners.
It strikes furthermore that both measures show almost no correlation to the
variables approximating the regions’ input factor endowment, see table D.7 in the
Appendix. Given the rather strong correlations between the input factors, this
may indicates the following. As described above the cooperativeness measures are
estimated such that it is controlled for the technological opportunities to interact
existing in regions. Hence, controlling for the technological effects on cooperation
behavior seems to account to a considerable extent for the non-technological
regional characteristics. Or put differently, the cooperativeness measures are
already taking parts of the endowment effect into account. Summarizing, the
performance approach in combination with the specific cooperativeness measures
seem to be sufficient for disentangling the endowment and organizational effect.
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6.5. Results
6.5.1. Robustness and reliability
Before the results are presented and discussed in detail it is worthwhile to an-
alyze their robustness and reliability. At this point, the employed performance
analysis does not allow to estimate the significance of the relationship between
cooperativeness and innovation performance, i.e. confidence intervals can not be
calculated for Qz. Hence, it is necessary to take a look at the numbers of ob-
servations backing the estimated relationships between the two cooperativeness
measures and the regional innovation performance. The histograms for the two
cooperativeness measures seem to be a natural choice in this manner. They can
be found in the Appendix in the top left corner of Fig. D.1 and D.2. However, in
order to get a more comprehensive picture, histograms for different sub-samples
of the data have also been estimated. These sub-samples will also be used in the
analysis of the relationship between cooperativeness and innovation performance,
see below.
The sub-samples are defined the following: for each cooperativeness measure
three sub-samples are drawn from the (over the years) pooled observations which
consist of those observations that fall into the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd quartile of the
other cooperativeness measure. The idea behind it is to reduce the three-variate
relationship between cooperativeness measures and performance measures to a
bivariate one. This is achieved by analyzing separately those observations with
‘similar’ values, i.e. those that fall into a certain interval, in one cooperativeness
measure. Here, ‘similar’ means that they fall into one of the quartiles of the other
cooperativeness measure. Within this sub-sample, the remaining two dimensions
can then be analyzed without the third dimension interfering (because it is held
‘constant’). Hence, in addition to the cooperativeness measures’ histograms, the
histograms for each of the six sub-samples are shown as well, see Fig. D.1 and
D.2. Please note again that the frequencies are based on the pooled observations
of the four considered years.
What do these graphs tell us? With respect to CoopIntra, we find that the
number of regions with zero values in this variable is in particular dominating in
the sub-sample of CoopInter’s first quartile. Nevertheless, about 44 percent of
the observations are characterized by CoopIntra having positive values. In the
case of CoopInter’s third quartile, the share of positive observations increases to
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about 64 percent. Apart from the case of CoopIntra being zero, in particular
the CoopIntra’s interval of 0.5 and 1.5 seems to be backed by sufficiently large
numbers of observations. In the case of CoopInter and CoopIntra’s quartiles,
similar patterns can be observed. However, here the share of observations with
zero values in CoopInter that are located in the first quartile of CoopIntra is just
about 31 percent. For the third quartile of CoopIntra it even decreases to 17
percent. Again, there are few observations with values of CoopInter lying in the
intervals ]0, 0.5] and ]1.5, 2].
Summarizing, the histograms suggest to restrict results’ interpretation to the
ones which are based on the observations that are characterized by values be-
tween 0.5 and 1.5 in both Cooperativeness measures. In addition, we find the
relationships between the cooperativeness measures and performance scores to be
fairly robust with respect to small changes in the data.25
6.5.2. General results
The first impression of the results is that they confirm the main findings in the lit-
erature that cooperation play a role for R&D activities for the case of the Electrics
& electronics industry. This is clearly shown in that the surfaces, representing the
influence of the two types of cooperativeness on regions’ innovation performances
depart clearly from a flat horizontal plane, see in Fig. 6.3 (firm-oriented analysis)
and 6.4 (region-oriented analysis).
Interestingly in both, firm-oriented and region-oriented, analyses the surfaces
take the form of a bump, i.e. with increasing levels of cooperativeness the sur-
faces turn upwards. However, when exceeding a certain turning point their slope
becomes negative.
In general do the results correspond nicely to the theoretical arguments pre-
sented before as we find evidence for a positive impact of cooperativeness, i.e.
the ‘bright’ side of cooperativeness. However, by benefiting from the use non-
parametric techniques we find also that high levels of cooperativeness are not per
se a guarantor for outstanding innovativeness. To the contrary, when a certain
25Several robustness checks have been conducted showing the stability of the results. For ex-
ample, it has been checked whether regions for which no influence of cooperativeness on
the innovation performance is found (regions with identical unconditional and conditional
performance scores) cause the observed patterns. This was done by conducting the re-
gressions again and excluding these regions. However, the resulting relationship between
cooperativeness and innovation performance did not change significantly.
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Figure 6.3.: Surface of Qz, Analysis 1
Figure 6.4.: Surface of Qz, Analysis 2
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level of cooperativeness is exceeded the negative aspects of cooperation seem to
outweigh the positive effects. Hence, the results are in line with the ‘dark’ side
theory according to which too intensive engagements in cooperation can reduce
the innovation performance.
Min. Max. Mean Median TP
firm
ori-
ent.*
TP re-
gional
ori-
ent.*
CoopIntrat−1 0.001 1.81 0.78 0.90 1.33 1.25
CoopIntert−1 0.001 1.82 0.87 0.96 1.18 1.03
* According to the maximum value of surfaces of Qz in Fig. 6.3 and 6.4.
Table 6.1.: Descriptives of cooperativeness’ impact
The turning point of cooperativeness’ impact is interesting in itself. In case of
CoopIntrat−1 it is considerably larger than one, while in case of CoopIntert−1 it
is just somewhat larger than one, see table 6.1. As has been argued in Section
6.4.3 the cooperativeness measures indicate whether a region’s actors cooperate
more intensively with other, regional or non-regional, actors than what can be
expected given the region’s technological profile. Or put differently, it signals
that the degree to which regional actors exploit their technological cooperation
potential. With respect to the difference in the levels of intra- and inter-regional
cooperativeness at the turning point it can be inferred that within a certain
range the intra-regional cooperation potential can be exploited to a higher degree
than the inter-regional cooperation potential without firms suffering from negative
effects. In this case the advances of geographic proximity work in favor of intra-
regional cooperation as they compensate some of the negative effects resulting
from too much intra-regional cooperativeness. This leads to higher values for the
turning point in case of CoopIntrat−1.
A more detailed view at the results can be achieved by depicting the influ-
ence of each cooperativeness measure for the previously introduced sub-samples.
Following Daraio & Simar (2007), hereby nonparametric smoothed regressions
are estimated between Qz and a cooperativeness measure for those observations
which fall into the first three quartiles of the other cooperativeness measure. The
resulting two-dimensional figures are represented as Fig. 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8.26
The dashed regression curve indicates the relationship of the considered coopera-
26Note that in the two-dimensional plots the turning points may depart from the one in the
three-dimensional surface plot. However, the two-dimensional plots represent only helping
illustrations.
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tiveness measure for the other’s first quartile, the solid line for the second quartile
(median) and the dotted line for the third quartile.
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Figure 6.7.: Effect of inter-regional coop. for intra-regional coop. quartiles, Anal-
ysis 1
In the four figures the regression curves for the median and the third quar-
tile show similar patterns. The regression curves for the first quartile, however,
highlight a relationship that is difficult to be noticed when looking at the surfaces
only. With the exception of the case of intra-regional cooperativeness and regional
orientation (Fig. 6.6) which will be discussed later, the regression curves show a
monotonic decreasing trend. This indicates that a sole orientation on intra- or
inter-regional cooperation lowers the innovation performance. Or in other words,
to a certain extent and below the turning point, intra- and inter-regional cooper-
ativeness are complements which only in combination foster innovativeness.
The economic rationale behind this finding is that firms need to access specific
resources from within as well as from outside the region. One might think of these
as ‘necessary cooperation’. These can be cooperation with close costumers or sup-
pliers that cannot be substituted and hence have to exists irrespectively of their
geographic location. If these necessary cooperation cannot be established the in-
novation performance cannot be raised. In fact, the performance even decreases
when taking additional cooperation efforts of the cooperativeness type which is
not underdeveloped. Because this is the case for both types of cooperativeness
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ysis 2
this suggests that the necessary cooperation partners are located within as well
as outside a firm’s home region. This situation can also be interpreted as ‘lock-in’
(lacking inter-regional cooperation) or ‘lock-out’ (lacking intra-regional coopera-
tion) phenomena. Here, actors lack the ability to cooperate inter-regionally and
intra-regionally respectively.
Lock-in effects, as described already above, can lead to a loss of regional com-
petitive advantages because of regional actors’ inability of regional actors to re-
place decrepit resources, to rebuild obsolete structures and to renew economically
“important regional” institutions (Maskell & Malmberg 1999). Opposite to this
we found hints for an other phenomena we call “regional lock-out”. It is defined
as a situation in which firms in a region show a comparable level of inter-regional
cooperation, but very low intra-regional cooperation activities. This results in
below average innovative performance.
With respect to the magnitude of the effects, the height of the bump suggest
further that intra-regional cooperativeness yields higher benefits. The benefits of
geographic proximity between the cooperating actors can again be put forward
for causing this finding. With respect to the magnitude of the negative effects
there seems to be not much of a difference for the two types of cooperativeness.
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Summarizing, do these results cast some doubts on that cooperativeness has
just a ‘bright side’. To the contrary, the evidence points towards ‘dark side’
effects that are relevant in the case of too strong intra- and inter-regional coop-
erativeness as well as when the focus is only put on one of the two. Hence, while
confirming the general consensus in the literature that cooperativeness has an im-
pact on regional innovation performance and that this influence is often positive,
there seem to be significant negative effects in place as well. In this the study
contributes to the demanding of Dahl & Pedersen (2002) that “[t]he downside
of information trading, for example the loss of information to competitors, which
could potentially weaken a firm’s performance, has to date, not received sufficient
attention” (p. 1685).
It has been noted above that in case of intra-regional cooperativeness the re-
gression curve for the first quartile of inter-regional cooperativeness in the region-
oriented analysis shows a behavior that departs from the other cases. This will
be subject to the next subsection in which the impact of the definition of the
resource endowment on the results is discussed in detail.
6.5.3. The impact of the resource endowment
In Section 6.3.3 it has been argued that there is no ‘correct’ definition of what re-
sources should be considered in the definition of regions’ input factor endowment.
When comparing the results of the firm-oriented and region-oriented analyses, the
first thing to notice is that the obtained non-parametrically estimated surfaces do
not change strongly when considering the firm external input factors, see Fig. 6.3
and 6.4. This suggests that in general the definition of the regions’ input factor
set does not seem to have a dominating effect on the results.
However, when taking a closer look at the four Figures 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8,
two things become apparent. First, in Fig. 6.6 the second, and to a smaller
extent the third, quartile regressions show a stronger increasing slope on the left
side of the bump than their counterparts in Fig. 6.5. Second, in contrast to the
situation in Fig. 6.5, the regression for intra-regional cooperativeness and the
first quartile of inter-regional cooperativeness does not decrease as strongly as in
Fig 6.6.
The latter indicates that for the first quartile of inter-regional cooperativeness
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the ratios between conditional and unconditional performances do not change as
the level of intra-regional cooperativeness increases. Hence, increasing the level
of intra-regional cooperativeness does not seem to have an effect in the particular
situation of low inter-regional cooperativeness and a region-oriented analysis. In
contrast, in the same situation, but a firm-oriented approach it shows as a neg-
ative impact. Or put differently, the consideration of the regional input factor
endowment levels out the negative effect of increasing intra-regional but constant
low inter-regional cooperation that can be observed in the firm-oriented analysis.
This means that the structure of these regions’ input factor endowment explains
a large extent of the negative effects resulting from low levels of inter-regional
cooperation and high intra-regional cooperativeness.
Methodically this implies that when controlling for the firm external input fac-
tor endowment the negative effects caused by a too strong inward orientation of
the regional actors are taken into account. Hence, extensive intra-regional orien-
tation accompanied by low inter-regional cooperation seems to be compensatively
by a decent regional input factor endowment. This yields however weaker posi-
tive effects on the innovation performance than an increase in the cooperativeness
with actors located outside the region would bring about.
Similar is not the case for strong inter-regional cooperativeness accompanied
by low intra-regional cooperativeness. If this would have been the case, the same
change would have been observed in the regression curves of inter-regional coop-
erativeness for the first quartile of intra-regional cooperativeness in Fig. 6.8 when
comparing it to Fig. 6.7.
The compensative effects of decent input factor endowments additionally can
explain why the effect of intra-regional cooperativeness show as a stronger in-
crease in the regression curve on the left side of the bump (larger magnitude)
in case of the region-oriented analysis, see Fig. 6.6 and Fig. 6.5. Because when
considering the regional input factor endowment, at the same time it is controlled
for the negative effects of strong intra-regional cooperativeness in the case of the
existence of non-supportive input factor endowments. Following the previous
argumentation these effects are particularly relevant in the case of low inter-
regional cooperativeness. In Fig. 6.6 this shows in form of the larger slopes of
the increasing regression curves for the first and second quartile of inter-regional
cooperativeness than it is the case in the corresponding curves in Fig. 6.5.
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So what is the economic rationale behind this finding? Broekel & Brenner
(2007) point out that R&D employees’ search for knowledge (the most important
resource in R&D processes) can be biased towards regional knowledge sources
even if this results in inferior solutions. For example, daily confrontation with
the regions’ resource profile can be a cause for this. Within a certain time period
actors become more familiar with the regional input factors which then leads to
that these come to mind more easily in the search processes. Taken to an extreme
this can correspond to a lock-in situation described by Camagni (1991).
In this particular case actors are strongly oriented towards their region (low
inter-regional accompanied by low intra-regional cooperativeness). Lacking fresh
ideas from outside the region their innovation performance decreases, even in
the case that intra-regional cooperativeness is increased. However, the degree to
which innovation performance decreases depends on the existing regional input
factor endowment. For example, if there are world class science institutes located
in a region, this will likely reduce the chance that a cooperation ends up in
an unsatisfactory result. The negative effects of regional lock-ins may thus be
softened by investments in the technological infrastructure.
6.6. Conclusion
There are few topics in the literature on regional innovativeness that have gained
as much attention as cooperativeness. Concepts like the ‘innovative milieu’ and
‘regional innovation system’ are to a large extent based on the idea that actors
that cooperate in R&D projects are able to achieve higher innovativeness. Trans-
ferred to a regional level this implies that regions in which actors engage more
frequently and more intensively in cooperative actions will in terms of innovative-
ness outperform other regions in which cooperative behavior is less prominent.
On a firm-level there are numerous studies that show empirically that coop-
erativeness indeed has an effect on firms’ innovation activities (e.g. Oerleman &
Meeus 2000). On the regional level there is however mainly qualitative evidence.
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing a quantitative empirical
analysis of the effects of intra-regional and inter-regional cooperativeness on the
regional innovation performance of the Electric / Electronics industry and the
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German labor market regions.
In addition, the relevance of the effects of regions’ endowment with factor rel-
evant in R&D processes and the effect of the organization of these resources for
regional innovativeness is discussed. From this it is derived that in order to
investigate the effect of cooperativeness, both effects have to be separated, theo-
retically as well as empirically.
In the empirical analysis of this chapter, this is accomplished by using cooper-
ativeness measures that are characterized by the absence of technological effects.
In addition, a specific nonparametric performance analysis is employed for in-
vestigating the effects of intra- and inter-regional cooperativeness on the regions’
innovation performance.
In general, we confirm the findings from firm-level research that cooperative-
ness has an impact on firms’ innovation performance for the case of the Electrics
& electronics industry on the regional level. In particular, we find that below a
turning point this effect shows as a positive influence on innovation performance.
When the turning point is exceeded the impact of higher cooperativeness dimin-
ishes and eventually turns negative. The turning point is characterized by higher
cooperativeness than the level that can be expected given regions’ technological
profiles.
In addition, we find evidence that intra- and interregional cooperativeness are
complements. Moreover, the results show that when regions lack interactions with
other regions, the negative effects of strong intra-regional cooperativeness seem
to depend on the region’s endowment with factors relevant in R&D processes.
Hence, decent factor endowment can, at least to some extent, compensate the
negative effects of regional lock-ins.
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7. Conclusion
This thesis comprises five empirical studies which all share the common goal to
improve our understanding of systemic innovations. While these studies differ
in manifold terms such as firm level vs. systemic level analysis, they uniformly
provide evidence that the regional component plays a decisive role in the field of
economics of innovation.
With this general notion in mind, the thesis initially (chapter 2) intended to shed
more light on the relationship between different types of interaction and the im-
pact of the regional knowledge base on these interactions. While this study is
a case study of three regions, the following four chapter avoid the concentration
on specific regions by dealing with all regional systems embedded in one national
innovation system in order to strengthen the explanatory power of the empirical
results. Thus, the data set of the next chapters was based on German-wide data,
mainly on patent data. The usage of patent data was critically discussed and it
was shown that information gathered from patent data – this is at the readers
discretion – are a sufficient indicator of inventive, cooperative and innovative ac-
tivities.
To what extent can the amount of intra-regional cooper-
ation be explained by the ability to get access to external
knowledge as one incentive to cooperate?
The first self-contained chapter examines the relationship between different
types of regional interaction and how these different types are affected by the
regional knowledge base. According to the resource-based view of the firm, the
incentives to engage in R&D cooperation increase as the regional knowledge base
grows (accumulates etc...) (Lockett 2001). Thus, it was assumed that the amount
of regional interaction is positively related to the amount and homogeneity of the
regional knowledge base. However, these positive relationships can be found solely
for the more formal oriented patent co-applications. As this type of interaction
fits with the suggestions of the resource-based view of the firm, it is further on
used as an indicator of individual as well as regional R&D cooperations.
154
Do technological and geographical patterns play a role in
the choice of the R&D cooperation partner?
When examining the importance of technological and geographical proximity
for the choice of the cooperation partner we found evidence that both dimensions
have a positive and self-contained impact. Although this result is contrary to
the notions of Boschma (2005), it contributes to the conclusion of chapter 1 that
there exist at least two types of innovation systems, technological and regional,
at the same point in time.
Is it possible to disentangle the effects of different dimen-
sions of proximity on cooperative innovation activities?
One main finding of chapter 3 is the co-impact of different dimensions of prox-
imity in the choice of the cooperation partner which implies the co-existing of
different types of innovation systems. Thus, in chapter 4 a methodology is intro-
duced how to disentangle regional and technological effects on cooperative innova-
tion activities. We find an indicator called relative regional impact of cooperative
innovation activities (RRI) by extracting technological effects on cooperative in-
novation activities. This indicator combines the influences of geographical and
social dimension of proximity on the one hand and, on the other hand, it is a
indicator relative to the average regional effects.
Is the strength of the regional innovation system influ-
enced by characteristics of the regional knowledge base?
In chapter 5 this RRI is related to the characteristics of the regional knowledge
base that have been identified as relevant for cooperation behavior in Breschi et al.
(2003). Doing so this chapter is, somehow, a refinement of chapter 2. The number
of cooperations is replaced by the RRI values and the regional knowledge base
is analyzed according to its related variety instead of homogeneity. The latter
assumes that all technologies are independent of each other, whereas the former
explicitly analyzes the relationships among all technologies. The results of 5
contribute to the absorptive capacity concept introduced by Cohen & Levinthal
(1990) by showing that the intensity of the regional interaction structure depends
positively on the related variety of the regional knowledge base.
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Does the strength of the regional innovation system mat-
ter for the efficiency of regional innovative activities?
The results of chapter 6 contribute to the ongoing discussion in recent litera-
ture about the impact of regional resources on the innovative performance. The
presented empirical study on regional level shows that the relative regional effects
on cooperative behavior, indicated by the RRI-value, has a positive impact on
firms’ innovative performance. As the indicator introduced in chapter 4 can be
interpreted as the strength of the regional interaction system, one can conclude
that the regional innovative performance depends on the degree of systemic in-
novations in that region. More precisely, this result gives evidence in favor of the
common assumption of all innovation systems concepts that collaborations in the
field of R&D tend to be more successful than R&D projects in isolation.
After presenting the results of all five papers separately, the next step is to
regard these single results to the broader topic of this thesis, the relevance of
technological and geographical patterns for the innovative performance. From the
author’s viewpoint, the following findings are helpful for a better understanding
of the conditions determining collective and interactive learning:
1. Technological proximity is a prerequisite for collective learning.
Based on the empirical findings, we conclude that economic actors willing
to cooperate are seeking after potential cooperation partner in their tech-
nological neighborhood. Following the resource-based view concept, this
is due to the incentive to cooperate for acquiring external knowledge. As
stated in the introduction, the concept of technological innovation systems
encloses the concept of social proximity by emphasizing individual behav-
ioral differences among sectors and technologies. Thus, the notion about
the importance of technological proximity for the described seeking mech-
anisms accompanies the notion about the importance of social proximity.
This might be due to an eased implication of control mechanisms during
the cooperation process.
2. Geographical proximity facilitates cooperation agreements.
A nearby location in terms of the spatial dimension of proximity increases
the cooperation probability. It can be shown that this is rather a self-
contained influence than only a facilitating tool. This result is, somehow,
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essential for those authors dealing with the regional innovation system ap-
proach. By showing that regional resource apart from technological pattern
influence the cooperative behavior and, thus, the innovative performance of
regions, this thesis gives evidence in favor to the common assumption of the
regional innovation system approach and corroborate its existence.
3. Regional cooperative activities differ.
The regional innovation system approach emphasizes the importance of re-
gional resources on the innovative and cooperative behavior of firms. We
can contribute to this approach by showing that the cooperative behavior
without any technological influences differ among German regions. As all
our empirical studies deal with German-wide data, international effects are
excluded. The residual effects after the extraction of technological effects
on cooperative behavior are interpreted as regional pattern of cooperative
behavior.
Furthermore, it can be shown that these differences in the relative regional
effects on cooperative behavior follow a certain path in their development
and are influenced by the related variety of the regional knowledge base.
Regarding political implications, it can be concluded that a low number
of regional cooperations is not an indicator for problems in those regions.
The low number of cooperations can either be driven by a low number of
innovations in general or solely by the technological pattern. The latter
implies that the RRI value is not necessarily below 1. This is the case in
a region where the actors are mainly engaged in technologies with a gen-
eral tendency of a single development of innovations. Here, the expected
number of cooperations would be low for that region, so that the ratio be-
tween observed and expected number of cooperations does not have to be
below 1. This scenario does not necessarily require political interventions,
whereas a low number of innovations denotes rather problems in innovative
capabilities than in cooperative behavior.
4. Cooperations are not uniformly positive.
The results of chapter 6 refute the purely positive effects of cooperation
on regional innovation performance. The empirical evidence provided here
highlights the ‘dark’ side of cooperation. In particular, it is crucial to
analyze carefully whether actors in a region lack intra- or inter-regional
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cooperation before initiating support for either of them because false incen-
tives for cooperative behavior may induce cooperation overload situations.
However, support for the type of cooperation that is already comparatively
well-developed in a region can entail regional lock-in and lock-out situations
which can yield even lower innovation performance.
This thesis examines the impacts of technological and geographical patterns in
the field of R&D in order to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the im-
portance of innovation systems in general and in particular of regional innovation
systems for the innovative performance of single actors and whole systems. The
applied methodology mainly uses national data dividing Germany into a number
of regions. In the field of RIS this is an uncommon approach as most of the ex-
isting studies use case study designs. The more general perspective used in this
chapter losses to a certain degree information about specifities of regions, but this
methodology enables us to find universally valid results about the mechanisms of
systemic innovations. This is a requirement for the innovation system approach
as this view aspires towards a higher acceptance in the literature of economics.
The methodology applied in this thesis in terms of using a more general per-
spective and disentangling the effects of different types of proximity can be used
for manifold further research projects. So far we only concentrated on more
formal cooperations. It would be very interesting to see whether the provided
results hold true for more informal interactions like scientist’ mobility linkages.
Furthermore, an analysis of the relationship between regional network structure
and the RRI-values might lead to highly interesting results in terms of whether
both are complementary in their explanatory power or more substitutable. We
started with a dynamic perspective of the development of regional interactions.
A more detailed analyzes of the importance of experiences in the past for current
cooperative behavior on individual as well as on regional level is a third possible
project building on the results of this thesis.
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A. Appendix to chapter 2
Table A.1.: Description of 43 NACE oriented technological fields
Fi.No.Description Fi.No.Description
F1 Food, beverages F23 Machine-tools
F2 Tobacco products F24 Special purpose machinery
F3 Textiles F25 Weapons and ammunition
F4 Wearing apparel F26 Domestic appliances
F5 Leather articles F27 Office machinery and computers
F6 Wood products F28 Electric motors, generators, transformers
F7 Paper F29 Electric distribution, control, wire, cable
F8 Petroleum products, nuclear fuel F30 Accumulators, battery
F9 Basic chemical F31 Lightening equipment
F10 Pesticides, agro-chemical products F32 Other electrical equipment
F11 Paints, varnishes F33 Electronic components
F12 Pharmaceutical F34 Signal transmission, telecommunications
F13 Soaps, detergents, toilet preparations F35 Television and radio receivers, audiovisual
electronics
F14 Other chemicals F36 Medical equipment
F15 Man-made fibres F37 Measuring instruments
F16 Rubber and plastics products F38 Industrial process control equipment
F17 Non-metallic mineral products F39 Optical instruments
F18 Basic metals F40 Watches, clocks
F19 Fabricated metal products F41 Motor vehicles
F20 Energy machinery F42 Other transport equipment
F21 Non-specific purpose machinery F43 Furniture, consumer goods
F22 Agricultural and forestry machinery
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B. Appendix to chapter 4
Figure B.1.: RRIs for Germany in 1999
Figure B.2.: RRIs for Germany in 2000
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Figure B.3.: RRIs for Germany in 2001
Figure B.4.: RRIs for Germany in 2002
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C. Appendix to chapter 5
Table C.1.: Relatedness of field numbers (FiNo) for 1999 based on Cosine index
FiNo 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 1 0.046 0.111 0.031 0.016 0.028 0.068 0.08 0.203 0.152 0.057 0.269 0.1 0.093
2 1 0.061 0.033 0.018 0.021 0.064 0.026 0.026 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.017 0.046
3 1 0.161 0.051 0.111 0.213 0.13 0.442 0.169 0.204 0.225 0.215 0.229
4 1 0.104 0.055 0.068 0.043 0.086 0.024 0.058 0.027 0.032 0.078
5 1 0.026 0.023 0.02 0.039 0.014 0.066 0.015 0.011 0.022
6 1 0.088 0.043 0.089 0.021 0.144 0.025 0.022 0.08
7 1 0.088 0.208 0.055 0.129 0.076 0.082 0.133
8 1 0.303 0.095 0.092 0.147 0.086 0.208
9 1 0.331 0.325 0.396 0.289 0.424
10 1 0.18 0.555 0.26 0.132
11 1 0.096 0.091 0.173
12 1 0.278 0.164
13 1 0.126
14 1
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
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Table C.2.: Relatedness of field numbers (FiNo) for 1999 based on Cosine index
FiNo 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1 0.106 0.071 0.042 0.038 0.024 0.019 0.097 0.059 0.046 0.153 0.011 0.079 0.018 0.018 0.009
2 0.034 0.11 0.025 0.034 0.027 0.06 0.054 0.049 0.029 0.158 0.022 0.023 0.016 0.033 0.018
3 0.377 0.141 0.257 0.092 0.059 0.034 0.108 0.079 0.071 0.277 0.032 0.055 0.028 0.027 0.015
4 0.085 0.1 0.105 0.056 0.173 0.029 0.06 0.036 0.047 0.137 0.051 0.049 0.027 0.029 0.021
5 0.033 0.097 0.043 0.034 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.036 0.014 0.04 0.009 0.024 0.014 0.009 0.01
6 0.073 0.11 0.342 0.088 0.157 0.055 0.139 0.042 0.157 0.11 0.024 0.054 0.019 0.026 0.017
7 0.14 0.118 0.144 0.066 0.08 0.031 0.082 0.043 0.067 0.287 0.025 0.041 0.158 0.03 0.021
8 0.158 0.076 0.068 0.065 0.069 0.046 0.156 0.062 0.057 0.136 0.101 0.047 0.125 0.058 0.046
9 0.555 0.175 0.209 0.117 0.071 0.034 0.226 0.099 0.051 0.193 0.025 0.063 0.052 0.024 0.017
10 0.153 0.036 0.052 0.023 0.018 0.005 0.053 0.057 0.012 0.043 0.005 0.018 0.012 0.004 0.002
11 0.194 0.049 0.206 0.045 0.053 0.01 0.054 0.113 0.023 0.089 0.015 0.021 0.015 0.008 0.004
12 0.163 0.039 0.05 0.028 0.016 0.008 0.062 0.046 0.015 0.059 0.013 0.021 0.027 0.008 0.006
13 0.159 0.039 0.047 0.034 0.019 0.012 0.051 0.034 0.02 0.128 0.008 0.034 0.012 0.009 0.003
14 0.236 0.109 0.163 0.094 0.084 0.035 0.131 0.05 0.061 0.183 0.161 0.038 0.04 0.028 0.025
15 1 0.121 0.193 0.074 0.044 0.04 0.122 0.072 0.049 0.225 0.018 0.05 0.03 0.021 0.01
16 1 0.172 0.17 0.136 0.094 0.136 0.055 0.095 0.201 0.037 0.121 0.061 0.051 0.135
17 1 0.194 0.219 0.046 0.147 0.077 0.11 0.154 0.049 0.088 0.036 0.035 0.03
18 1 0.15 0.068 0.172 0.057 0.144 0.194 0.04 0.072 0.037 0.057 0.086
19 1 0.138 0.128 0.058 0.21 0.106 0.056 0.114 0.063 0.111 0.081
20 1 0.112 0.068 0.134 0.101 0.05 0.082 0.041 0.239 0.059
21 1 0.092 0.135 0.217 0.043 0.183 0.049 0.082 0.035
22 1 0.06 0.125 0.022 0.043 0.029 0.04 0.019
23 1 0.184 0.033 0.05 0.044 0.063 0.047
24 1 0.054 0.079 0.075 0.09 0.031
25 1 0.022 0.057 0.039 0.028
26 1 0.063 0.069 0.079
27 1 0.091 0.093
28 1 0.123
29 1
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
Table C.3.: Relatedness of field numbers (FiNo) for 1999 based on Cosine index
FiNo 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
1 0.029 0.014 0.014 0.026 0.008 0.008 0.07 0.052 0.023 0.026 0.008 0.022 0.014 0.023
2 0.01 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.012 0.008 0.036 0.029 0.032 0.021 0.009 0.113 0.03 0.04
3 0.07 0.028 0.032 0.049 0.021 0.012 0.065 0.046 0.029 0.047 0.008 0.039 0.029 0.04
4 0.022 0.037 0.033 0.028 0.033 0.022 0.135 0.031 0.037 0.068 0.031 0.05 0.075 0.265
5 0.007 0.017 0.011 0.01 0.009 0.011 0.131 0.018 0.043 0.022 0.021 0.01 0.014 0.226
6 0.025 0.034 0.028 0.031 0.015 0.008 0.04 0.047 0.033 0.034 0.011 0.043 0.035 0.06
7 0.054 0.034 0.045 0.054 0.061 0.052 0.04 0.061 0.051 0.112 0.051 0.03 0.023 0.058
8 0.076 0.053 0.183 0.091 0.1 0.068 0.112 0.314 0.138 0.089 0.063 0.112 0.049 0.039
9 0.163 0.037 0.041 0.084 0.026 0.017 0.107 0.082 0.04 0.08 0.012 0.047 0.032 0.033
10 0.04 0.009 0.009 0.018 0.004 0.005 0.092 0.045 0.009 0.022 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.012
11 0.053 0.017 0.012 0.027 0.006 0.006 0.077 0.02 0.009 0.029 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.067
12 0.048 0.012 0.022 0.032 0.011 0.014 0.137 0.141 0.029 0.041 0.013 0.014 0.009 0.013
13 0.039 0.009 0.008 0.025 0.005 0.004 0.049 0.025 0.01 0.023 0.002 0.013 0.008 0.01
14 0.078 0.042 0.034 0.112 0.038 0.038 0.078 0.066 0.041 0.104 0.015 0.056 0.039 0.028
15 0.087 0.023 0.034 0.047 0.012 0.009 0.067 0.035 0.021 0.048 0.006 0.028 0.021 0.049
16 0.047 0.076 0.066 0.056 0.065 0.027 0.094 0.085 0.085 0.104 0.031 0.13 0.08 0.1
17 0.061 0.063 0.049 0.088 0.035 0.017 0.053 0.047 0.036 0.071 0.015 0.051 0.056 0.056
18 0.039 0.059 0.058 0.107 0.05 0.025 0.052 0.068 0.054 0.08 0.019 0.073 0.069 0.049
19 0.046 0.091 0.102 0.065 0.068 0.031 0.064 0.072 0.106 0.079 0.049 0.193 0.118 0.133
20 0.024 0.077 0.081 0.077 0.048 0.023 0.056 0.102 0.111 0.054 0.026 0.422 0.169 0.067
21 0.05 0.053 0.069 0.071 0.041 0.02 0.094 0.11 0.091 0.051 0.021 0.182 0.114 0.062
22 0.022 0.031 0.04 0.028 0.02 0.013 0.045 0.064 0.048 0.032 0.021 0.125 0.04 0.031
23 0.024 0.033 0.047 0.077 0.059 0.026 0.061 0.092 0.103 0.076 0.028 0.106 0.05 0.035
24 0.053 0.029 0.046 0.14 0.039 0.035 0.098 0.112 0.079 0.085 0.017 0.072 0.057 0.06
25 0.021 0.044 0.08 0.039 0.053 0.041 0.029 0.132 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.133 0.056 0.045
26 0.02 0.132 0.087 0.06 0.063 0.026 0.059 0.081 0.113 0.053 0.065 0.113 0.051 0.12
27 0.049 0.053 0.232 0.136 0.375 0.328 0.103 0.19 0.276 0.209 0.262 0.108 0.05 0.078
28 0.032 0.079 0.219 0.14 0.125 0.066 0.049 0.115 0.154 0.052 0.05 0.247 0.099 0.045
29 0.044 0.132 0.128 0.121 0.264 0.08 0.027 0.098 0.121 0.063 0.091 0.13 0.039 0.035
30 1 0.034 0.069 0.051 0.123 0.05 0.031 0.11 0.066 0.042 0.037 0.057 0.03 0.013
31 1 0.189 0.096 0.08 0.056 0.073 0.095 0.088 0.212 0.046 0.197 0.074 0.074
32 1 0.135 0.275 0.196 0.08 0.277 0.277 0.115 0.154 0.237 0.106 0.048
33 1 0.201 0.103 0.074 0.187 0.157 0.111 0.064 0.095 0.042 0.027
34 1 0.429 0.06 0.184 0.35 0.151 0.273 0.123 0.046 0.047
35 1 0.118 0.154 0.177 0.207 0.16 0.067 0.029 0.036
36 1 0.232 0.105 0.156 0.085 0.054 0.045 0.127
37 1 0.363 0.192 0.149 0.244 0.094 0.046
38 1 0.123 0.169 0.279 0.09 0.052
39 1 0.105 0.094 0.054 0.065
40 1 0.081 0.028 0.091
41 1 0.232 0.091
42 1 0.067
43 1
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D. Appendix to chapter 6
D.1. Smoothing & Bandwidths
With respect to the employed nonparametric regression technique that helps to
interpret the scatter-plots, we follow Daraio & Simar (2007) in using a simple
Nadaraya-Watson (Nadaraya 1964, Watson 1964) estimator with a Gaussian ker-
nel. A crucial aspect in nonparametric regression is the choice of the degree of
smoothing, i.e. the choice of the appropriate bandwidths (see, e.g., Bowman &
Azzalini 1997). In the context of the employed analysis Daraio & Simar (2007)
suggest to use a least-squares cross-validation (CV) automatic procedure.
However, it seems that that the CV-obtained bandwidth is in this context too
small, hence it seems that this method ‘undersmoothes’ the relationship. There-
fore, the bandwidths are chosen using the Improved Akaike Information Criterion
(AICC) developed by Hurvich et al. (1998).
D.2. Tables & Figures
Distance < 50km 50 < 200km Share 1999 Share 2000
GRAD ENG (university) 48.8% 29.8% 41.6% 40.7%
GRAD ENG (tc) 42.3% 35.5% 58.4% 59.3%
GRAD NAT (university) 61.2% 14.9.9% 89.7% 89.8%
GRAD NAT* (tc) 45.4% 36.0% 10.3% 10.2%
* No data available, the shares of all technical graduates taken together are used.
# Data based on Legler et al. (2001) but adjusted for inner Germany mobility
Table D.1.: Graduates Mobility
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Empirical values Estimation
Spill-over source < 50km 200km <# < 50km 200km < α
GRAD ENG 45,1% 33,1% 44.70% 34.35% 1.4851
GRAD NAT 60.0% 17.0% 56.34% 29.29% 1.6358
SCIENCE # 36.0% 34.0% 34.82% 37.36 % 1.3197
Estimation based on sum of 1999 and 2000 data.
# Numbers are approximated from data in Beise & Stahl (1999).
Table D.2.: Range of spill-overs of R&D institutes, hyperbolic distribution
Technological fields * NACE industries**
TF27, TF28, TF29, TF30, TF31 DL31, DL32, DL30
* As defined in Greif & Schmiedl (2002)
** According to the GIC DESTATIS (2002)
Table D.3.: Definition of the Electrics & Electronics industry according to Broekel
(2007)
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Figure D.1.: Histograms of CoopIntra
165
Variable Description
PAT Sum of patent applications of
TF27, TF28, TF29 ,TF30, TF31 in Greif & Schmiedl (2002),
Greif et al. (2006)
DL 31 R&D employees of DL31
DL 32 30 Sum of R&D employees of industries DL32, DL30
POP DEN Inhabitants per kilometer2 land area
GDP Gross domestic product per inhabitant
SERVICE Production structure specialization index of
WZ03’ category 74: ’other business activities’ (business ser-
vices) industry
EMP HIGH Share of employees with high qualification
ELEC PS Production structure specialization index (PS) of RD ELEC)
EMPL ELEC Absolute regional employment of ELEC
GRAD ENG Distributed engineering graduates per employee
GRAD NAT Distributed natural and science graduates per employee
SCIENCE Distributed researchers at public research institutions per em-
ployee
All shares refer to total employment
Table D.4.: Variables, estimation base, and sources
Variable Firm-level orientation Regional orientation
Innovativeness measures
PATt × ×
Input factors
DL32 30t−1 × ×
DL31t−1 × ×
SIZEt−1 ×
EMPL ELECt−1 −
EMP HIGHt−1 ×
GDPt−1 ×
ELEC PSt−1 −
POP DENt−1 −
SERV ICEt−1 ×
GRAD ENGt−1 ×
GRAD NATt−1 −
SCIENCEt−1 −
× Indicates inclusion, − exclusion because of correlation.
Table D.5.: Variables and their employment
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DL32 DL31 EMPL ELECELEC POP DistriNAT DistriENG
DL30 PS DEN
DL32 DL30 1∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ −0.05∗ −0.12∗∗∗
DL31 0.48∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ −0.1∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
EMPL ELEC 0.75∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.2∗∗∗
ELEC PS 0.62∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01
POP DEN 0.5∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗
DistriNAT −0.05∗ −0.1∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.21∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗
DistriENG −0.12∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.2∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.32∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
DistriScience −0.17∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.4∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
GDP 0.45∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
EMP High 0.38∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
Service 0.11∗∗∗ 0.02 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02 0.29∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
Firm size 0.53∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.05∗
CoopIntrat−1 0.22∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.02
CoopIntert−1 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.17∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.06∗∗
Table D.6.: Pearson’s correlation coefficients I
DistriScience GDP EMP High Service SIZE Coop Coop
Intrat−1 Intert−1
DL32 DL30 −0.17∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
DL31 −0.22∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.02 0.65∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗
EMPL ELEC −0.29∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗
ELEC PS −0.06∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 0.85∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.05∗
POP DEN −0.4∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
DistriNAT 0.75∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.02 0.06∗∗ −0.02
DistriENG 0.81∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.05∗ 0.02 −0.06∗∗
DistriScience 1∗∗∗ −0.2∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.09∗∗∗
GDP −0.2∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
EMP High −0.34∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
Service −0.12∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.03
Firm size −0.13∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.02
CoopIntrat−1 −0.03 0.2∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
CoopIntert−1 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.03 0.02 0.08∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
Table D.7.: Pearson’s correlation coefficients II
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Figure D.2.: Histograms of CoopInter
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